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Traditionally, the assumption has been that academic misconduct emerges 
primarily in response to “publish or perish” pressures. Robert Slutsky, a 
UC San Diego cardiologist famously caught in 1986 reporting imagi-
nary experiments, was, at one point, putting out one article every ten 
days (Lock and Wells, 2001). “Publish or perish,” however, is no longer 
the sole incentive for misconduct. New practices are emerging that are 
not limited to the production of fraudulent publications but are aimed 
instead at enhancing, often in unethical or fraudulent ways, the evalua-
tion of their importance or “impact” (Biagioli, 2016). “Publish or perish” 
is merging with “impact or perish.”1
This is related to but different from the predictable gaming of aca-
demic performance indicators one would expect from Goodhart’s law: 
as soon as an indicator becomes a target, gaming ensues, which fore-
closes its ability to function as a good indicator.2 That may take the form, 
for instance, of massaging the definition of what counts as a “success-
ful student” in metrics about schools’ performance, or of what counts 
as a “peer- reviewed” paper in faculty evaluation protocols. It could also 
involve aligning one’s practices to metrics- relevant parameters, like cap-
ping classes’ enrollment to nineteen students to have them fit the US 
News and World Report’s definition of “small class,” which is rewarded 
in its ranking of universities. But we now find authors and editors who 
move beyond this kind of gaming to create (rather than tweak) metric- 
enhancing evidence, such as citations to one’s work or to the work pub-
lished in a given journal so as to boost its impact factor. We argue that 
the growing reliance on institutional metrics of evaluation does not just 
provide incentives for these kinds of manipulations, but also creates their 
conditions of possibility. They would not have come into being were it 
not for the new metrics- based “audit culture” of academia (Power, 1997; 
Strathern, 2000; Burrows, 2012).
Introduction: Metrics and the New Ecologies 
of Academic Misconduct
Mario Biagioli and Alexandra Lippman
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Beyond Truth and Falsehood: Innovation in Manipulation
As shown by the US federal definition, misconduct is construed in epis-
temic terms: fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism.3 Accordingly, mis-
conduct is equated to producing false statements like making up data, 
fudging data, and faking authorship— false statements within a publica-
tion. Traditional fraud and misconduct continue to exist, and these defini-
tions may be suitable to describe them. What they fail to grasp, however, 
are the new forms of manipulation that do not affect the epistemic status 
of a publication but take place around and outside the claims them-
selves like, for example, submitting fake peer reviews (often to publish 
in a higher impact factor journal than the article would have probably 
deserved), hacking journal databases (to manipulate the acceptance of one’s 
article or to insert one’s name in the authors’ byline of an article already 
in press), setting up citation rings among authors (to maximize their per-
sonal citation counts) or among editors (to maximize their journals’ impact 
factors), and so on. These may be called “post- production” manipulations 
in the sense that they concern the publication process and the impact of the 
claims, rather than a manipulation of the content of the publication. And 
while post- production manipulation may overlap with traditional miscon-
duct, it does not need to. One can have a legitimate paper published in a 
journal with a good impact factor thanks to fake peer reviews.
We do not propose to simply expand old definitions of academic fraud 
to make room for post- production manipulations. Nor do we suggest 
that they are a lesser evil than traditional misconduct, or that they should 
be labelled as “questionable practices” rather than misconduct because 
they do not necessarily affect the core of a publication— its evidence and 
claims. The line between misconduct and questionable practice is notori-
ously hard to draw (Steneck, 2004; Biagioli, Kenney, Martin, and Walsh, 
2019), and, more importantly, we cannot be positive that the different 
definitions of fraud and misconduct adopted by different countries, agen-
cies, and academic institutions are accurate or fully commensurable with 
each other. This is not meant as a criticism but as an acknowledgment 
that the thinking, definitions, and policies about misconduct have been 
and continue to be the work in progress of hundreds of concerned prac-
titioners in universities, governmental institutions, funding agencies, and 
journals (Jacob, 2014).
Our goal is neither to question nor to uphold existing views about 
traditional misconduct, but to call attention to and provide a first analy-
sis of a recent dramatic development: the emergence of a range of new 
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ways of manipulating the publication process— manipulations that are 
qualitatively different from traditional academic misconduct. Many of 
the practices described in this book are obviously unethical and arguably 
illegal. For instance, independently of the nature of the specific manipu-
lation involved in a given case, the goal of most of these practices is to 
produce an artificially enhanced curriculum vitae, which gives its holder 
a leg up against fair- playing competitors in gaining positions and funding 
that they might not have otherwise obtained. This would seem to match 
the legal definition of fraud, without having to mobilize more specialized 
definitions of academic or scientific misconduct. Our primary interest as 
scholars, however, is to understand the features of these new forms of 
manipulation, why they are emerging now, what motivates or incentivizes 
them, and what are the new forensic techniques and actors that are being 
mobilized to detect them. Ultimately, these questions are key to determin-
ing whether we are confronting new instances of old misconduct— old 
wine in new bottles— or something altogether different. In old Kuhnian 
parlance, the fact that several of these practices seem irreducible to the 
current misconduct taxa (fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism) does 
not tell us whether they are merely apparent anomalies that can be even-
tually massaged into our current “misconduct paradigm,” or whether, 
instead, we might end up having to rethink it altogether. We believe that 
the latter outcome is the more probable one, and hope that our book will 
contribute to that rethinking by providing a comprehensive map of the 
problem and its contours. As our many chapters show, the emergence of 
this new species of misconduct (or whatever more appropriate term we 
might develop down the line) should be seen simultaneously as a problem 
and a symptom of a more general shift in the academic publication sys-
tem, down to the very meaning of publication, and thus of misconduct.
To put it somewhat crudely, what we discuss here are less “epistemic 
crimes” than “bureaucratic crimes”— practices involving the produc-
tion of publications that manipulate the publishing system itself or, more 
specifically, what that system has recently evolved into. What is clear is 
that these manipulations amount to post- production activities and that, 
despite their many different forms, they are framed by metrics of evalu-
ation variously based on citations and impact rather than by concerns 
with plain productivity (as it was in the “publish or perish” age). Conflat-
ing epistemic and bureaucratic manipulations would risk foreclosing an 
understanding of the conditions behind the emergence of these new prac-
tices and what that may tell us about what “publication” is becoming in 
the age of metrics in an increasingly global context.
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Redefining Publication and Evaluation
In the seventeenth century, “publication” meant making things public by 
a variety of means, ranging from lectures (to students or fellow academi-
cians) to letters, personal conversations with reputable people, and printed 
publications. That changed in the nineteenth century when, at least in 
science, the definition of publication was narrowed down to printed arti-
cles in academic journals (Csiszar, 2018). But if the definition of acceptable 
modalities and technologies of publication changed in time, the assump-
tion remained that the evaluation of the claims made public was to be done 
by those who listened to or read them. It was a judgment made by humans, 
which could be contested by challenging either the protocols employed 
in the judgment, or the qualifications of the people making them. Today, 
instead, publication is no longer necessarily evaluated through reading by 
people but, in some contexts, through markers connected to the publica-
tion (though external to it), such as the impact factor of the journal where 
it is published or the number (or, in some cases, the weight) of the citations 
it receives (West et al., 2010; Biagioli, 2018) or article metrics on platforms 
like Academia . edu and ResearchGate (Lippman and Kelty 2019).
The meaning of “publication” has substantially changed, not just 
because its evaluation has almost ceased to require human agency, but 
also due to the fact that publication is no longer limited to the process 
of making claims public. Publication used to be separate from evalua-
tion (which was clearly thought of and practiced as a post- publication 
activity), but the two may now be folded together. When it relies on the 
journal’s impact factor, evaluation no longer follows publication but 
takes place together with the act of publication. It involves locating the 
venue of the publication and attaching that location’s index— the impact 
factor— to the publication. A publication is born evaluated, so to speak.
The meaning of evaluation has changed as much as that of publica-
tion. It is not just that, as we often hear, nobody reads but people only 
count. Something more radical has happened: the traditional locus of 
evaluation— the publication’s claims— has become technically irrelevant 
to metrics regimes based on impact factors. It is not that people ought to 
read but have lazily stopped doing that. People still read for research and 
educational purposes, but reading is no longer a necessary component 
of institutional forms of evaluation because some of those metrics are 
independent of the epistemic dimensions of that specific publication— its 
claims— but rely, instead, on metadata and similar markers that can be 
picked out and processed by nonhumans.
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From Content to Metadata
These changes in what “publication” and “evaluation” mean are not 
immediately evident from the external appearance of an actual publica-
tion. Whether you look at it in print or online, a journal article still looks 
very much like it did in the 1980s. What has changed is the role of its 
metadata, which has gone from descriptive to evaluative. The title of the 
journal where the article is published no longer simply describes where 
that article became public (or where it can be found on a library’s shelf), 
but, through the impact factor, it conveys a numerical estimation of its 
reception and effect. Conversely, an article published in a journal whose 
title appears on a list of online open- access “predatory journals” (dis-
cussed below) may be simply dismissed as having no value whatsoever 
by a committee reviewing a researcher for hiring or promotion. It could 
be effectively treated as a nonpublication despite the fact that it looks 
exactly like an article published in a journal that looks exactly like a 
journal. It is the shift of the focus of evaluation from the claims (internal 
to the publication) to the circumstances of the publication (external to it) 
that anchors all the changes discussed above: the end of reading (replaced 
by the scraping of metadata); the switch from qualitative human judg-
ment to quantitative calculated indexes; and the merging of publication 
and evaluation.
It is worth noticing that, taken as an institutional genre, these new 
modalities of evaluation are an expansion of the form of library cata-
loguing. Like cataloguing, they do not involve the reading of a publica-
tion’s content but rather the processing of a publication’s metadata. We 
might say that impact- oriented evaluation becomes part of an “expanded 
indexing,” one that does not simply generate a call number but pro-
cesses aggregate publication metadata to generate figures about the pur-
ported value of the publication as an input in a variety of institutional 
decisions— faculty hiring and promotion; whether the library should or 
should not subscribe to that journal (or to the catalogue of a given pub-
lisher); whether grants to defray open- access publication costs should be 
given to faculty who want to publish in those journals; and so on. If in the 
past the evaluation of a publication was almost exclusively undertaken 
to either assess the quality of its claims or the scholarly quality of its 
author, the new forms of evaluation based on indexes (rather than con-
tent) are aimed at informing a variety of institutional decisions, down to 
the national or even global ranking of the institutions themselves.
6  Mario Biagioli and Alexandra Lippman
Are Journals Becoming Mints?
Also striking is what has become of the notion of impact. In common 
usage, impact refers to an effect, that is, to something that has happened 
already (like, say, the citations that an article has received since its pub-
lication). The increasingly coveted Journal Impact Factor (JIF), however, 
functions as an estimation of impact before it happens, as a device to give 
a valuation right now to a publication that can in fact accrue value (that 
is, impact) only in the future. This is different from saying that the value 
of things is bound to fluctuate in time. A house has value both when it 
is first built and then years after that, but, by definition, the impact of a 
publication is zero when the publication comes off the press. This means 
that a publication’s impact cannot be measured by the impact factor 
because there is literally nothing to measure at the time of the publica-
tion. All the JIF can produce is purely a prediction of impact, and one that 
is not based on the features of that specific publication but on those of 
previous articles published in that journal over a certain period of time.
Like actuarial or death tables, the impact factor is based on evidence 
about the past. And in the same way that actuarial tables are used to 
estimate the likely length of one’s future life to calculate today’s insur-
ance premium, the impact factor is deemed to provide an estimation of 
the amount of citations the article will have received in the future based 
on the fact that it was published in that journal, thus “pricing” the article 
(and thus its authors) right now rather than after it would have had actual 
impact. It is a rather crude tool to price futures. We are not speaking 
metaphorically: In China, universities hand substantial cash bonuses to 
their faculty for their publications, indexing them to the journals’ impact 
factor. Nature and Science articles fetch over $30,000 a piece.4 Similar 
schemes can be found on the other side of the Equator:
Melbourne Business School pays $A15,000 cash for every paper published in 
the Top 40 list compiled by the Financial Times. The scheme at Queensland 
University Business School is more complicated. Payments, made to the depart-
mental accounts of authors, are approximately: Tier 1 journal— $A12,000; 
Tier 2 journal— $A7500; Tier 3 journal— $A5500; Tier 4 journal— $A2000; 
Professional journals— $A1000. (Macdonald and Kam, 2007)
There is nothing wrong in using reasonable estimates about future 
states of affairs, except that the impact factor is not used as an estimate, 
but has been reified into a positive measure of impact and, more broadly, 
of value. Furthermore, while the impact factor refers specifically to the 
journal (not the articles), the JIF has come to signify the impact or value 
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of each article published by that journal. It functions, literally, like money. 
It is the “face value” impressed on a coin or banknote, which determines 
its value no matter what the coin is made of (copper, silver, gold, steel), or 
what the exchange value that coin would have as metal. The “content” of 
the coin is just the medium for the stamp, which needs to be impressed on 
some material. What carries value is not the inside but the outside— the 
number inscribed on the surface. Whether the article is a piece of gold or 
lead (or worse), the JIF has come to determine the face value of that article. 
(We could probably think of journals as mints printing or coining money 
with a face value equivalent to their impact factor.5) I do not even need to 
know what the JIF is, how it is calculated, or how reliable it is because my 
institution— and probably all institutions I will ever work for— will honor 
that face value. An article in Science or Nature is literally money in the 
bank, independently from the actual impact it will ever have.6
Attaching an impact factor to an article at the time of publication (and 
thus before real impact has accrued) shows that the JIF has literally noth-
ing to do with the evaluation of that specific article, but simply prices it 
in a currency that allows for exchange. As an author, I can “trade” articles 
with certain impact factors into a job, and the institution that employs 
me can then “trade” those publications (together with hundreds or thou-
sand more by other faculty of the same university) into a better national 
or global ranking, which may be subsequently traded into more students, 
donors, contracts, and so on. (Conversely, these days in China, one can 
purchase authorship in a prewritten and preaccepted article to be pub-
lished in an English language journal, at prices that vary according to the 
impact factor of the specific journal.7) The impact factor (which we are 
using as an exemplar of metrics) is thus literally neither about the evalua-
tion of a specific article nor about making evaluation fair and transparent 
by removing it from the arbitrariness of qualitative judgments: It is about 
creating the conditions of possibility for a market.
No matter how accurate available actuarial tables may be, one can 
hardly develop a life insurance industry without them. And even if they 
are statistically good, they are still very unlikely to accurately predict 
the exact date of death of Ted the baker around the corner (in the same 
way that even the best of impact factors is not going to correctly predict 
the impact of any specific article). But that’s not the point. It does not 
matter that, at best, the impact factor can only capture some features 
of a population of articles published in a given journal. The role of the 
JIF is spreading (despite some spirited opposition)8 because it produces 
prices and a currency in which those priced goods can be exchanged and 
8  Mario Biagioli and Alexandra Lippman
circulated between authors, universities, libraries, and publishers. And, 
crucially, these prices can be determined at the time of publication, with-
out having to wait to count the citations it will accrue in time. The jour-
nal impact factor shaves off the several years it would have taken for that 
article to grow its value, thus enabling more scholars— especially junior 
ones— to enter the market with something that looks like “hard value” 
rather than what they mostly have, that is, possible value in the future.
Emergent Objects, Emergent Manipulations
This shows, yet again, that post- production manipulations like those 
aimed at impact factors are qualitatively distinct from traditional miscon-
duct, making it difficult to define what kind of misconduct they are, and 
whether misconduct is indeed the right term. They are not about manip-
ulating knowledge claims but their institutional valuation. This means 
that, unlike traditional misconduct that has been boiled down to three 
practices— falsification, fabrication, and plagiarism— post- production 
manipulations can take up as many forms as there are metrics techniques 
and markets, which are constantly changing. The dramatic innovations in 
post- production manipulations that have emerged over the last few years 
support this view, while also suggesting that post- production manipula-
tion may not be an object stable enough to be definable. New metrics and 
indicators are being constantly introduced or modified often in response 
to the perceived need to adjust or improve their accuracy and fairness. 
They carry the seed of their never- ending tuning and hacking, as each 
new metric or new tuning of an old one can be subsequently manipu-
lated in different ways. Also, new “markets” and uses keep developing 
for existing metrics, which means that new categories of actors can get in 
the game, manipulating the metrics in different directions in response to 
specific goals. Metrics of student performance evaluation may become, 
for instance, tools to evaluate the performance of teachers, or of an entire 
school district. Closer to home, we know (as Csiszar’s chapter shows) 
that scientometrics emerged as a tool for mapping scientists’ works and 
networks, but was then turned into a tool for evaluating them. Similarly, 
the JIF was meant to evaluate journals, but has become the premier tool 
to assess the value of articles. The techniques and indicators may remain 
the same, but the changing significance of the outcome can be enough to 
create a market for new manipulations.
In sum, we do not yet have a new concept that can capture all the vari-
ous manifestations of post- production misconduct, and it is not likely that 
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we will develop one anytime soon. All we know is that all these forms 
share the same telos: the manipulation of the metrics of academic evalu-
ation. The means take many different forms, but the ends stay the same.
Ways of Gaming
Unlike traditional scientific fraud, post- production manipulation is no 
longer the purview of individuals but rather involves groups, networks, or 
entire institutions. Journal editors conspire to increase their publication’s 
JIF through co- citation agreements among journals, authors organize 
themselves into fake peer- review rings, and editorial service providers not 
only help scientists write their articles in good English, but also, for an 
extra fee, help to line up friendly peer reviews. Up the institutional ladder, 
universities select or massage their data to score well on global university 
rankings (whose importance is growing with the increasing global scale 
of the higher education market).
Post- production manipulation has not only become a more collabora-
tive effort, but it has also moved beyond the sites of traditional fraud like 
universities, corporate laboratories, and federal research institutions. It 
has spread from places where research originates to places where it goes 
to, like journals (especially those which librarian Jeffrey Beall and others 
termed “predatory journals”9) and “fake” conferences in vacation desti-
nations that may use impressive- looking but possibly fake advisory com-
mittees while promising to publish the papers’ abstracts (likely accepted 
without review) in journals that would probably fall in the “predatory” 
category (Brooks, 2009). You went on vacation (possibly paid for by 
your grant or research funds) and came back to find your vitae enriched 
by one additional conference talk and a publication.
Traditionally, journals have been cast in the role of gatekeepers, cred-
ited with the ability to sort good science from bad through peer review. 
Today, however, we see so- called “predatory journals” actively contribut-
ing to the post- production manipulation trend. While criticized mostly 
for their virtual freedom from the constraints of peer review, for their 
pay- to- play business model, and for their tendency to have fictional edi-
torial boards (Morgenstern, this volume, chapter 15), we find the emer-
gence of this breed of journals particularly interesting as a window on the 
logic of the new metrics- based regime of science publications. While light- 
years away from high impact journals like Science, Nature, or Cell, these 
“predatory journals” may be simply the other side, or perhaps the bottom, 
of the same metrics economy. Their impact factor is often insignificant 
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(or possibly made up), and yet they seem to provide a crucial service— 
possibly even a lifeline— to authors who are struggling to meet the quan-
titative publication benchmarks set by their institutions, or their strict 
deadlines.
These authors’ institutions may be neither high ranking nor particu-
larly ambitious, but they can hardly ignore the ranking game, which has 
become global and played at all levels of the “excellence” spectrum. As a 
result, these universities may still demand their faculty to publish a cer-
tain number of publications in nonlocal journals, that is, “international” 
English- language venues (de Rijcke and Stöckelová, this volume, chapter 
7). The content of the article may not be crucial if the author can at least 
appear to be productive and able to publish in English— a fact that his/
her department chair and dean can turn into a figure they can use as 
they pitch the steps— however modest they may be— that they are taking 
toward leading their institutions on the long path to excellence.
What these journals produce, therefore, are not publications but publi-
cation effects or publication tokens. More objects than texts, these publi-
cations (if publication is indeed the proper term here) are not meant to be 
read, but are rather generated for the sole purpose of allowing the authors 
to add an entry to their curriculum vitae, or for their deans to tally and 
include them in their annual reports to the higher administration or 
to prospective donors.10 These publications and journals may be virtually 
impact free, but they are not outside of the metrics- based economy of 
impact. They are simply at the bottom of that economy and, no matter 
the scorn they receive, no economy can function without a bottom.
The rise of “impact or perish” has also been accompanied by a marked 
increase in journal self- citation. In some cases, editors pursue this by ask-
ing prospective authors (especially junior ones) to cite other articles from 
the journal they have submitted their articles to (Wilhite and Fong, 2012). 
Clarivate Analytics (formerly Thomson Reuters) tracks self- citation and 
bans journals whose self- citation is deemed excessive. For instance, after 
the Journal of Biomolecular Structural Dynamics’s impact factor spiked 
from 1.1 to 5.0 in just one year between 2009 and 2010 (Van Noorden, 
2012), Thomson Reuters asked the journal to explain its success. JBSD’s 
editor- in- chief attributed the journal’s sharp rise in impact factor to their 
publication of a controversial paper, which generated many responses, 
and to a new policy encouraging authors to explain their work’s connec-
tion to other articles previously published in the journal (Van Noorde, 
2012). Unconvinced, Thomson Reuters excluded the journal from its 
Journal Citation Reports (the annually updated list of the impact factors 
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of the journals tracked in the Web of Science database), effectively deny-
ing them a ranking. But while such bans are becoming increasing com-
mon (rising from nine in 2007 to thirty- eight in 2013), some believe they 
should be imposed more frequently given that even Thomson Reuters’s 
“own statistics indicate that 140 journals have had self- citations making 
up more than seventy percent of total citations in the past two years” 
(Van Noorden, 2012).
If self- citation is easy to track, citation cartels between journals are sig-
nificantly more difficult “to detect since they represent coordinated efforts 
among several journals to collectively self- cite.”11 Perhaps emboldened by 
this gap in the available technologies of detection, in 2009, the editors of 
eight Brazilian science journals decided to boost their impact by agreeing 
to publish “articles containing hundreds of references to papers in each 
others’ journals” (Van Noorden, 2013). The scheme worked well for a 
few years, until 2013, when Thomson Reuters developed an algorithm 
to detect citation rings by spotting “concentrated bursts of citations from 
one journal to another.”12 This led them to suspend fourteen journals 
from the Journal Citation Reports, including four members of the Brazil-
ian citation ring.13 One of the editors explained that:
The citation ring grew out of frustration with his country’s fixation on impact 
factor. In Brazil, an agency in the education ministry, called CAPES, evaluates 
graduate programs in part by the impact factors of the journals in which stu-
dents publish research. As emerging Brazilian journals are in the lowest ranks, 
few graduates want to publish in them. This vicious cycle, in his view, prevents 
local journals from improving. (Van Noorden, 2013)
Another member of the ring— the editor of the Jornal Brasileiro de 
Pneumologia— emphasized a link between the impact factor and the 
global politics of publication: the scheme to boost the journals’ impact 
factor was not only self- serving but “also to show off articles in Brazilian 
journals, attracting better contributions and raising quality all round” 
(Van Noorden, 2013). Whether self- serving or patriotic, the scheme was 
surely incentivized and made possible by the increasing global “hege-
mony” of the impact factor (Barbour and Stell, this volume, chapter 11).
Some scholars who wish to bypass the constraint of having to either 
write papers or plagiarize them from other scholars opt to use SCIgen— an 
article- generating software. This is rather ironic, or worse, given that the 
developers of SCIgen— three graduate students at MIT— created this 
software as a way to expose, rather than contribute to, unethical evalu-
ation and publication practices. Tired with the invitations to spurious 
conferences and journals that clogged their inboxes, they created SCIgen 
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to generate nonsensical (but legitimate- looking) submissions, which they 
then fed to “fake” conferences like the capaciously titled “World Multi-
conference on Systemics, Cybernetics, and Informatics.” Their goal was 
to expose the fact that such conferences accepted any paper that came 
their way, without review, provided the presenter was willing to pay the 
registration fee. But, in a move that ran diametrically counter to their 
critical and humorous intent, the software was quickly co- opted by sci-
entists who started to use it for real, effortlessly cranking out papers that 
they then humorlessly submitted to conferences— conferences that, as the 
SCIgen team had suspected, did accept and subsequently publish them 
(Antkare, this volume, chapter 14). (This is yet another example of how 
these new forms of manipulation seem to expand by repurposing tools to 
enable new opportunities, and so on.)
SCIgen- generated texts traveled far and wide. After creating software 
to detect such articles, Cyril Labbé (Lippman, this volume, chapter 21) 
identified and catalogued scores of computer- generated papers published 
in the proceedings of respectable conferences, not just the spam- like ones 
that the original SCIgen pranksters wanted to make fun of. For instance, 
Springer and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 
had to retract more than 120 papers they had previously accepted and 
published (Van Noorden, 2014; Bohannon, 2015). Following the embar-
rassment, Springer enlisted Labbé and his laboratory to develop SciDetect, 
an open- source software to “ensure that unfair methods and quick cheats 
do not go unnoticed.”14 (Parenthetically, two years ago, a team at the Uni-
versity of Trieste introduced software to produce fake peer reviews. Like 
their SCIgen brethren, they mean it as a prankish tool to expose the prob-
lems of peer review, but only time will tell if it will also be used for real.15)
Peer reviews too can be manipulated in various ways. The website 
Retraction Watch (Oransky, this volume, chapter 10) has reported many 
cases— more than six hundred papers so far16— of rigged peer review. 
These are cases in which authors submitted email addresses of suggested 
reviewers that were in fact registered to the authors themselves. When the 
journals took up the suggested reviewers (which happened more often 
than one would expect), the authors received an email inviting them 
to review their own papers, which they typically found promising and 
publishable with a few revisions. In more sophisticated schemes, authors 
added citation rings to these rigged peer reviews (Ferguson et al., 2014). 
Finally, the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) has found that 
some organizations sell services “ranging from authorship of prewritten 
manuscripts to providing fabricated contact details for peer reviewers 
Introduction  13
during the submission process and then supplying reviews from these 
fabricated addresses.”17
The rising importance of the impact factor has also created a market 
for fake ones, which are particularly attractive to low- quality journals 
trying to look better than they are. Beall warned that, “in this competi-
tive market, publishers want to stand out from the crowd and attract 
the author fees. One way to effectively earn these fees is to boast high 
journal rankings”18— rankings that one can buy pretty much off the shelf. 
Many of the “tailored” impact factor providers mimic legitimate scien-
tometrics services through similar- sounding names and website domains. 
For instance, the shamelessly counterfeit “Thomson Reuters Institute for 
Scientific Information” ran the website www . isi - thomsonreuters . com (as 
distinct from the original www . thomsonreuters . com) and claimed to be 
the actual ISI (the original scientometrics company). Other equally cre-
ative citation companies supplying impact factors to so- called predatory 
journals include Universal Impact Factor (UIF), Global Impact Factor 
(GIF), and Citefactor (Jalalian, 2015). By providing impact factors for 
established journals such as PLoS and Nature along with less- reputable 
journals, fake impact factor companies contribute to the appearance of 
legitimacy within the ecosystem of post- production manipulations.
Finally, while universities use metrics to evaluate their faculty, they are 
subjected, in different contexts, to some of those same metrics (Espeland 
and Sauder, 2016). Several global university rankings, for instance, con-
sider the faculty’s citation counts. In recent years, universities have sought 
to raise their rankings by targeting the very indexes by which they are 
ranked, and hiring consultants to identify exactly how to do that. North-
eastern University provides one of the most successful examples of how 
to target the U.S. News and World Report rankings. Already in 1996, 
former Northeastern University President Richard Freeland observed 
“how schools ranked highly received increased visibility and prestige, 
stronger applicants, more alumni giving, and, most important, greater 
revenue potential. A low rank left a university scrambling for money. This 
single list … had the power to make or break a school” (Kutner, 2014). 
Following this insight, Freeland identified precisely what Northeastern 
would need to target— class size, graduation rate, admission statistics, 
and so on— to rise in the rankings and break into the top 100. The effort 
paid off, and then some. From its score of 162 in 1996, Northeastern 
rose to 98 in 2006, and to 44 in 2018. This is by no means an isolated 
case. Other universities’ tactics for swaying rankings have included hiring 
top- cited faculty as well- paid, part- time, affiliated, nonresident faculty,19 
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inflating students’ SAT scores, high school GPAs, and graduation rates, 
and refunding poorly performing freshman students (or, in Yale’s case, 
first- year law school students) their tuition after their first semester if they 
are willing to drop out.
Fake Is No Longer What It Used to Be
We find it intriguing that the results of post- production manipulations 
developed to meet or exceed the performance benchmarks established 
by institutions, funding agencies, or global university rankings cannot be 
easily categorized as “fake” in the same way that traditional misconduct 
could be said to involve fake evidence or fake authorship. For lack of a 
better term, we may use “spammish” to point to a tension inherent in 
some post- production manipulations that is not captured by terms such 
as “fake,” “bogus,” or “predatory.”
No doubt, there are differences between a traditional conference and a 
for- profit event organized largely for the purpose of having scientists pay 
to deliver papers and have them printed in some obscure journal (with 
possible ties to the conference organizers) (Grant, 2016; Straumsheim, 
2016). Still, it would be inaccurate to say that the latter is simply a “fake” 
version of the former. Similarly, obscure journals whose editors clog our 
inboxes with offers to publish next week what we submit by this Friday 
are definitely suspect, but not merely “fake.” They surely engage in mis-
representations (as when they boast stringent peer- review standards), but 
they mostly withhold information from their prospective authors, creat-
ing ambiguities that play in their favor. They are still academic journals, 
some of them listed in the standard indexes (though often in fewer than 
the ones they boast). And they do indeed publish articles, some of which 
get cited. Occasionally, some of these journals are bought up by prime- 
time publishers, suggesting that they may be perceived as “emergent” 
rather than simply “fake.” (Unless of course you think that the big pub-
lishers buy up these journals simply because they are profitable, without 
worrying too much about their publishing ethics).
Similarly, while some of the scholars whose names grace their edito-
rial boards may not be aware of being listed there (see Morgenstern, this 
volume, chapter 15), that does not mean that “fake” fully describes those 
boards. In some cases, the editorial boards are indeed made up, but, in 
others, advisors agree to have their names listed, perhaps because they 
do not understand the nature of those journals, or because they want to 
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support affordable open- access publishing.20 In other instances, however, 
they may decide not to ask too many questions and simply accept the 
invitation so as to add another line to their vitae.
Again, while there is a certain fakeness about these journals, to say 
that they are plainly “fake” or “predatory” misses the complexity of the 
ways in which they are both fake and not fake, and the fact that such 
ambiguities are central to their role and business model. While it is dif-
ficult to find kind things to say about these journals, their relentless vili-
fication as illegitimate, fraudulent, and rapacious looks like othering— an 
index of how the publishing professionals of the Global North use these 
journals as a foil to project a desirable identity and image of themselves. 
(As some of the chapters argue, these “predatory” journals may be in fact 
a blessing in disguise for the more established publishers by providing a 
“bad” benchmark against with they can strut their quality.) Furthermore, 
while the generic and random nature of the invitations we receive to pub-
lish in these journals, the wildly capacious assemblages of disciplines that 
are conjured in their titles, or the impressively fast publication time they 
boast seem as far fetched as the large sums of money that spam emails 
claim to be waiting for us in some remote bank account, these journals 
cannot be said to be truly “spam” or “predatory” either (Brunton, this 
volume, chapter 18). It would take a truly naïve scientist to believe that 
these publication venues belong in the same category and have the same 
credibility of the peer- reviewed journals in which they would rather pub-
lish.21 Equally naïve would be the belief that their submissions could be 
properly reviewed and published in a matter of days, or that the emails 
one receives from these editors (populated by strange typos and dubi-
ous academic links) are actually coming from those people and from 
those addresses. Given that academics are a reasonably intelligent bunch, 
those who choose to publish in these venues are not likely to be deceived 
into doing so. An attempt to deceive is surely involved here, but one too 
transparent to justify saying that those who accept those invitations are 
“preyed upon,” cheated out of the money they send to these journals for 
publication costs or for gold open- access fees (which, in any case, are a 
fraction of the going rates of more established journals).
“Spammish” may be a better term to capture the ambiguous nature of 
these practices that, while appearing spam- like, are to some extent col-
lusive. It may be to the authors’ advantage to treat publications in these 
suspicious journals or attendance to these suspicious conferences as per-
fectly legitimate and worthy of inclusion in one’s vitae, only to say that 
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they got tricked into publishing in these journals or going to those confer-
ences in case their university questions their choices. Neither “real” nor 
“fake,” these practices are effective precisely because they can be played 
and presented differently, depending on the circumstances (Jacob, this 
volume, chapter 19).
New Evidence, New Watchdogs
It should not come as a surprise that modes of misconduct detection 
have changed with the emergence of new metrics- based post- production 
manipulations, and the changing notions of fakeness that go with them. 
While some of these manipulations may still be detected through peer 
review, most of them are beyond the reach of traditional referees. In 
some cases, peer review is unable to function as a gatekeeper precisely 
because it becomes itself the target of those manipulations. (For instance, 
peer review and citation rings function by rigging peer review, that is, by 
replacing legitimate reviews with counterfeit ones.) Some of these new 
manipulations, therefore, can be detected not through careful reading of a 
manuscript, but only through extensive analysis of journal databases— of 
the wording of reviews, review turnaround times, citation patterns, and 
the mutual relationships between authors and reviewers across different 
publications.22
This requires both a different kind of expertise as well as access to dif-
ferent levels of evidence and data. Much of this evidence, in fact, can be 
mined only by teams of investigators, hired by the publishers, carefully 
poring over information held in proprietary journal databases. And as 
shown by the terseness and brevity of most retraction notices, editors and 
publishers are often reticent to expose how their editorial processes have 
been gamed, as that exposes weaknesses in their systems and services 
(Biagioli, 2016). Less than ten years ago, a now- prominent misconduct 
researcher contacting a journal about an uninformative retraction notice 
was told that, “it’s none of your damn business”— a kind of answer that 
some editors still relay today (when they respond, which they do less than 
half of the time).23 We are seeing, in sum, both an increase in the amount 
of forensic traces of misconduct as well as the decrease of the readabil-
ity of those traces, which are now often beyond the reach of traditional 
peer review. This “privatization” of forensic evidence and the prolifera-
tion of its forms have been paralleled, however, by an opposite trend: the 
crowdsourcing of the discussion and analysis of evidence of potential 
misconduct.
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The emergence and pervasiveness of new forms of misconduct exceeds 
the reach, resources, and conceptual framework of traditional govern-
mental watchdog organizations like the Office of Research Integrity in 
the United States— agencies that are already undergoing some identity 
crisis (Kaiser, 2016). But these institutional bodies are no longer the 
sole players. Noninstitutionally affiliated watchdog organizations have 
emerged, like Retraction Watch, PubPeer, blogs such as Scholarly Open 
Access, and other sites like the now- defunct Science Fraud (Pain, 2014; 
Aschwandan, 2015; Blatt, 2015). This new generation of watchdogs is 
successfully making up for their lack of resources by mobilizing hundreds 
of scientists— some named, but mostly anonymous— who are willing to 
read texts, evaluate images, run through statistical analyses of a publica-
tion’s data, and share their findings and views on websites, blogs, wikis, 
and social media. As Eric Raymond famously said about open- source 
software collaborative practices, “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are 
shallow” (Raymond, 1999). And though they lack legal authority, these 
new watchdogs can be very effective through their ability to maximize 
the visibility of these issues, which may force the authorities to intervene 
(Guaspare and Didier, this volume, chapter 12). Interestingly, all these 
efforts have been moving in the opposite direction from the forms of 
evaluation characterized by the adoption of the impact factor and other 
metrics. Rather than looking at metadata, these watchdogs engage in 
careful reading of the content of the publication— data, images, text— 
and sometime attempt to reproduce the claims. Their modus operandi 
is that of traditional peer review but, through the adoption of a crowd-
sourcing model, it operates on a scale and is able to draw expertise from 
a population that is an order of magnitude larger than that of traditional 
peer review as practiced by journals. This change of scale has a direct 
impact on the granularity of the review, but it also profoundly shifts the 
“governance” of misconduct research from governments and institutions 
to the practitioners themselves.
And as these developments mark a transformation from top- down 
to bottom- up knowledge production, they are often accompanied by an 
affect that is rather unusual in academia: humor. There is a clear migra-
tion (Lippman, this volume, chapter 21) away from the high seriousness 
and humorlessness of the discourse of university committees and govern-
mental agencies such as the ORI, and toward the carnivalesque attitude 
of some of the new watchdogs. Wearing the masks of anonymity and 
pseudonimity, and cracking jokes (some better than others), they blur the 
line between “policemen” and “pranksters.”
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Notes
1. In some cases, we can empirically see the shift from one to the other. In 
places where the number of publications is the top target, people publish 
much but not in particularly high- impact journals. Instead, where institutions 
tie rewards to publications in top- tier journals rather than to sheer quantity, 
authors adjust by publishing less but in higher impact journals.
2. “Goodhart’s law” is named after Charles Goodhart who formulated it in a 
paper from 1975. For an example of an analysis of “Goodhart’s law,” see Mari-
lyn Strathern, “‘Improving Ratings’: Audit in the British University System,” 
European Review 5(1997):305– 321. The adage is also sometimes referred to 
as “Campbell’s law” from Donald T. Campbell’s 1975 paper, “Assessing the 
Impact of Planned Social Change” or the “Lucas Critique,” which economist 
Robert Lucas articulated in “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” 
(1976). The relationship between “Goodhart’s law” and the “Lucas Critique” is 
discussed in Alec Chrystal and Paul Mizen, “Goodhart’s Law: Its Origins, Mean-
ing and Implications for Monetary Policy,” in Paul Mizen, ed., Central Banking, 
Monetary Theory and Practice, Vol. I (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2003), pp. 221– 243.
3. The Office of Research Integrity, “Definition of Research Misconduct,” 
Accessed September 1, 2016, http:// ori . hhs . gov / definition - misconduct .
4. Phil Davis, “Paying for Impact: Does the Chinese Model Make Sense?,” 
Scholarly Kitchen, April 7, 2011, Accessed August 1, 2016, https:// 
scholarlykitchen . sspnet . org / 2011 / 04 / 07 / paying - for - impact - does - the - chinese 
- model - make - sense . Jufang Shao and Huiyun Shen, “The Outflow of Academic 
Papers from China: Why Is It Happening and Can It Be Stemmed?,” Learned 
Publishing 24(2011):95– 97.
5. This analogy brings up interesting questions about the difference between 
printing (money) and publishing knowledge, and how the JIF is effectively nar-
rowing that difference, if not blurring it outright.
6. Encouraging scholars to submit to high- impact, international journals also 
harms the development of high- quality, higher impact Chinese journals accord-
ing to Wang Shuhua and Paul Weldon, “Chinese Academic Journals: Quality, 
Issues, and Solutions,” Learned Publishing 19(2006):97– 105. See also Xu Jie 
and Matthias Wahls, “The Scholarly Publishing Industry in China: Overview 
and Opportunities,” Learned Publishing 25 (2012):63– 74.
7. Alison McCook, “7 Signs a Scientific Paper’s Authorship Was Bought,” 
Retraction Watch, October 10, 2016, Accessed October 27, 2016, http:// 
retractionwatch . com / 2016 / 10 / 24 / seven - signs - a - paper - was - for - sale / . Mara Hvis-
tendahl, “China’s Publication Bazaar,” Science 342(6162):1035.
8. See, for instance, Phil Davies, “On Moose and Medians (or Why We Are 
Stuck with the Impact Factor),” Scholarly Kitchen, April 12, 2016, Accessed 
August 15, 2018, https:// scholarlykitchen . sspnet . org / 2016 / 04 / 12 / on - moose - and 
- medians - or - why - we - are - stuck - with - the - impact - factor .
Introduction  19
9. For years, Beall has maintained an online blacklist (now removed) and a 
widely read and sometimes- critiqued blog, Scholarly Open Access. See for 
instance, Monica Berger and Jill Cirasella, “Beyond Beall’s List: We Need a 
Better Understanding of Predatory Publishing Without Overstating Its Size and 
Danger,” The Impact Blog, March 18, 2015, Accessed June 26, 2016, http:// 
blogs . lse . ac . uk / impactofsocialsciences / 2015 / 03 / 18 / beyond - bealls - list - predatory 
- publishers .
10. Mario Biagioli, “Recycling Texts or Stealing Time? Plagiarism, Author-
ship, and Credit in Science,” International Journal of Cultural Property 
19(2012):463– 464.
11. Phil Davis, “Citation Cartel Journals Denied 2011 Impact Factor,” Scholarly 
Kitchen, June 29, 2012, Accessed June 15, 2016, https:// scholarlykitchen . sspnet 
. org / 2012 / 06 / 29 / citation - cartel - journals - denied - 2011 - impact - factor . On recent 
developments toward detecting citation cartels, see Iztok Fister et al., “Toward 
the Discovery of Citation Cartels in Citation Networks,” Frontiers in Physics, 
December 15, 2016, Accessed 8/1/2018, http:// journal . frontiersin . org / article / 10 
. 3389 / fphy . 2016 . 00049 / full .
12. Ibid.
13. The Journal Citation Reports. Accessed June 1, 2016, http:// adminapps 
. webofknowledge . com / JCR / static_html / notices / notices . htm .
14. Renate Bayaz, “Springer and Université Joseph Fourier Release SciDetect to 
Discover Fake Scientific Papers,” March 23, 2015, Accessed August 15, 2018, 
https:// www . springer . com / gp / about - springer / media / press - releases / corporate 
/ scidetect / 54166 .
15. Jack Grove, “Robot- Written Peer Reviews,” Inside Higher Ed, Septem-
ber 22, 2016, Accessed September 23, 2016, https:// www . insidehighered . com 
/ news / 2016 / 09 / 22 / many - academics - are - fooled - robot - written - peer - reviews # . V 
- Qd_s9vpF0 . gmail .
16. Allison McCook, “A Publisher Just Retracted Ten Papers Whose Peer 
Review Was ‘Engineered— ,’” Retraction Watch, July 12, 2018, Accessed 
August 14, 2018, https:// retractionwatch . com / 2018 / 07 / 12 / publisher - has 
- known - of - problem - of - fake - reviews - for - years - so - how - did - 10 - papers - slip - its 
- notice / .
17. “COPE Statement on Inappropriate Manipulation of Peer Review Pro-
cesses,” December 19, 2014, Accessed June 20, 2016, http:// publicationethics 
. org / news / cope - statement - inappropriate - manipulation - peer - review - processes . 
Mara Hvistendahl has also reported on “China’s Publication Bazaar” in which 
agencies, scientists, and editors sell papers indexed by Thomson Reuters and 
Elsevier in “China’s Publication Bazaar,” Science 342(6162):1035– 1039.
18. Jeffrey Beall, “Look Out for Bogus Impact Factor Companies,” Scholarly 
Open Access, Accessed July 1, 2016, https:// scholarlyoa . com / 2013 / 08 / 06 / bogus 
- impact - factor - companies . See also Mehrdad Jalalian, “The Story of Fake 
Impact Factor Companies and How We Detected Them,” Electronic Physician 
7(2):1069– 1072.
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19. Lior Pachter wrote about how unknown King Abdulaziz University hired 
top- cited mathematicians as “distinguished adjunct professors” and rose to 
number 7 in USNWR’s global university ranking by subject. Accessed July 1, 
2016, https:// liorpachter . wordpress . com / 2014 / 10 / 31 / to - some - a - citation - is - worth 
- 3 - per - year .
20. Jeffrey Beall, “Bogus Polish Journal Has Completely Fake Editorial Board,” 
Scholarly Open Access, Accessed June 20, 2016, https:// scholarlyoa . com / 2016 
/ 02 / 02 / bogus - polish - journal - has - completely - fake - editorial - board / . See also Piotr 
Sorokowski et al., “Predatory Journals Recruit Fake Editor,” Nature, March 23, 
2017.
21. We therefore disagree both with the use of the term “predatory” and 
with the logic of predation that is actually mobilized in some of the litera-
ture on these practices, like Alexander M. Clark and David R. Thompson, 
“Five (Bad) Reasons to Publish Your Research in Predatory Journals,” JAN 
73(2017):2499– 2501.
22. The complexity of the forensic analysis and the proprietary nature of the 
sources is exemplified by an early case of fake peer reviews, which “sparked 
a 14- month investigation that came to involve about 20 people from SAGE’s 
editorial, legal and production departments. It showed that the Gmail addresses 
were each linked to accounts with Thomson Reuters’ ScholarOne, a publication- 
management system used by [various] publishers. … Editors were able to track 
every paper that the person or people behind these accounts had allegedly writ-
ten or reviewed. … As they worked through the list, SAGE investigators realized 
that authors were both reviewing and citing each other at an anomalous rate.” 
Cat Ferguson, Adam Marcus, and Ivan Oransky, “Publishing: The Peer- Review 
Scam,” Nature, 515:480– 482, doi:10.1038/515480a.
23. Adam Marcus, “Journal Editors Still Don’t Like Talking about 
Misconduct— And That’s a Problem,” Retraction Watch, August 2, 2018, 
Accessed August 14, 2018, https:// retractionwatch . com / 2018 / 08 / 02 / journal 
- editors - still - dont - like - talking - about - misconduct - and - thats - a - problem / .
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I
Beyond and Before Metrics

Before and Beyond Metrics begins with the origins of publication metrics, 
tracing the contingencies of their genealogy to both question the present 
and to envisage possible future postmetrics scenarios. Rather than ana-
lyzing the manipulation of a specific metric, this section considers the 
gaming that is necessarily involved in the introduction of any metrics— 
not the gaming of an established game, but the gaming that goes into 
defining the game itself. Metrics are not set once and for all, but are 
rather introduced and modified through a never- ending process propelled 
by gaming itself. Any metric will create the possibility of its gaming (and 
gaming- related misconduct), which will eventually crowd that market, 
thus creating an incentive to modify the metrics, which in turn will usher 
in the next generation of innovative gaming and manipulations. Metrics 
appear to set specific targets, but those targets are inexorably bound to 
be moving ones. Several contributions to this section show how Good-
hart’s law, despite its obvious value, does not capture the fact that— from 
faculty performance to university rankings— academic metrics is not one 
thing, but many different factors, rankings, and indicators jockeying for 
attention in an increasingly tight market, marginalizing some competi-
tors while forcing others to focus on different indicators and niches. (The 
remarkable variety— if not outright incommensurability— of interna-
tional university rankings exemplifies this trend).
Alex Csiszar shows that the problem of gaming metrics, far from 
being an exogenous pathology, is part and parcel of the history of scien-
tometrics. Well before scientific indicators came into common use, Rob-
ert Merton wrote a letter to Eugene Garfield, the owner of the Institute 
for Scientific Information and the inventor of the Science Citation Index, 
predicting that a “goal displacement” would inevitably emerge if scien-
tometrics were to be used not to map the dynamics of the scientific com-
munity (as Garfield had initially proposed), but to evaluate and reward 
28  Beyond and Before Metrics
the publication performance of specific scientists. In a striking foretelling 
of Goodhart’s law, Merton stated the following: “Whenever an indicator 
comes to be used in the reward system of an organization or institu-
tional domain, there develop tendencies to manipulate the indicator so 
that it no longer indicates what it once did.” The future of scientometrics 
unfolded precisely as Merton had predicted, creating a field that became 
extraordinarily influential precisely because it was “hacked” and turned 
from a descriptive into an evaluative discipline, thus spawning a poten-
tially endless range of indicators, and their gaming.
Yves Gingras puts the local history of scientometrics into the context 
of large- scale global economic changes that have affected scholarly pub-
lication to argue that “the internet revolution, the economic transforma-
tion of journal publishing and the evaluation turn” created the “perfect 
storm,” which transformed scientific publishing and contributed to the 
rise in academic misconduct. Gingras’s conclusion resonates well with 
Merton’s prediction: the scientific paper has been transformed “from a 
knowledge unit to an accounting unit used to evaluate researchers.”
Michael Power and Paul Wouters move from a focus on scientific 
papers to one on institutions. Power argues that the university’s demand 
that its faculty demonstrate the impact of their research “has become 
a  game, understood as an infrastructure for the production of a certain 
kind of truth (Foucault).” In this meta- game, the order of scholarly pro-
duction has been flipped upside down: researchers must make sure that 
they will have impact “before they do the related research. Rather than 
impact being an outcome of research, it is research, or a certain style of 
research, which is becoming the product of the impact apparatus.” The 
need to be found to have had impact determines the kind of research one 
will do and the questions one will ask.
Paul Wouters expands on the strange alchemy of “impact” by reflect-
ing on how academic research has become “a strategic business in which 
it is increasingly vital for researchers to be visible at both the national and 
international level.” This need for high visibility has curtailed academic 
autonomy, subjecting researchers to continuous evaluations and assess-
ments of the scientific excellence and societal impact of their work. Given 
how research has become a strategic business, Wouters concludes that it 
has become difficult to distinguish “gaming the system” from “properly 
functioning in the system.”
Sharing many of the concerns of the previous contributors, James Gri-
esemer offers a radical proposal to move us toward a postmetrics future. 
Griesemer moves beyond the mantric reiteration of Goodhart’s law and 
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the a priori critique of metrics it entails, proposing we study metrics as 
just any other dimension of scientific practice (including instruments, 
funding, and training) and to do so “experimentally.” That is, we should 
not just look at the effects that metrics has on those who respectfully fol-
low it, but also at the unexpected consequences that happen when one 
actively “hacks” metrics. Such experimental hackings should be practiced 
and understood as a form of productive misbehaving (to be clearly dis-
tinguished from “behaving badly”): “just as video game hackers improve 
game play by intentionally violating the designs of the game designers 
to make the game play differently, science studies research might involve 
experimental manipulation of metrics as a means of understanding con-
temporary science in the age of metric tides.” And because metrics is about 
publications and their reception, a journal or series of journals explicitly 
dedicated to the experimental study of metrics would be the “laboratory” 
for this kind of research that hacks metrics for knowledge, not for profit.

Henceforth, academic interviewees, it won’t be: How many papers have you pub-
lished? but: Where? … Publish at the top or be damned.
— Correspondence in New Scientist, November 23, 1972.
On June 13, 1974, in the foothills of Stanford University, a group of social 
scientists, information entrepreneurs, and government officials gathered 
to deliberate what had recently become pressing questions: Can science 
be measured? How? And what might be the consequences of doing so? 
The conference on “science indicators” at the Center for Advanced Stud-
ies in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) was among the first ever held on 
the subject. But the invitations sent to participants had already raised 
the question how measuring scientific productivity might alter the very 
object under study: “the creation and official use of indicators may lead 
to shifts in the range and kind of scientific activity itself.”1
Proposals to establish objective measures of individual and national 
scientific activity have been around for nearly two centuries.2 But during 
the late 1960s in the United States, renewed pressure on scientific funding 
bodies, sociological interest in studying what had become known as “the 
scientific community,” and the increasingly wide availability of citation 
data put a spotlight on these questions.
It is commonly supposed that rising incidence of gaming is an unin-
tended consequence of these developments, one that an era more innocent 
than our own simply did not have much reason— or enough foresight— to 
confront. We have even adapted a term from economics— Goodhart’s 
law— to capture the idea that when measures become standards, they 
cease to be good measures. By unearthing a set of episodes from the early 
history of citation analysis, I want to argue two things. First, this supposi-
tion is historically mistaken: the idea that attempts to measure scientific 
1
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output might lead to changes in researcher behavior has been a part of 
the conversation about citation metrics from the beginning. Second, the 
very framing of the problem in terms of unintended consequences not 
only has a long history, but also has caused observers to ask a limited 
set of questions about gaming and misconduct and thus to produce an 
equally limited set of responses to it.3
Many circumstances had come together to bring about the conference 
on science indicators. The catalyst was the publication by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) of the first edition of Science Indicators (here-
after SI- 72), a collection of statistics on the relative performance of sci-
ence in the United States during 1972. In the late 1960s, at the instigation 
of Congress, the NSF had undergone its first major restructuring since it 
was established in 1950. The resulting 1968 amendment to the NSF act 
brought the foundation more closely under the control of Congress and 
the executive branch (Committee on Labor and Welfare, 1968). In partic-
ular, there would now be annual hearings to approve expenditures, and 
approval would depend on an annual report from the foundation on the 
“status and health of science and its various disciplines.” The legislation 
did not specify the form of these reports but there were strong hints that 
numbers were what was wanted. Henceforth, the NSF owed the people 
hard data about the outputs of science.
The new mandate led NSF officers to the notion that they might con-
struct a comprehensive and standardized set of indicators of the health 
of science. Congress received the first such report in 1973. The NSF then 
reached out to the Social Science Research Council— already studying 
the construction of social indicators— about how they had done in this 
first effort. The latter thought this an ideal job for sociologists of science. 
Robert K. Merton, the towering figure in the field, got the call.
The timing could not have been better. That academic year, Merton 
and his collaborator and partner Harriet Zuckerman were on leave at 
CASBS in Palo Alto, where they had assembled an interdisciplinary work-
ing group to pursue projects in the historical sociology of science. The 
core group included Nobel Prize– winning biologist Joshua Lederberg 
and the historians Arnold Thackray and Yehuda Elkana. The project on 
indicators could prove the relevance of the new program in sociology of 
science, Merton thought. It would be “a test for the guild.”4
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“Fun and Games with Citations”
In a small room uncomfortably packed with scientists and sociologists 
(Merton explained that “enforced intimacy is more conducive to straight- 
out serious talk”), one of the most consequential participants had no aca-
demic affiliation at all. Eugene Garfield was the proprietor of the Institute 
for Scientific Information (ISI) and the inventor of the Science Citation 
Index (SCI). Much of the debate about measuring science that had arisen 
in the past decade was focused on analyzing citation data obtained (at a 
price) from his company. Garfield was asked to precirculate a paper on the 
ways in which citation data could be used to track the health of science, 
its cognitive development, and its goals. Nearly all the other papers were 
dedicated to more or less savage critiques of SI- 72 from a variety of per-
spectives, including statistics (William Kruskal), economics (Zvi Grili-
ches), history and philosophy of science (Gerald Holton), and political 
philosophy (Yaron Ezrahi). The only other constructive paper— by the 
brothers Jonathan and Stephen Cole, students of Merton— also relied on 
Garfield’s work; it explored how citation analysis could be used to iden-
tify scientific consensus.5 Garfield’s invention was under the microscope.
In his role as convener, Merton often steered the conversation. He was 
especially keen to direct attention to one key problem: “I’d like to get on 
the record the problem of goal displacement.” He explained that “when 
certain indicators get officially, or quasi- officially, established as measures 
of this, that, or the other, there will be, one should look for, efforts to 
manipulate the numbers, by one’s behavior”:
In the case of citations, I make a small self- fulfilling prophecy, that has already 
been fulfilled in one area I know, namely, as more and more citations are used 
both officially and unofficially as measures of contribution of work of relative 
standing and the like, there will be diverse patterns of adaptations to those 
uses, in a feedback way, and citation behavior will change in part in certain 
sub- sets of the community.
Merton noted, cryptically, that he knew already of a “highly organized 
effort … to operate on citations for political purposes” and he worried 
that the “purity of the community of science is itself, maybe, put in jeop-
ardy” by this new behavior.6
So important did Merton believe this problem to be that he contin-
ued to impress it on Garfield in the months following the conference. “I 
enjoyed your fun and games with citations,” he wrote, perhaps with a 
hint of mockery. And he warned Garfield to exercise care:
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Watch out for goal displacement: Whenever an indicator comes to be used in 
the reward system of an organization or institutional domain, there develop 
tendencies to manipulate the indicator so that it no longer indicates what 
it once did. Now that more and more scientists and scholars are becom-
ing acutely conscious of citations as a form of behavior, some will begin, in 
semi- organized fashion, to work out citation- arrangements in their own little 
specialties.
This was as true for science, Merton said, as it was for any bureau-
cratic system involving counting and rewards: censuses, employee perfor-
mance measures, or government agencies.7
Merton knew all this well, for he had introduced the concept of goal 
displacement to sociology himself several decades earlier. In 1940, he had 
written an essay, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” which focused 
on the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucratic organizations. “Goal 
displacement” was the process by which “an instrumental value becomes 
a terminal value.” This was an important case of the unintended conse-
quences of purposive action; it occurred whenever rules or performance 
measures were set up, which gradually came to be adhered to by actors 
as ends in themselves. Over the next decades, many of Merton’s students 
helped found the US field of organizational sociology, studying govern-
ment agencies, industrial firms, and other organizations to determine 
how rules and performance metrics can lead to deviant behavior and 
unintended outcomes— goal displacement, in short.
At the end of the 1950s, after major contributions to several areas 
of sociology, including a major intervention in structural- functionalism 
sociological theory, Merton shifted his research focus back to the sociol-
ogy of science (the topic that he had written for his PhD). In this field, 
two of his papers had already become classics (Merton, 1938, 1942). 
These papers outlined a set of behavioral norms that governed the social 
structure of science. Insofar as these norms— universalism, communism, 
organized skepticism, and disinterestedness— were adhered to by prac-
titioners, he had argued, science progressed toward greater and more 
certain knowledge. But this had always been a rather theoretical idea. 
As he returned to the issue (Merton, 1957), he realized that to observe 
these norms in action, he needed to get more concrete: just how were 
they instantiated in actual practice? Publishing practices seemed to be the 
nerve center where issues of reward, responsibility, and status merged on 
an everyday basis.
But the value placed on publishing papers, which made “open disclosure” 
the rule in science, also contained within it the possibility of pathology. As 
Gaming Metrics Before the Game  35
this value became institutionalized, Merton (1969) explained, it increas-
ingly encouraged “through the displacement of goals, a spurious empha-
sis on publication for its own sake, almost irrespective of the merit of 
what is published.”8 Scientists published more and more papers, but each 
of them said less and less.
The same went for other measures of achievement. Merton began to 
enroll graduate students and to run seminars on the sociology of science 
in the 1960s, and he was on the lookout for sources of data for research 
projects. The group explored bibliometric data, biographical data, and 
survey methods. Through Garfield’s efforts to market his products to 
sociologists and historians, Merton learned of the SCI in 1962. By 1965, 
Merton’s students were mining the citation index for insights on the 
development of schools and fields, the growth of scientific consensus, and 
reward systems. By 1970, he was tentatively employing citation analysis 
in his own work, but already warning of its dangers. In a paper on age 
stratification in science (Zuckerman and Merton, 1972), a long footnote 
warned that the growing use of citation analyses “as aids in deciding 
upon the appointment and promotion of scientists” could lead to changes 
in citation practices that would invalidate them as measures altogether.
By the time of the CASBS conference in 1974, Merton was far from 
alone in expressing concern over the role that paper counting and cita-
tion counting might do to science. The conference had come at a critical 
moment for Garfield’s enterprise. During the 1960s, he had worked dili-
gently to market the SCI to scientists as an aid to information retrieval 
(Wouters, 1999). Looking to explore other markets for his expensive tools, 
he had also reached out tentatively to sociologists and others concerned 
with studying science, asking politely whether they might find some use 
in it. But he tended, in public, to play down suggestions that the cita-
tion index might be used as a means of evaluating scientists or research 
programs.
A decade later, however, Garfield had become bolder, and he mounted 
a public campaign to argue for new uses of citation analysis. In 1970, 
he wrote in Nature that “increasingly scarce intellectual and financial 
resources for supporting research could be managed more efficiently” using 
citation counting to identify the most promising and creative researchers. 
In 1972, he published in Science his first public ranking of journals accord-
ing to the frequency with which they came up in citations— both absolutely 
and relative to the number of articles published. That year he also began 
marketing Journal Citation Reports, which became the permanent home 
of the “Impact Factor.”
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Garfield’s early steps toward legitimating the evaluative use of cita-
tion analysis— along with other investigations by Derek J. de Solla Price 
(1969), Joel Margolis (1967), and the Cole brothers (1972)— made it a topic 
of controversy in scientific circles. Many observers were appalled, arguing 
that such surveillance and the encouragement of hierarchy were inimical 
to the spirit of creativity and equality central to the scientific community. 
Garfield’s ranked list of journals was “a pedantic dunghill,” suggested one 
letter in New Scientist, a “highly invidious pecking order” calculated to 
appeal to “connoisseurs of hierarchies.”9 Others, such as Samuel Goudsmit 
(1974), legendary editor of the Physical Review, argued that the implicit 
theory of citation of these studies was mistaken, for acknowledgement was 
only a minor use of footnotes. He dismissed citation analysis and quoted 
approvingly a warning that equating “high frequency of citation with 
worth or excellence will end in disaster.”
Many critiques were explicit about the potential for gaming. Journal 
rankings were the equivalent of “pop charts for science,” suggested Alex 
Comfort (1970) in Nature. The corrupt music industry gave scientists a 
taste of “the abuses we might expect (and even … indulge in): Commer-
cial concerns dedicated to lobbying, so that our rating might be raised? 
Promotional quotation data on the relative one- upmanship of particular 
journals? In California nothing is impossible.” And the mathematician 
and historian Kenneth O. May (1967) noted that these new uses of cita-
tions would lead authors to cite “their friends’ papers more (a friend is 
someone who cites in return)” and also to increase their citations to mar-
ginally relevant papers “so as to attract people who might (and perhaps 
should) miss the paper.”
Thus, while Garfield went into the conference with optimism, he also 
knew that these new uses for citation analysis were coming under attack. 
But that Merton himself should challenge their legitimacy must have been 
jarring. Merton had become a great supporter of Garfield and the ISI; he 
sat on its board, proselytized the uses of the citation index to others, and 
gave Garfield strategic advice when problems arose. Garfield neverthe-
less took Merton’s warning in stride. “If it should turn out that over the 
next 10 to 20 years goal displacement does occur with the Science Cita-
tion Index,” Garfield admitted, “then we will simply have to abandon its 
uses as an indicator of quality, etc.” But he did not really think that this 
was likely. Maybe editors could be taught “to look out for self- serving 
attempts to distort citation data?”10 Merton felt able to reassure Gar-
field that while localized citation misconduct was sure to happen, it was 
doubtful that things would get so bad that science itself would really 
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be transformed “for a long, long time, if at all. It would follow upon a 
massive use of citation counts as a part of the reward system of science: 
appointments, promotions, research grants, elections to office in profes-
sional societies, awards, etc. And that is not in the cards.”11
Merton was wrong. In the next decades, citation analysis and the 
Journal Impact Factor (JIF), which became enshrined in Journal Citation 
Reports, spread far and wide. The field of scientometrics blossomed. By 
1980, Garfield was considering ways to capitalize on the growing use of 
citation data in evaluations of individuals and institutions. After several 
years of publishing Impact Factor data, in 1981, the ISI formulated a plan 
for a new suite of products marketed for the “deliberate use of citation 
counts for evaluative purposes.” The proposed Science Citation Analysis 
System (SCAS) would be an online tool for “administrators of research 
faculty/staff” to measure the productivity of individuals and institutions 
without relying on such crude markers as the JIF.12 Again, Garfield and 
Merton engaged in intense conversation about the potential consequences 
of such a move for science. Were Garfield’s tools simply making more effi-
cient a set of evaluative practices that were already flourishing? Or would 
the availability of such tools encourage these practices and thus lead to 
their misuse by administrators and deviant behaviour by those subject to 
the measures? Merton assured Garfield that the latter would be the case, 
and that there were no moral grounds on which he could disavow his role 
in any such an outcome: “You’re helping to build the practice which will 
include a lot of pollution, this misuse which you can’t control, but you’ve 
been instrumental in making possible.”13
Even as Merton continued to warn Garfield about goal displacement 
behind the scenes, he remained a strong supporter of the ISI in public. 
The term that has come most often to be used to describe the susceptibil-
ity to manipulation of metrics of science was not “goal displacement” 
but rather Goodhart’s law.14 Although the latter originated in monetary 
economics, the common formulation in this context comes from Mari-
lyn Strathern (1996): “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to 
be a good measure.” While “goal displacement” describes a similar phe-
nomenon, the emphasis is inverted: where Goodhart’s law highlights the 
consequences for the validity of the metric, Merton’s concept highlighted 
the consequences for the object being measured. This emphasis was espe-
cially clear in the studies of bureaucratic organizations pursued by Mer-
ton’s students. In many cases, measures and rewards that were instituted 
to encourage behavior that would further the goals of an organization led 
not simply to dysfunctional behavior, but also to reshaping the perceived 
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goals of the organizations themselves. In the big picture, the phenomenon 
of gaming matters not simply— or even principally— because it invali-
dates any given metric, but because it can profoundly shape the everyday 
conditions under which research is carried out, not simply in terms of 
how and when people publish their findings, but of what kinds of projects 
they choose to pursue and how they go about them. Ironically, Strathern’s 
now- famous formulation of Goodhart’s law was derived from a paper 
by Keith Hoskin (1996), which was itself a critique of this formulation 
along these lines. Hoskin pointed out that the law seems to imply that the 
target is the problem, and that measures are not in themselves potentially 
problematic, thus leading to a search for “either better targets, or better 
ways of anticipating and handling a presumed natural- born predilection 
for beating the target system.” (This is a reasonable characterization, inci-
dentally, of a key argument made by advocates of altmetrics.15)
More generally, however, the ideas behind goal displacement and 
Goodhart’s law have both constrained the kinds of questions we ask 
about metrics and their problems. By adapting the theory of bureaucracy 
to the study of science, Merton encouraged the idea that the social study of 
science could be pursued along broadly similar lines to the social study 
of corporations and firms, and in relative isolation from the rest of society. 
But this obscured a fundamental disanalogy. In a democratic state, there is 
little chance of there being widespread consensus about what the goals of 
science ought to be in the first place. Broad public views about the legiti-
mate ends of scientific activity cannot in general be separated from public 
representations of scientific activity and its productivity. For that reason, 
public indicators of science affect not only the practice of research, but 
also the public legitimacy of science.16 To put it another way, understand-
ing metrics of science is not just about the internal sociology of research, 
but also about the politics of scientific knowledge (Ezrahi, 1978; 1990).
My sense is that many of the most common critiques of the imple-
mentation and use of scientometrics essentially ignore this consideration. 
They tend to suppose that there is some pure and efficient form of sci-
entific practice— and of scientific publishing— that was once directed 
wholly to the production of knowledge, but which has recently been 
turned upside down (for good or ill) by the implementation of account-
ing practices.17 The late- Mertonian mode in the sociology of science was 
at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, but it remained alive among those 
experts producing increasingly sophisticated tools with which to measure 
scientific productivity, even as they grew increasingly frustrated that these 
tools were subject to misuse and abuse.
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When we debate the efficacy of a given measure of scientific achieve-
ment, we are also debating (perhaps implicitly) the grounds of the public 
legitimacy of science itself.18 This perspective implies that the analysis of 
metrics in use ought to attend to the political values and modalities of 
power within which they are constructed, deployed, and spread (Merry, 
2016). Metrics have become mediating devices in the interaction between 
the groups and institutions involved in science policy, its administration, 
and research. Scientific publishing— whose ascendancy has often been 
linked to public representations of the legitimacy of modern science— is 
now front and center in public debate about inefficiency and corruption 
(Sarewitz, 2016; Oransky, this volume, chapter 10).
Previous histories of measuring science (Godin, 2005; Bellis, 2009; Gin-
gras, 2016) have not generally paid much attention to the question of mis-
conduct and gaming, but we need a new history that puts these matters at 
the heart of the story. This is not simply because I think we need to get the 
history right, but because producing a better historical narrative will help 
to break the spell of Goodhart’s law and its several variations. It is not 
yet clear what the history of scientific metrics in use might look like. But I 
suspect that we will need to formulate Goodhart’s counter- law to describe 
the more common historical sequence: “only when a measure becomes a 
target is it widely taken up as a measure worth using.”
Notes
1. See the rough transcript of R. K. Merton’s remarks, and the generic confer-
ence invitation template dated March 21, 1974, in Robert K. Merton Papers, 
Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library [hereafter RKMP], 
328.4.
2. For an early example of measuring scientific output, see Granville (1830).
3. I am inspired here in part by James Griesemer’s essay in this volume.
4. Quoted in Robert Parke letter to R. K. Merton, December 21, 1973, RKMP 
328.7.
5. Conference agenda, RKMP 328.4.
6. Rough transcript of R. K. Merton’s remarks, RKMP 328.4.
7. R. K. Merton letter to E. Garfield, August 3, 1974, RKMP 168.5.
8. See also, earlier, Merton (1957) and, later, Zuckerman and Merton (1971), 
in which the authors also make the fascinating hypothesis that the spread of 
referee systems was a further unintended consequence of the impulse to publish 
as an end in itself.
9. “At the Heart of the Paper Blizzard,” New Scientist, November 23, 1972, 
p. 464. On resistance to “the moral equivalence of the scientist,” see Shapin (2008).
40  Alex Csiszar
10. E. Garfield letter to R. K. Merton, August 19, 1974, and R. K. Merton’s 
reply, September 2, 1974, RKMP 168.5.
11. R. K. Merton to E. Garfield, September 2, 1974, RKMP 168.5.
12. SCAS is described in L. Simon, “Preliminary Specification for Science Cita-
tion Analysis System (SCAS),” January 29, 1981, in RKMP 168.4.
13. Transcript of a recorded conversation between E. Garfield and R. K. 
Merton on May 23, 1981, Papers of Eugene Garfield, Science History Institute, 
Philadelphia, 44.5.
14. This is not to say that “goal displacement” has wholly disappeared from the 
conversation. See, for example, Hicks et al. (2015).
15. See Jennifer Lin in this volume, chapter 16.
16. These points were in fact made at the 1974 conference by the political theo-
rist Yaron Ezrahi (1978). But they seem largely to have been ignored.
17. See, for example, Yves Gingras in this volume, chapter 2. For the historical 
counterargument, see Csiszar (2018).
18. A similar point is made at the end of Paul Wouters’s contribution to this 
volume, chapter 4.
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Since the mid- 1990s, observers and actors in the scientific field— as 
defined in Bourdieu (1986, 2004) as a structured space of agents and 
institutions in competition for the accumulation of credit or “symbolic 
capital”— have commented on the many facets of an ongoing major 
transformation in the structural conditions of scientific practice: mas-
sification of research, mounting pressure to publish, relative decline of 
government investments, and the arrival into the research system of the 
ideology of “knowledge management” with its insistence on quantitative 
evaluation measures of productivity and “impact” of academic research 
(Bruneau and Savage, 2002). As discussed by many contributions to this 
book, these transformations of the research system led actors to respond 
with various strategies of “gaming” the system through manipulating the 
metrics to attain the required results or, as suggested by Griesemer in his 
contribution, to try to derail the whole enterprise of metrics, though it 
is not clear how one could do that. By the end of the twentieth century, 
the technical infrastructure of journal publishing had also started to be 
radically transformed through the use of internet and electronic publishing 
(Thompson, 2005). These new technologies of communications made it 
possible to skip the materiality of the scientific paper and directly produce 
digital papers and journals that could then circulate much faster and glob-
ally on the internet, in turn contributing to transforming the dynamic of 
scientific practice. Finally, the mounting concentration of scientific journals 
in the hands of a limited number of giant publishing firms submitted to 
an increasing demand of profitability on the stock exchange, engendered 
in the mid- 1990s what has been called a “crisis in scholarly publishing” 
due to the mounting price of journal subscription for academic libraries 
(Thatcher, 1995; Tenopir and King, 1997; McGuigan and Russell, 2008; 
Larivière, Haustein, and Mongeon, 2015). An answer to that crisis has 
been the emergence of the “open- access” movement (Laakso et al., 2011). 
2
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The combination of internet technology and the profitability of academic 
journals, which could now be born digitally, gave rise to the multiplica-
tion of specialist journals, many considered of dubious quality, trying to 
capture a part of the value generated in answering the “offer” of more 
papers being produced by researchers answering the “publish or perish” 
injunction from their institutions. Finally, internet diffusion of papers in 
open access made results more easily accessible to new nonspecialist audi-
ences who could in return influence choices and priorities of research.
Each of these three major processes (the internet revolution, the eco-
nomic transformation of journal publishing, and the evaluation turn) have 
generated specific effects. Many of them are analyzed in this book, but my 
thesis is that it is their mutual interactions in a kind of “perfect storm” that 
made possible the radical changes observed in the scientific field, which 
saw the rise of deviant behavior on the part of scientists and journal editors 
as well as managers of academic institutions. One may think here of the 
multiplication of “predatory journals,” faked peer review, the manipulation 
of citations to raise impact factors of journals and positions in academic 
rankings, and the rise in the number of “corrections” to and “retraction” 
of scientific papers (Corbyn, 2009; Van Noorden, 2013; Haug, 2015; 
Beal, 2016), topics discussed below in the contributions collected in sec-
tions 2 and 3 of this book.
In this chapter, I propose a global macro- structural analysis that aims 
at showing how these different transformations have become connected 
as a consequence of the transformation of the paper from a knowledge 
unit to an accounting unit used to evaluate researchers and research orga-
nizations (departments, laboratories, and universities). The present struc-
ture of the scientific field is thus the result of the complex interrelations 
of different causal series that converged to change the social function 
of the scientific paper, making it fit with the twin ideologies of the New 
Knowledge Management and the Audit Society (Power, 2000; Wilson, 
2002). In order to better understand the nature of these recent transfor-
mations, I must first present the basic social dynamic that propelled sci-
entific research for more than three centuries. I limit myself to academic 
research and publications in academic journals and exclude research done 
for profit or to obtain patents, as this dynamic— though obviously more 
and more connected to that of the scientific field in response to declin-
ing government investments in “basic” research— obeys a different logic, 
namely that of profit. As Sismondo’s contribution to this book shows, 
the production of papers by pharmaceutical companies is not an end in 
itself but only a means to market their products (pills and syrups …). By 
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contrast, scientists’ final product in the scientific field is the paper, sup-
posed to contain new knowledge, hence my term “unit of knowledge.”
The Classic Cycle of Accumulation of Symbolic Capital
The classical sociology of science developed by Robert K. Merton and his 
school has well established that symbolic recognition (or credit) lies at 
the basis of the dynamic of scientific research (Hagstrom, 1965; Cole and 
Cole, 1973; Merton, 1973). In exchange for making known to the scien-
tific community, through publication, a “discovery” (new fact, instrument, 
interpretation or theory), the scientist obtains the symbolic recognition 
of his original work. Such a social recognition then gives better chances 
to access material and economic resources and institutional positions to 
make further research. This simple but powerful model has been extended 
by Pierre Bourdieu to take more explicitly into account the links and 
mutual transformation between recognition, now seen as a form of sym-
bolic capital, and the other kinds of capital (economic, cultural, social) 
that are also at play in the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1986, 2004).
Figure 2.1 shows how that cycle of credibility, to use Latour and Wool-
gar’s reformulation of Bourdieu’s ideas, works (Latour and Woolgar, 
1982). To simplify the figure, I exclude the cases when papers are rejected. 
In fact, the model predicts that too many rejections, which means lack of 
recognition by the community, will lead the affected scientist to abandon 
research and search for a different kind of recognition, often in a differ-
ent social field. This cycle is premised on the fundamental but implicit 
idea that the scientific paper is the embodiment of what we can call a 
“unit of knowledge,” that is any original contribution that is perceived 
as legitimate by the members of a particular scientific field. Generally, the 
“unit of knowledge” comes only after being peer reviewed and published 
in a journal, as its value and legitimacy comes from the social recogni-
tion and is not intrinsic to the submitted article. Depending on the value 
(large or small) of that unit of knowledge, which in some fields could 
even be lines of computer codes, the author then accrues more or less 
symbolic capital, in particular through being cited by other researchers. 
The citations accrued in the scientific field thus work as a symbolic credit 
allocation mechanism. The accumulation of symbolic capital facilitates, 
in turn, access to new resources (including grants, research assistants, and 
postdocs) for research and favorable institutional positions. With better 
resources, one can then have better instruments and thus raise the prob-
ability of producing better papers and larger “units of knowledge.”
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In this system, the obvious crucial step is “peer review,” for it is at this 
very point in the process that the paper will exist or not as a socially rec-
ognized unit of knowledge circulating in the scientific field. Since its insti-
tutionalization in the middle of the seventeenth century, it has of course 
evolved in its detail (blind review or not, external or done by the editor), 
but retains its basic function of gate- keeping the entry into the scientific 
field (Zuckerman and Merton, 1971; Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Biagioli, 
2002; Kronick, 2004; Pyenson, 2008). It could thus be expected that the 
mounting pressure on the research system since the mid- 1970s would 
generate a mounting critique of peer review (Gustafson, 1975). By the 
end of the 1980s, the peer- review mechanism even became the object of 
systematic and continued analysis, particularly in the biomedical sciences, 
through an annual congress of peer review (Rennie, 2016). But despite all 
the critiques addressed to peer review, it remains central to the basic cycle 
of accumulation of scientific credit. When the scientific paper will have 
been transformed into a simple accounting unit used for the evaluation 
of researchers and their institutions, we will observe the emergence and 
growth of various more or less deviant behaviors trying to cope with the 
multiplications of metrics through manipulating them or even the peer- 
review process itself.
The Multifarious Effects of Research Evaluation
Though bibliometrics developed as a research specialty in the 1960s and 
1970s studying the aggregate properties of publications and citations for 
the use of librarians and historians and sociologists of science, its methods 
became increasingly used, especially since the 1990s, to facilitate the eval-
uation of researchers (Gingras, 2016; Wouters’s contribution to this book, 
chapter 4). This development was in line with the ideology of benchmark-
ing and “knowledge management,” which invaded the public sector in 
ARTICLE( JOURNAL(
NEW(RESOURCES(
(students,(grants,(instruments,(etc.)(
SYMBOLIC(
CAPITAL(
KNOWLEDGE(
UNIT(Peer$$
review$
$Figure 2.1
The classic cycle of knowledge production, evaluation, and accumulation of credit.
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the 1980s and the universities in the 1990s (Bruno and Didier, 2013). 
As the tradition of qualitative peer review for promotion and tenure 
became more and more criticized in the mid-1970s for being “subjective,” 
quantitative indicators based on counting papers started to be used as a 
measure of the “productivity” of researchers (Wade, 1975). Bibliometric 
methods thus provided the basic measures of “impact” used by promoters 
of “benchmarking” and “league tables” and other “rankings” supposed 
to evaluate researchers and journals as well as universities (Espeland and 
Sauder, 2016; Kehm’s contribution to this book, chapter 6).
The move to digital versions of journals and papers would not in itself 
have transformed the traditional cycle of credit, for it just made papers 
accessible through the internet for those who were affiliated to institu-
tions that subscribed to the journals. However, the pressure to publish 
“accounting units” for evaluation purposes triggered a series of important 
transformations, synthetized in figure 2.2, that gave rise to new actors and 
new technologies of measurement. An initial important change, though 
largely invisible to the scientists, is the very content of bibliometric data-
bases. While the oldest of them, the Science Citation Index (SCI; now the 
Web of Science), at first coded only information on the first author of a 
paper (since that was sufficient to retrieve it in an information system), 
bibliometric databases now include the complete list of all authors of 
papers, because these data are now used for evaluation purposes and not 
only for making bibliographic searches. From the 1980s to the 2000s, the 
only direct measure of the “impact” of scientific papers was the number 
of citations by other papers as registered in the SCI database, which had 
a monopoly until the creation of the competing Scopus database by Else-
vier in 2004.
A second effect of the new evaluation context, one visible to any active 
scientist, is that it offered an opportunity for companies to create new 
journals that could accept those papers. The multiplication of papers, 
related to the growth of the research system and the added competition 
for scarce resources, called in the creation of new journals. The creation 
of new journals has of course always been a part of the growth and diver-
sification of research specialties since the emergence of the first journals 
in the 1660s (Peiffer and Vittu, 2008; Csiszar, 2018). But what is new 
is that the combined effect of internet publication and the emergence of 
“open- access journals,” which transfer the cost from subscribing libraries 
to authors, has opened the door to what many scientists called “predatory 
journals,” which, without the need of a large investment in infrastructure 
(as it was necessary with printed journals), could offer rapid publication 
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to scientists struggling to find outlets for their research results (Grant, 
2009a, 2009b; Beal, 2016). As for already well- established journals hav-
ing a strong brand, like Nature, they could maximize their monetary value 
by creating sister journals, using their main brand as attractor. Thus, after 
having capitalized for more than a century off the value of a single multi-
disciplinary journal called Nature, the company understood that it could 
extract even more value from this brand by multiplying the titles associ-
ated with it. Since the 2000s, it has thus created more than thirty titles 
associated with the name Nature: Nature Physics, Nature Chemistry, and 
so on, betting on the aura effect of the original journal to attract the “best 
papers” from authors in search of maximum visibility for their research 
results. Property of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS), the journal Science has also adopted that strategy by cre-
ating a series of sister journals like Science Robotics and Science Immu-
nology, for example.
Now, much as the number of “citations” had become the “objective” 
measure of the value of papers too numerous to be read carefully by eval-
uation committees, so the Journal Impact Factor has become the measure 
of the value of journals too numerous to be known to researchers and 
their evaluators. First published in 1975 as a measure of the visibility of 
a journal in the scientific field, it was aimed at librarians as a tool of 
collection management. Significantly, it only became an object of conten-
tion in the scientific field in the mid- 1990s, when it had been transformed 
into a mechanical tool for evaluating researchers instead of journals. The 
main drawback of using “citations” to papers as a quantitative indicator 
of their “value” is that they take time to accrue, whereas “evaluation” 
thrives on “timeliness.” Before citing a paper, one must first read it (or at 
least see a reference to it), then write a new paper citing it, make it pass 
through peer review, and then see it published. That means that, generally, 
it takes at least a few years to begin to be cited and about five to seven 
years (depending on the field) to reach a peak before observing declining 
citations as the knowledge becomes standard, what Merton called “oblit-
eration by incorporation” (Merton, 1988; McCain, 2014). Faced with this 
problematic time delay, evaluators thus tended to replace citations by the 
more readily accessible Journal Impact Factor. Though it characterizes 
the journal and not the paper, it provides an immediate “proxy” measure 
of “quality” and “impact” that obviates the problem of having to wait a 
couple of years to know whether or not a given paper has had a scientific 
impact on the field.
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Having become a measure of “quality,” the impact factor was then 
used by companies to promote their journals and attract new authors. 
This apparently inconsequential change gave journals an added centrality 
in the evaluation system, as it was access to them that was now measured 
and valued and no more the content of the paper itself and its visibil-
ity (measured by its citations). Hence government officials and research 
institutions in a number of countries (Pakistan, China, South Korea, and 
Japan) have even established financial incentives based directly on the 
numerical value of a journal’s impact factor, despite the obvious fact 
that these values cannot be compared across disciplines (Fuyuno and 
Cyranoski, 2006). This, in turn, put added pressure on scientists, some 
of whom went so far as to manipulate the peer- review system of journals 
to make sure their papers get published (see also Brunton’s contribution 
in this book, chapter 18). Once uncovered, the scam led journal editors 
to retract the papers on the basis that they had been fraudulently peer 
reviewed by their authors (Barbash, 2015; Haug, 2015; see also Barbour 
and Stell’s contribution in this book, chapter 11). Hence, these new met-
rics can directly influence access to the resources needed for research (fig-
ure 2.2).
The simplistic nature of metrics based on Journal Impact Factors was 
much denounced by scientists and bibliometricians. After more than a 
decade of harsh critiques, many journals, including Nature and other “elite 
journals,” took some distance from an indicator they had long used to 
brand themselves, in order not to be associated with simplistic evaluation 
methods that could tarnish their reputation (Callaway, 2016). As journals 
supposed to publish units of knowledge, they thus seem to resist being 
transformed into a mere measurement tool. A similar situation happened 
with academic book publishers in the 1990s. Pressured by authors to 
publish the book they needed to justify tenure, publishers asked universi-
ties to decouple the tenure system from university presses (Waters, 2004).
The central place now accorded to quantitative indicators of produc-
tivity and impact also created a new market for companies offering their 
service to “evaluate” researchers, laboratories, and universities (Ameri-
can Association of University Professors, 2016). As papers and journals 
were being transformed into accounting units, journal publishing com-
panies saw a new opportunity to market themselves as providing new 
evaluation indicators based on their own set of journals, while at the 
same time enrolling institutions to push their researchers to publish in 
their self- proclaimed “high- quality” journals. The best example of such 
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a strategy is the creation in 2014 of the “Nature Index,” which ranks 
countries and institutions on the basis of the papers they publish in only 
sixty- eight journals, defined as “high- quality science journals,” and which 
include seventeen (25 percent) from the Nature group itself, owned by 
Macmillan and now merged with Springer, one of the largest publishers 
of scientific journals. This new ranking is said to offer “a perspective on 
high- quality research on the basis of published articles” and to “provide 
institutions with an easy means to identify and highlight some of their 
best scientific research.”1
In addition to radically transforming the mode of circulation of sci-
entific papers, internet access also affected the kind of metrics promoted 
to measure the “impact” (rarely clearly defined) of research. Through the 
internet, one can access the article and look at the screen for a minute or 
download a copy of the entire paper. These actions leave traces and thus 
create new data on the “uses” of scientific papers. This situation gave rise 
to “altmetrics,” presented as an alternative to citation analysis, though 
they simply measure something different than citations (Priem et al., 
2010; see also Lin’s contribution to this book, chapter 16). Whereas cita-
tions are essentially coming from within the scientific field, measures of 
internet uses survey a larger spectrum of users of unknown nature in the 
larger social space, as the “clicks” don’t tell us if the author is a simple 
citizen or a publishing researcher.
By broadening the spectrum of metrics, internet- based measures of the 
visibility of publications have also contributed to the rush to measure 
the “impact” of scientific research, even though the exact meaning of 
those “impacts” remains evanescent. The evangelists of these new web 
measures have been quick to point out that it takes years to be cited, 
whereas “views” and “downloads” are accessible in real time, day after 
day, even hour after hour. By adding blogs and tweets to the array of 
metrics, one certainly gets tools to follow the diffusion of research results 
among diverse communities, but that does not say much about the qual-
ity or even robustness of the published results. Moreover, these various 
metrics have radically different temporalities and correspond to differ-
ent audiences: whereas the scientific field with its citation culture works 
on the scale of many years, blogs and tweets operate in the larger social 
space and fluctuate and vanish within days for blogs and within hours 
for tweets. One can thus expect that scientists will be very critical of insti-
tutions trying to use such crude and ill- defined metrics to evaluate the 
“impact” of their research, be it social, economic, cultural, or whatever 
else it could be. Pressured to constantly show the usefulness of scientific 
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research, laboratories and universities may nonetheless succumb to the 
cynical use of these metrics when they suit their purpose, much as they 
do with the so- called “world university rankings,” despite their obvious 
flaws (Gingras, 2016; see also Kehm’s contribution to this book).
Conclusion
After having been in a relatively stable state for more than three centuries, 
and this despite its continuous exponential growth during that period 
(Price, 1963), the basic structure of the scientific field has been submitted 
over the last twenty years to a series of radical transformations. It is not 
really possible at this point in time to evaluate their long- term effects. We 
are still in a transition period that sees many kinds of experimentation 
going on with various ways of making knowledge claims circulate: pre-
print servers, open reviews, post- publication comments, “fast- track” peer 
review, and many others. But as the physicists have shown through their 
use of the preprint server system ArXiv since the beginning of the 1990s, 
not all disciplines can follow the same model. The potentially dangerous 
social impact of false medical discoveries announced without peer review 
would be far more important, for example, than the surprising announce-
ment by physicists of their having observed a neutrino moving faster than 
the speed of light (Cho, 2012). Though erroneous, this spectacular news 
item kept the social media and the blogosphere excited for a few days in 
the fall of 2011, but this major mistake could not have had any serious 
effect on the daily life of citizens.
One thing seems certain: the pressure to get faster results— and faster 
evaluation of results— has given rise to a reaction among scientists and 
the creation of the “slow science” movement (Berg and Seeber, 2016). The 
manifesto proclaims that “slow science was pretty much the only science 
conceivable for hundreds of years.” The partisans of the movement insist 
that “society should give scientists the time they need, but more impor-
tantly, scientists must take their time […] to think, […] to digest […] to 
misunderstand each other, especially when fostering lost dialogue between 
humanities and natural sciences.”2 And only time will tell whether scien-
tists, by becoming more conscious of the mechanisms that triggered the 
transformations that now affect their research activities, will also take 
the time needed to make sure the evaluation methods that contributed 
to transforming the product of their research into mere accounting units 
get replaced by ones that are more consistent with the nature of research, 
which, as the manifesto also underlines, “develops unsteadily, with jerky 
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moves and unpredictable leaps forward— at the same time, however, it 
creeps about on a very slow time scale, for which there must be room and 
to which justice must be done.”
Notes
1. http:// www . natureindex . com / faq # introduction2 . Accessed May 2, 2017.
2. http:// slow - science . org / slow - science - manifesto . pdf .
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scientific paper a simple accounting unit of research activity, thus generating a series of 
intermediaries and new evaluation metrics.
The Transformation of the Scientific Paper  53
- scientific - journal - to - retract - 43 - papers - systematic - scheme - may - affect - other 
- journals / .
Beal, J. 2016. “Predatory Journals: Ban Predators from the Scientific Record.” 
Nature 534(June 16):doi:10.1038/534326a.
Berg, M., and B. Seeber. 2016. The Slow Professor: Challenging the Culture of 
Speed in the Academy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Biagioli, M. 2002. “From Book Censorship to Academic Peer Review.” Emer-
gences 12(1):11– 45.
Bourdieu, P. 1986. “Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory of Research for 
the Sociology of Education, edited by J. E. Richardson, 241– 258. New York: 
Greenwood Press.
Bourdieu, P. 2004. Science of Science and Reflexivity. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
Bruneau, W., and C. D. Savage. 2002. Counting Out the Scholars: How Perfor-
mance Indicators Undermine Universities and Colleges. Toronto: James Lorimer.
Bruno, I., and E. Didier. 2013. Benchmarking: L’État Sous Pression Statistique. 
Paris: La Découverte.
Callaway, E. 2016. “Publishing Elite Turns Against Impact Factor.” Nature 
535(July 14):210– 211.
Cho, A. 2012. “Once Again, Physicists Debunk Faster- Than- Light Neutrinos.” 
Science (June 8): http:// www . sciencemag . org / news / 2012 / 06 / once - again - physicists 
- debunk - faster - light - neutrinos .
Cole, J. R., and S. Cole. 1973. Social Stratification of Science. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Corbyn, Z. 2009. “Retractions Up Tenfold.” Times Higher Education (August 
20): https:// www . timeshighereducation . com / news / retractions - up - tenfold / 407838 
. article .
Chubin, D., and E. Hackett. 1990. Peerless Science. Peer Review and US Science 
Policy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Espeland, N. W., and M. Sauder. 2016. Engines of Anxiety: Academic Rankings, 
Reputation, and Accountability. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Fuyuno, I., and D. Cyranoski. 2006. “Cash for Papers: Putting a Premium on 
Publication.” Nature 441(June 15):792.
Gingras, Y. 2016. Bibliometrics and Research Evaluation. Uses and Abuses. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Grant, B. 2009a. “Merck Published Fake Journal.” TheScientist . com (April 30): 
http:// www . the - scientist . com / blog / display / 55671 / .
Grant, B. 2009b. “Elsevier Published 6 Fake Journals.” TheScientist . com (May 7): 
http://www. the - scientist . com / blog / display / 55679 / .
Gustafson, T. 1975. “The Controversy Over Peer Review.” Science 190(December 
12):1060– 1066. doi:10.1126/science.190.4219.1060.
Hagstrom, O. W. 1965. The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books.
54  Yves Gingras
Haug, J. C. 2015. “Peer- Review Fraud— Hacking the Scientific Publication Pro-
cess.” New England Journal of Medicine 373(December 17):2393– 2395.
Kronick, D. A. 2004. “Devant le Deluge” and Other Essays on Early Modern 
Scientific Communication. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow.
Laakso, M., P. Welling, H. Bukvova, L. Nyman, B.- C. Björk, and T. Hedlund. 
2011. “The Development of Open Access Journal Publishing from 1993 to 2009.” 
PLoS ONE 6(6):e20961. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020961.
Larivière, V., S. Haustein, and P. Mongeon. 2015. “The Oligopoly of Academic 
Publishers in the Digital Era.” PLoS ONE 10(6):e0127502.
Latour, B., and S. Woolgar. 1982. “The Cycle of Credibility,” in Science in Con-
text. Readings in the Sociology of Science, edited by Barry Barnes and David 
Edge, 34– 43. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McCain, W. K. 2014. “Obliteration by Incorporation,” in Beyond Bibliometrics, 
edited by Blaise Cronin and Cassiry R. Sugimoto, 129– 149. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
McGuigan, S. G., and D. R. Russel. 2008. “The Business of Academic Publishing: 
A Strategic Analysis of the Academic Journal Publishing Industry and Its Impact 
on the Future of Scholarly Publishing.” Electronic Journal of Academic and Spe-
cial Librarianship 9(3): http:// southernlibrarianship . icaap . org / content / v09n03 
/ mcguigan_g01 . html .
Merton, R. K. 1973. The Normative Structure of Science. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Merton, R. K. 1988. “The Matthew Effect in Science, II. Cumulative Advantage 
and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property.” Isis 79:606– 623.
Peiffer, J., and J. P. Vittu. 2008. “Les Journaux Savants, Formes de la Communi-
cation et Agents de la Construction des Savoirs (17e- 18e siècles).” Dix- Huitème 
Siècle no 40:281– 300.
Power, M. 2000. “The Audit Society— Second Thoughts.” International Journal 
of Auditing 4(1):111– 119.
Price, D. J. de Solla. 1963. Little Science, Big Science. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
Priem, J., D. Taraborelli, P. Groth, and C. Neylon. 2010. “Altmetrics: A Mani-
festo.” October 26: http:// www . altmetrics . org / manifesto .
Pyenson, L. 2008. “Physical Sense in Relativity: Max Planck Edits the Annalen 
der Physik, 1906– 1918.” Annalen der Physik 17(2– 3):176– 189.
Rennie, D. 2016. “Let’s Make Peer Review Scientific.” Nature 535(July 7): 
31– 33.
Tenopir, C., and D. W. King. 1997. “Trends in Scientific Scholarly Journal Publish-
ing in the United States.” Journal of Scholarly Publishing 28(3):135– 170.
Thatcher, G. S. 1995. “The Crisis in Scholarly Communication.” Chronicle of 
Higher Education (March 3):B1– B2.
The Transformation of the Scientific Paper  55
Thompson, J. 2005. Books in the Digital Age: The Transformation of Academic 
and Higher Education Publishing in Britain and the United States. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
Van Noorden, R. 2013. “Brazilian Citation Scheme Outed. Thomson Reuters 
Suspends Journals from Its Rankings for ‘Citation Stacking.’” Nature 500(August 
29):510– 511.
Wade, N. 1975. “Citation Analysis: A New Tool for Science Administrators.” Sci-
ence 188(4187):429– 432.
Waters, L. 2004. Enemies of Promise: Publishing, Perishing, and the Eclipse of 
Scholarship. Chicago: Prickly Paradigms Press.
Wilson, T. D. 2002. “The Nonsense of ‘Knowledge Management.’” Information 
Research 8(1): http:// InformationR . net / ir / 8–1 / paper144 . html .
Zuckerman, H., and R. K. Merton. 1971. “Patterns of Evaluation in Science: Insti-
tutionalization, Structure, and Functions of the Referee System.” Minerva 9:66– 100.

In 2014, two philosophy departments, at the universities of Birmingham 
and Keele in the United Kingdom, came equal top in a league table, each 
with grade point averages of 3.80 (where 4 is a maximum). The Depart-
ment of Philosophy at Oxford University was ranked tenth with a grade 
point average (GPA) of 3.40.1
Ranking systems are widespread, not least in the field of education 
(see Kehm, this volume, chapter 6). For example, Espeland and Sauder 
(2007) examine the rankings of US law schools and their effects on the 
behavior of key organizational participants, such as deans, who are com-
pelled to pay attention to them despite being doubtful of their worth. 
Furthermore, while small differences in GPA calculations can amplify dif-
ferences in rank ordering, these crude snapshots of relative performance 
provide easy and popular comparability for nonspecialist publics. How-
ever, there is something particularly distinctive about the ranking of UK 
philosophy departments described above: it is based on an evaluation of 
the impact of their research.
By impact in this context, one would ordinarily imagine journal citations 
and other demonstrable measures of quality within the field of academic 
philosophy. Such bibliometrics have attracted considerable attention from 
analysts (e.g., Gingras, 2016). Yet this would be wrong. Impact in this UK 
setting means the social and economic beneficial impact outside academia. 
In other words, the departments of philosophy at Birmingham, Keele, and 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom were graded and ranked in terms of the 
social and beneficial impact of their research. In fact, all subject areas in UK 
universities were evaluated for this kind of impact as part of a major evalu-
ation of research quality, the Research Excellence Framework (REF2014 
hereafter, which is the successor to the Research Assessment Exercises of 
previous decades). UK universities made 1,911 submissions across all sub-
ject areas from 52,061 staff who produced 191,150 research “outputs” 
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of one kind or another. Importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, UK 
universities submitted 6,975 case studies to demonstrate the impact of 
their research.2 As noted above, the Birmingham and Keele departments 
of philosophy came top of all philosophy departments for their impact.
How is it possible to produce such strange organizational facts as these, 
and for them not to be regarded as strange? In the next two sections, I pro-
vide a brief account of the REF2014 evaluation regime and of the impact 
case study (ICS) as a new accounting instrument in UK higher education. 
The argument then focuses on a specific style of evidence gathering for 
impact adopted by many UK academics— solicited testimony— and uses 
this feature of REF2014 to suggest that the requirement to demonstrate 
the impact of research is a meta- game, understood as an infrastructure 
for the production of a certain kind of truth (Foucault, 1980) that also 
contains the seeds of a kind of “institutional wrongdoing.” Indeed, as 
noted by Wouters (this volume, chapter 4), a meta- game signifies that 
it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between gaming the 
system and the normal functioning of the system (see also Biagioli, 2016). 
Two important internal features of this meta- game are highlighted. First, 
while ICSs are qualitative narratives, they are also reductive in nature and 
create the platform for commensuration via evaluative metrics. Second, 
the impact meta- game is constituted by a “logic of auditability” with con-
sequences for academic habits and orientation.
REF2014 and Impact
The periodic evaluation of research in the United Kingdom every six to 
seven years is well established and has been replicated in other countries. 
Governments demand these evaluations in order to demonstrate that 
money is being well spent on high- quality research and, in theory at least, 
to allocate scarce resources to the best universities as judged by the evalu-
ation exercise. In practice, compromises are always required in order to 
avoid a winner- takes- all concentration of reward in a few universities, 
leading many to question the purpose of these evaluations.
Different policy fields have had a longstanding interest in the impact 
of interventions, and “impact” and “impactfulness” have emerged as val-
ues in many areas, such as environmental impact assessment. In the UK 
higher education setting, a decisive catalyst for change was the Warry 
Report (2006), which recommended that universities measure the impact 
of their research outside the academy. This ambition finally became a real-
ity for REF2014, and it was decided that twenty percent of total funding 
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for research would be awarded on the basis of such impact (Funding 
Councils, 2011). Despite initial skepticism and opposition to the crudity 
of an impact measure for the humanities, UK universities got on with 
the job of operationalizing the requirement. However, the approach that 
emerged was very different from the metrics- based regime imagined by 
the Warry Report. After a period of consultation and experimentation, the 
regulators of UK universities settled on a case study approach to the dem-
onstration and evaluation of research impact. In effect, while the journal 
article has long been an “accounting unit” for individual academics (see 
Wager, this volume, chapter 17; Gingras, this volume, chapter 2), a further 
new statement was created— the Impact Case Study or ICS— to account 
for the impact of these primary accounting units. And, as noted above, UK 
universities produced nearly seven thousand of these ICSs.
The Impact Case Study as an Accounting Unit
Academics have a long history of being involved, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in the world beyond academia. They may be advisers to govern-
ment and business; they may develop beneficial technologies in medicine 
and engineering; they may be public commentators on issues of the day 
and so on. Yet the UK impact regime has changed the status of all these 
activities, which we might call engagement. Simply put, they have come 
to be regarded as not necessarily impactful in and of themselves. They 
have been redescribed as “pathways to impact” and therefore as distinct 
from ultimate impact in the sense of a beneficial change. Accordingly, UK 
academics have had to ask themselves two questions: “What has changed 
(outside academia) as a result of my research?” and, crucially, “How can 
I demonstrate it?”
UK universities needed to provide resources to support the ICS process 
and to build an infrastructure to cope with this entirely new requirement 
(Power, 2015). The workload was mitigated to the extent that not all 
research was required to demonstrate its impact; a norm emerged that 
roughly one ICS would need to be produced for every ten members of 
research- active academic staff (this is not a natural ratio and there is no 
reason to suppose it will not change). Furthermore, in contrast to the 
Warry Report, the rules published by the regulator were pluralistic about 
the kinds of impact that academic research might have. Creating a new 
life- saving drug might be the gold standard, but critical interventions in 
public policy debates contributing to change would also count as long as 
they could be proven. Finally, UK universities were highly motivated to 
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comply with the requirement since the financial reward for a 4* ICS— 
the highest grade— was considerable. Indeed, an official was heard at a 
conference to confess that the ICSs were “overpriced.” Research impact 
had in effect become big business for UK universities.
Many UK academics, believing or knowing themselves to be impact-
ful, embraced the impact agenda and got on with the work of producing 
their case studies. They were advised and quality controlled by committees 
that were themselves learning the impact game. ICSs would be evaluated 
for their “reach” and “significance” and there was a prescribed template 
design to shape and limit the form, content, and length of an ICS. Although 
ICSs might essentially be narrative in form (i.e., be “stories of impact”), 
they would have a prescribed structure with maximum word counts for 
each section. There were also more specific rules— not least about the 
accounting time window within which impact might be measured— but 
also quite a lot of pluralism about the kinds of possible impact to consider 
and also about the forms of evidence that might be used to support claims 
of impact (Funding Councils, 2011). A particularly significant form of evi-
dence used by scholars at the London School of Economics (LSE), includ-
ing myself, was “solicited testimony.” Reflecting on this evidence form 
provides some insight into the workings of the research impact regime.
Evidence of Impact and Solicited Testimony
In the practical field of evaluation, it is accepted that a way to find out if 
an intervention has had an impact is to ask those people or groups who 
one would naturally expect to have been “impacted.” In other words, 
their testimony is solicited. Although this method of data collection has 
its own epistemological shortcomings, and care must be taken not to lead 
the respondents, for very pragmatic reasons, it was an attractive form of 
evidence for social scientists. Many very smart people at LSE encountered 
problems writing their ICSs largely because of the difficulties of causal 
attribution coupled with normal scientific caution and modesty. And even 
where their external impact might be self- evident to themselves, it would 
not be to others. Because the effects of research, if any, dissipate into 
the wider social and institutional environment of universities, evidential 
traces of impact lie outside the organization and are costly to collect. 
At LSE, the ICS proved to be a distinctive kind of genre that had to be 
crafted, and the process gave rise to many unexpected difficulties. In such 
a setting, and with a race against time to prepare the ICSs, the epistemic 
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weaknesses of solicited testimony were outweighed by its pragmatic, low- 
cost features.
Terms like “solicited testimony” imply seriousness and scientificity. But 
the impact game was new, and many academics, in the search for corrobo-
rating evidence, rang or emailed those who may have been influenced by 
their research. Conversations might have gone like this: “Look, you know 
that piece of work I did for you, based on my research, which you thought 
was important? Would you mind just putting that in a letter to me or in 
an email please?” In this way, a trace of external impact was created that 
could be collected as evidence. Importantly, it was not sitting out there 
waiting to be found. It was actively constructed by the researcher.
Meta- Gaming
What is going on here? Were academics like me gaming the system by 
seeking solicited testimony in this way? Was this a cheap and quick way 
to build a credible ICS, particularly as the narrative of impact had to be 
constructed ex post and in a hurry? This is undoubtedly partly the case; 
at LSE, concerns were voiced about the overuse of this evidence type in 
many ICSs. These concerns were also shared by evaluators. One report 
on the REF2014 process and the evaluation of ICSs notes that they found 
it “very hard to assess the significance of an impact where evidence was 
nuanced and in the form of corroborating testimonials” (Rand Europe, 
2015). However, much more is at stake here than gaming by individual 
academics.
The impact agenda in the United Kingdom represents a rebalancing of 
two logics or values that have always existed in tension with each other 
in academic life, namely, the logic of autonomous curiosity and the logic 
of use- value and economic benefit. Furthermore, different universities and 
different subject areas will combine these logics in different ways. Fields 
such as social policy, where action research is common, embraced the turn 
toward impact. Strangely perhaps, in business schools, where subdisciplines 
have been on a path to greater academic respectability, the impact agenda 
created more challenges than might be expected. And for fields such as his-
tory and philosophy, the agenda was entirely new and disruptive.
However, while the rise of impact accounting in UK universities exhib-
its this diversity of reactions, the example of solicited testimony as an 
evidence form suggests that something systematic is at stake. Following 
REF2014, new academic habits are visible, supported and routinized by 
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new infrastructures and databases for the collation and analysis of impact. 
Universities are creating dedicated roles, such as “impact officers,” and pro-
viding support to academics to help them maximize their impact (LSE Pub-
lic Policy Group, 2012). Research funding bodies are awarding prizes for 
impact. In short, an entire impact apparatus is being created. UK funding 
bodies also often require a statement of expected impact or something 
similar in grant applications. In effect, this means that applicants must 
turn the causal pathway model on its head; the economic stakes of being 
successful in raising funding implicitly requires them to ensure that they 
are having or will have an impact before they do the related research. So 
the grant application process reveals a variant of Goodhart’s law, whereby 
an ex post outcome measure of impact “flips” to become an ex ante target 
(see also Griesemer, this volume, chapter 5, for more on Goodhart’s law). 
Rather than impact being a measured outcome of research, as it was for 
REF2014, it is now research, or a certain style of research, that is becom-
ing the product of an apparatus that targets impact (Power, 2015).
Formally not all UK academics are required to prepare ICSs and be 
impactful. Yet impact is now one of the formal criteria in promotion 
guidance. Impact has therefore become an established norm of evaluation 
regardless of nuances of scope. Consequently, as the example of solicited 
testimony suggests, UK researchers are learning how to engage with pos-
sible users of their research, constructing them as good impactees who 
are actively cultivated and internally represented for the purpose of writ-
ing future ICSs.
From this point of view, the use of solicited testimony is not simply the 
gaming of the impact accounting system by individual academics. Rather, 
it reveals how the system actually works. The impact accounting regime 
may indeed be subject to gaming of its rules, but those rules in aggregate, 
embedded in apparatuses, constitute a meta- game, namely rules for the 
production of a certain kind of truth in Foucault’s (1980) sense, meaning 
systematized ways of governing what it is possible for individuals to say, 
and what actions and performances are legitimate. While it is easy to hold 
specific humans to account and make them visible within an accounting 
system, it is much harder to hold an accounting system to account and 
to provide a critical account of its operating logic. Below I argue that 
this operating logic in the case of research impact in the United Kingdom 
has little to do with social and economic benefit— the originating policy 
values— but is motivated by a distinctive cultural commitment to evidence 
gathering and its associated disciplinary power. I call this the “logic of 
auditability” (Power, 2019).
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Qualitative Commensuration
While the ambition of the original Warry Report was for the measurement 
of impact, and this is an ambition which has not disappeared, the ICS 
regime that took shape in the United Kingdom did not take this direction. 
While metrics (e.g., citations in public documents) supporting impact may 
be used as forms of evidence, this is within the context of an overall case 
study narrative. However, if metrics are not a required input of the impact 
accounting system, they are a consequence of it. The grade point average of 
3.8 scored by the departments of philosophy in the universities of Birming-
ham and Keele noted above are composites of scores given to individual 
ICSs by a panel of evaluators. So at this point of evaluation, very different 
ICSs narrating very different kinds of impact become commensurable, 
are made capable of being compared, and, importantly, ranked (Espeland 
and Stevens, 1998).
The process of commensuration, the point at which qualities are 
made into quantities, is a continuing source of interest to scholars and to 
the emerging “valuation studies” agenda.3 However, the case of research 
impact in the United Kingdom suggests that there may not always be a 
singular ontological jump from quality to quantity. The ICS accounting 
regime provides an example of how qualitative characteristics become sub-
ject to quasi- commensuration in templates and requirements for narrative 
precision. This is not a direct form of quantification, but rather its condi-
tions of possibility— in this case, it enables grading by an evaluator. In other 
words, the point of metricization and quantification has its conditions of 
possibility in the construction of qualitative or hybrid narrative forms that 
integrate with, and support, quantification. So the ground for commen-
suration has already been prepared in their construction. The final stage 
of quantitative commensuration can then be performed by evaluators 
who make judgments about the quality of each ICS and express them in 
metrics.
Impact and the Logic of Auditability
The research impact requirements in the United Kingdom emerged from 
policy ambitions to reconnect universities to the UK economy and to make 
this demonstrable. In particular, the ICS infrastructure requires the traces 
of impact to be constructed and reported in templates that enable them 
to be evaluated and audited. Such a model is familiar to accountants— it’s 
the way accounts are produced. Yet, this creation of traces, how we do it 
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and for what activities, whether they’re citations or other fact- bearing 
objects, reflects a cultural logic of a distinctive kind, a logic of auditability 
(Power, 2019). Fundamentally, this is a logic of  trace production rather 
than measurement specifically. For example, solicited testimony discussed 
earlier is one form of systematic, nonquantitative trace construction that 
is interiorized, embodied in ICSs, and then evaluated. Guided by the logic 
of auditability, the trace does not simply record the impact; it defines and 
constitutes what impact is.
The logic of auditability as a cultural form of trace production mat-
ters when considering the evaluators of the 6,975 impact case studies 
noted above. It is clear that that they found the evaluation process very 
difficult, despite the discipline of the ICS production process. Evaluators 
reported that they had very little time or resources to drill down to check 
(i.e., audit) the underlying sources or traces referenced in the ICSs, and 
they drew attention to the poor quality of links to underlying evidence 
(Rand Europe, 2015). Their operational challenges reveal the face of the 
real “audit society” (Power, 1997). It is far from being a fully transparent 
and “auditable” society, or even one that’s full of very confident inspec-
tors and watchdogs who perform checks. Rather, the logic of auditability 
is essentially productionist; it names a cultural compulsion for organiza-
tions to construct and collect traces of activities, and to fabricate audit 
trails that link accounts of performance, such as ICSs, to an underlying 
evidence base. That evidence must be shaped, selected, and constructed 
so that traces of impact are auditable in principle, even if this is not pos-
sible in actuality.
The logic of auditability is a cultural value that passes for common 
sense and is reinforced by the construction of infrastructures for trace pro-
duction. In this respect, the impact regime is a meta- game for the produc-
tion of a distinctive kind of facticity. It is a meta- game because it embodies 
a potential for misconduct that has little to do with gaming metrics at the 
individual level. Rather, a kind of misconduct is embodied in the infra-
structure itself whose deep logic is that of auditability and trace produc-
tion, whether the traces are citations within academia (Biagioli, 2016) or 
traces of impact in the “outside” world. The logic of auditability does not 
itself value users or consumers or indeed economic value as such— the 
value is in the trace (Power, 2019). To understand the power of this logic 
is to understand why there seems to be so much investment in evaluation 
systems that are very costly and seem to produce little economic benefit.
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Conclusions: From Traces to Metrics
The chapter began with the example of UK philosophy departments 
playing the game of research impact. Of course we know that philosophy 
has an impact; the influence of Plato and Aristotle on Western culture and 
cognitive assumptions is well known. However, had Plato and Aristotle 
lived today, I think they would have been hard pressed to construct an 
ICS and to collect traces of the kind required by the REF2014 exercise. 
Ironically, this is because their impact has been so great and so diffuse that 
even the most helpful impact support officer would struggle to support 
them in producing the evidence. This is another paradoxical feature of 
the impact regime in the UK: the more impact you actually have, the 
harder it is to account for it.
I have suggested that the regime for accounting for research impact in 
the United Kingdom is a kind of meta- game in the form of elaborate rules 
for the production of a new kind of truth about academic research. Appar-
ent individual gaming of this regime, such as the use of solicited testimony 
discussed above, is in fact a feature of the way the regime works. Following 
Foucault (1980), I also allude to a growing “impact infrastructure” that 
regulates the production of this truth in the form of acceptable “account-
ing” statements about impact. This impact infrastructure is in turn itself 
permeated by a systemic logic of auditability that demands the produc-
tion of traces (not just numbers), which, when gathered into the ICS tem-
plate, can be evaluated and then metricized. As regimes of impact truth 
production, these infrastructures have also created new forms of deviance. 
Strangely, this deviance does not always take the traditional form of aca-
demic fraud or gaming the system. Rather it also involves carrying on as 
before without regard for the cultural imperative to produce precise traces 
of activity that can “travel.” From this point of view, being an intellectual 
and writing long books are forms of deviance relative to, and brought into 
existence by, the research impact accounting system in the United King-
dom. But in a system whose logic would define Plato and Aristotle as devi-
ant, we should probably ask where the ultimate misconduct really lies.
Notes
1. https:// www . times higher education . com / sites / default / files / Attachments / 2014 
/ 12 / 17 / k / a / s / over - 14 - 01 . pdf . Accessed on May 9, 2016. A grade point average is 
simply what it says (i.e., an overall average of grades given on  individual units 
of evaluation, usually calibrated from 1 to 4). The impact of all subject areas 
66  Michael Power
was aggregated to give a score for impact at the individual institutional level. 
The UK Institute of Cancer Research was top in the rankings overall.
2. See http:// www . ref . ac . uk / media / ref / content / pub / REF%20Brief%20
Guide%202014 . pdf . Accessed on May 9, 2016.
3. For the recently created online journal Valuation Studies, see http:// 
 valuationstudies . liu . se / .
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In this chapter, I would like to discuss the implication of the problematic 
relationship between “gaming the system” and “properly operating in the 
system” for research evaluation. As Biagioli and Lippman (Introduction, 
this volume) argue, the current audit culture in academia has created new 
dimensions of academic misconduct. The performance indicators that 
are supposed to objectively measure the value of scientific production 
have become the objects of new forms of manipulation. Because research 
evaluations have become reliant on proxy indicators that measure only 
indirectly what they are supposed to represent (either quality, impact, or 
societal relevance), it is increasingly hard to see the difference between 
indicator manipulation and authentic high- value research. According to 
Biagioli and Lippman (Introduction, this volume), “the traditional locus 
of evaluation— the publication’s claims— has become technically irrel-
evant to metrics regimes based on impact factors.” Reading has stopped 
being necessary in institutional evaluations, they argue, while the role 
of metadata has shifted from descriptive to evaluative. While I think the 
practice of evaluation is still quite messy (in many assessments, reading 
might still happen), and the role of indicators is not so straightforward 
(the Journal Impact Factor, though the most popular indicator, is not 
the only game in town and neither representative for all), I do agree that 
Biagioli and Lippman very perceptively sketch a portrait of the dominant 
tendencies in the academic audit culture and of the market enabled by the 
infrastructure of citation (Wouters, 2014). Indeed, if these trends remain 
dominant, high performance scores will be made identical to high- value 
work. Those aspects of academia that are not presentable in indicators 
may then no longer be supported (by researchers themselves as well as 
by their employers) and may have to migrate to the area of works of love 
(amateurs)— or become extinct. Scientific research may in such a scenario 
still lead to exciting innovations, but the notion of knowledge itself as 
4
The Mismeasurement of Quality  
and Impact
Paul Wouters
68  Paul Wouters
an important aspect of human culture would no longer be an important 
leitmotiv of universities. Scientific research will then have been instru-
mentalized in its totality.
If we wish to somehow preserve, or restore in new forms, this aspect of 
academic life, it seems useful to imagine alternative scenarios. This should 
also involve alternative forms of research assessments and performance 
evaluation of individual researchers, research groups, and institutions. 
Imagining these will require a bolder redesigning of current evaluation 
protocols at universities than is currently the case. In particular, I will 
argue, evaluation experts and scientometrians need to go beyond the 
popular concept of “informed peer review” (Moed, 2005). It is not suf-
ficient to claim that peer review and indicators need to be combined in 
intelligent ways because the very basis of what counts as an intelligent 
combination is at stake. What is needed is a more radical recontextualiza-
tion of indicators as well as qualitative evidence in assessments.
Before discussing a possible alternative to the market- oriented, indicator- 
driven forms of evaluation, it makes sense to briefly outline how research 
assessments have become influential in shaping academic life.
First of all, the conduct of research has become so strategic that it is 
vital for researchers to be visible at both the national and international 
level. Second, partly as a result of the success of scientific and techno-
logical research in many fields, and partly as the consequence of indepen-
dent policy developments, the traditional academic autonomy no longer 
exists. Apart from some exceptions, the scholarly community on which 
Robert Merton built his sociology of scientific norms (Merton, 1973) 
has become pervaded by extra- academic interests and communications 
(Leydesdorff, 2000; Shapin, 2008). Third, research groups and individual 
researchers in the public research system in all disciplines are subjected to 
recurring institutional assessments in which performance must be made 
visible in the terms of that specific institution. Usually, scientific quality 
(or excellence) and societal impact are the main pillars. Other criteria 
such as the quality of teaching and PhD training, viability and feasibility 
of the research plans, and, last but not least, earning power are drawn in 
as well. The key issue is that the results of these evaluations produce the 
symbolic capital with which the researchers can— or cannot— participate 
in the next cycle of research.
Two different forms of research evaluation are usually distinguished 
in opposition to each other in the interdisciplinary debate about the best 
way to assess academic research and universities. The first is the qualita-
tive judgment called peer review, based on the assessment by scientific 
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experts usually working in the same or a related field as the research 
group. The second is assessment by indicators often based on simple or 
complex forms of citation analysis in which high numbers of citations are 
seen as proxy for influence or quality. Academia has a lively debate about 
the weight each form of evaluation should have and about the extent to 
which it is possible to combine one with the other (Hicks et al., 2015; 
Wilsdon et al., 2015).
In this debate, it is often overlooked that the two forms of assessment 
are intrinsically and intensely linked to each other. This was not yet the 
case when the Science Citation Index was invented by Eugene Garfield 
(Garfield, 1955; Wouters, 1999, 2014; Csiszar, this volume, chapter 1). 
But as a result of the rise of the use of citation- based performance indi-
cators since the early 1980s, first in national science policies and later 
in the management of universities and research institutes and in global 
university rankings, both methods are no longer purely quantitative ver-
sus qualitative but have intertwined and interpenetrated each other. This 
is relevant to the debate about research integrity and norms for proper 
scientific behavior because, as we will see, comparable forms of mixing 
are making the identification of improper behavior less evident. So it is 
worthwhile to spell out the connections and mutual pollution between 
peer review and assessment by indicators in more detail.
Citing relationships are, in the end, based on the decisions by authors 
of scholarly papers to include formal references in their bibliography to 
scientific work that they deem relevant (implicit references do not end 
up in citation indexes, although they may be very important intellectu-
ally). These citing relationships are usually concentrated within the same 
research area combined with additional interdisciplinary connections to 
other literature. The decision to cite a specific reference, and not an alter-
native piece of work, is shaped by a complex mixture of intellectual and 
strategic motives. The guidelines of scholarly journals or book publish-
ers regarding number and type of references form the template for these 
decisions, but there is still a lot of leeway for the authors to express their 
preferences. It is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly separate intellectual 
and strategic motives. In addition, it should be stressed that both motives 
are of a social nature.
In addition to this basic connection at the individual level, there is also 
a group connection between peer review and citation- based indicators: 
they draw upon the same scientific or scholarly community. This may 
vary by type of document and by discipline, but, very often, the research-
ers in the citation network are also involved in the regular peer- review 
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work of journal and book publications. An interesting question, not yet 
frequently studied, is to what extent these communities are also the basis 
for post- publication peer review such as the national research assessment 
exercises. The latter forms of peer review may draw upon more inter-
disciplinary networks and hence be more removed from the core peer 
networks in particular research areas.
A third connection between citation and peer- based evaluation is 
the reflexive loop that has been created by the emergence of citation- 
based performance indicators. Because researchers have become aware, 
on a large scale, that their bibliographies may influence the careers of 
the researchers they cite, their “citing behavior” will be affected by this 
knowledge. The strategic motives may therefore have become more 
important because the competition among researchers has been extended 
to the domain of metadata such as numbers of citation. Ethnographic 
research of publication and evaluation practices has shown that research-
ers tend to reason quite strategically about both their publication outlets 
and their bibliographies, although it is also clear that this varies strongly 
by field and type of research (Rushforth and de Rijcke, 2015). This does 
not mean, inter alia, that bibliographies have become completely dishon-
est and unreliable as a source for intellectual queries, but it has certainly 
made the sociological interpretation of citation frequencies and networks 
more complex. It is an example of the basic reflexive nature of communi-
cation behavior and networks (Leydesdorff, 1995).
This third connection may have important consequences for the 
conduct of post- publication evaluation of research performance. Most 
formal evaluation protocols do not include instructions to use citation 
indicators and some even discourage the use of indicators such as the 
Journal Impact Factor or the Hirsch Index. However, this does not mean 
that these indicators do not play a role in, for example, the preparation of 
a committee session by individual evaluators. Because the citation indica-
tors have basically become an easily available resource and can indeed 
be seen as a citation infrastructure (Wouters, 2014), consulting Web of 
Science– , Scopus- , or Google Scholar– based citation scores may be mat-
ter of course without much conscious deliberation. They have even led to 
“folk citation theories” upon which researchers draw in their interpreta-
tion of these data (Aksnes and Rip, 2009; Rushforth and de Rijcke, 2015; 
Wilsdon et al., 2015). For example, biomedical researchers are usually 
quite aware of the technical limitations of the impact factor and use these 
as components of a field- specific interpretation of the journals. High 
impact factors may then be interpreted as indicating journals with a large 
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number of submissions and a high rejection rate. Hence, publishing in 
these journals is a sign of success in the fierce competition for recognition. 
Rushforth and de Rijcke (2015) show how the impact factor is used in 
comparable ways as a judgment device that is already deeply engrained 
in collaboration and publication strategies. This does indeed indicate that 
the impact factor, as Biagioli and Lippman (Introduction, this volume) 
argue, functions as a measure of value in a market, in other words as a 
currency.
In the recent Higher Education Funding Council for England report 
The Metric Tide (Wilsdon et al., 2015), a number of norms for proper 
evaluation have been proposed. The unifying concept here is “responsible 
research metrics,” which makes an important reference to the European 
policies on “responsible research and innovation.” Responsible research 
metrics should be seen as those practices in using quantitative perfor-
mance indicators that are attuned to five core principles:
• Robustness: basing metrics on the best possible data in terms of accu-
racy and scope
• Humility: recognizing that quantitative evaluation should support— 
but not supplant— qualitative, expert assessment
• Transparency: keeping data collection and analytical processes open 
and transparent, so that those being evaluated can test and verify the 
results
• Diversity: accounting for variation by field, using a variety of indica-
tors to reflect and support a plurality of research and researcher career 
paths
• Reflexivity: recognizing the potential and systemic effects of indicators 
and updating them in response
These principles have been formulated on the basis of the recognition 
of the complex interplay between peer judgment and citation- based indi-
cators. If national and institutional research assessments and the building 
of the databases used in them would consistently adhere to these prin-
ciples, it would surely represent important progress in evaluation prac-
tices. But how should we interpret the second principle, “humility”? It 
can easily be read as the incorporation of quantitative indicators within 
a framework that is dominated by peer- review and expert judgment. But 
is this really a form of humility?
The recent Leiden Manifesto formulated a comparable norm for the 
use of quantitative performance indicators (Hicks et al., 2015): “Quan-
titative evaluation should support expert assessment.” The manifesto is 
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a warning against exaggerated forms of performance- based indicators 
and pleads for a judicial combination of quantitative and qualitative evi-
dence in research evaluation. This basically builds forth on the concept 
of “informed peer review,” which also aims to combine citation analysis 
with peer review, both in the context of peer review itself (where indica-
tors would simply be a form of evidence next to other forms of quali-
tative or quantitative evidence) and as a check on the integrity of the 
peer- review process itself (Moed, 2005; Butler, 2007).
Informed peer review can be seen as an attempt at triangulation: if we 
can collect more evidence and this evidence points in the same direction, 
surely we have a more robust foundation for our conclusions? However, 
this is based on the assumption that the two forms of evidence are indepen-
dent of each other. As we have seen, this is only partially the case. In addi-
tion, a practical problem arises when citation analysis and peer judgment 
are in conflict with each other about a particular research performance. 
On what basis should the evidence be weighted? The idea that expert judg-
ment is always better ignores the gatekeeper role of scientific reviewers 
and is naïve with respect to the strategic motives operating in the process 
of peer review. Conflicting outcomes of peer review and citation analysis 
may for example be a signal that the reputational mechanisms in the aca-
demic system are not keeping up with novel developments in research. Peer 
review may also play in the hands of “old boys” networks and discriminate 
against women and ethnic and intellectual minorities in science. Relying 
mainly on peer review may delay interdisciplinary innovation because 
this often entails not only a reconfiguration of substantive or method-
ological research areas, but may also mean a redefinition of the very crite-
ria of what counts as high quality in research. In other words, peer review 
in a particular discipline may simply filter out radical innovation because 
it is not recognized as high quality.
So we cannot always rely on peer review as the ultimate arbiter. But the 
same holds for quantitative performance indicators. Neither the number of 
publications nor their number of citations, normalized for field, document 
type, and age or not, can simply be interpreted as proxies for quality or 
impact. Researchers with exceptional publication numbers may be open-
ing up an exciting new field or they may be very good in gaming the per-
formance system. A high number of citations may indicate great research 
with a huge influence or they may come from humdrum me- too research 
or even citation cartels. And a low number of citations may result both 
from less interesting research and from path- breaking studies that are not 
The Mismeasurement of Quality and Impact  73
yet recognized. So we need some form of judgment to assess the value of 
publication or citation performance criteria (the same holds for indica-
tors of earning power). But this brings us back to the experts involved in 
the peer- review system. We seem to be caught between a rock and a hard 
place.
And yet, this does not hinder assessments to take place. In fact, the 
international research system is a buzzing evaluation machine (Dahler- 
Larsen, 2012). The construction of peer review and metrics- based assess-
ment as two opposites, common in generalized debates about research 
evaluation and in most research policy discussions, is a false one in the 
sense that it is not what happens in the varied practices of research evalu-
ation. Rather than the dichotomy of qualitative versus quantitative, or 
peer review versus measurement, we should focus on the context of eval-
uation. The tendency to speak of research evaluation as such tends to 
ignore the wide variety of practices that are bundled in this container 
concept. The weight of impact indicators, for example, varies strongly 
between the assessment of the results of a PhD student and the ranking 
of a university in comparison to its international peers. The tendency to 
speak of research evaluation as a somehow integrated institution is a form 
of purification that tends to make invisible precisely that which should 
be foregrounded in an alternative discourse. In this light, the proposals 
to formulate principles of responsible metrics and responsible evalua-
tion are only a first step. These could still easily be incorporated in the 
framework of a market- oriented audit culture. To enable a true alterna-
tive to the dominant trends in academic research evaluation, we need to 
complement the concept of responsible metrics with the recognition that 
valuing is principally an act of judgment in context. Decontextualized 
information, whether peer based or indicator based, needs to be put back 
into context if we wish to create a strong barrier in assessment practices 
to academic misconduct in all its novel forms.
Technically, my proposal is to replace the notion of “informed peer 
review” as the supposedly most nuanced approach in research assess-
ments by “contextualized judgment,” which 1) puts context central and 
2) does not create a false dichotomy between peer review and indicator- 
based assessment. It takes into account the flexible, and often quite inge-
nious, ways in which researchers attach meaning to constructs like peer 
opinion and citation indicators (Rushforth and de Rijcke, 2015).
Politically, following this approach would put two questions central in 
the construction of new evaluation protocols and procedures:
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 1. How will this evaluation design influence the creative process of knowl-
edge creation?
 2. Who is in control of the agenda setting and the research process?
The first question is about coping with matters of perverse effects, the 
alignment of the criteria in the evaluation and the mission of the specific 
research group or program, and effects on the texture of power in the field. 
The second question addresses the way quality is managed in the field and 
its connections with stakeholders, nonacademic partners, and society at 
large. Both questions point to the political aspects of norms for evaluation. 
This is as it should be since matters of evaluation are deeply political mat-
ters and deal with the question of how we wish to live and what kind of 
society we are creating (Mol, 2002; Thurtle and Mitchell, 2002).
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This chapter offers two thoughts to the meta- conversation about aca-
demic performance metrics and misconduct. One is that Goodhart’s law 
(1975) concerns more than simply the idea of individual responsiveness to 
pressures from societal policies, for example, central bank monetary poli-
cies employ economic performance measures as standards of regulation 
and control in banking. The other concerns how we might exploit what 
more there is to Goodhart’s law to probe the character of “mis”- conduct, 
as individuals and organizations adapt to, and comply with, academic 
performance metrics institutionalized as standards. Contrast this with 
“bad” conduct, as individuals and organizations cynically attempt to 
“game” or “exploit” the system to achieve a better evaluation than their 
performance warrants. Along with other chapters in this volume (Csiszar, 
this volume, chapter 1; Power, this volume, chapter 3), I suggest Good-
hart’s law describes conditions that not only undermine the representa-
tional success in modeling causal order in human social systems, but also 
the operation of the law inverts the causal order. Conversions of metrics 
into standards not only invite “gaming the system,” they also practically 
construct “gaming” as the new form of practice, rendering the original 
product or practice to be measured as a “side effect” in the new causal 
order. Or, as Wouters (this volume, chapter 4) urges, we must distinguish 
gaming the system from properly functioning in an inverted system. It is 
thus problematic to moralize and shame so- called “predatory” practices 
as if it were clear what constitutes ethical, nonpredatory practice in social 
worlds where Goodhart’s law operates.
Goodhart’s lesson was that such measures are self- defeating because 
they invite “mis”- conduct. If people respond to standards as intended, the 
measure ceases to represent and record the primary target performance 
and comes to measure only compliance or conformity to the standard. 
The critique cuts deeper. As Lucas’s (1976) critique of macro- econometric 
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models showed, such measures are self- defeating because the underlying 
causal structures of individual and organizational social behavior change 
when people and organizations respond to policies based on the models, 
so the policy causes the model to cease to represent the very thing the 
measure was designed to measure as it changes the system’s causal struc-
ture. Goodhart’s law and Lucas’s critique apply to social policies built 
upon quantitative metrics taken as standards of quality and performance 
evaluation, for example, academic achievement. So the causal influence is 
reciprocal. This creates conditions for an arms race. The only escape from 
arms races is to realize their futility. Either policy- makers must stop mak-
ing arms- race– producing policies, or the governed must revolt against 
intolerable institutions.
The second thought is that, philosophically, asking a different question 
may lead to more valuable insights than seeking answers to the question 
originally posed. Questions like “what is the nature of misconduct in 
response to academic metrics?” are of this sort because posing this ques-
tion itself reinforces or facilitates circumstances in which Goodhart’s law 
will apply. Framing the question of academic misconduct as one of gaming 
a system of metrics is to accept metrics as standards, if only for the sake of 
argument. Asking draws attention to the problem while entrenching pre-
suppositions of the question. It is a prime mode of escalation in a metrics 
arms race between standards imposers and gamers. Csiszar (this volume, 
chapter 1) calls this an “inverse” form of Goodhart’s law: “Only when a 
measure becomes a target is it widely taken up as a measure worth using.” 
Practices and policies that use metrics as standards turn work performance, 
including scholarship, into a game in which the goal is to exceed the stan-
dard rather than perform the work that was to be measured. In other 
words, compliance with the standard becomes the goal rather than a side 
effect of the performance, and, in turn, performance of the work becomes 
a side effect of a policy imposing a standard. As Chamayou (2009) disturb-
ingly but eloquently argues: the goal is to write articles, not do research. 
Other institutions are changing in parallel ways, so this is a widespread 
change across societies. Managing health risk has become the goal (and 
meaning) of health while curing illness has become the side effect of phar-
maceutical use, rather than the other way around, as Dumit (2012) has 
shown.
Alternative questions are: If academic performance metrics are a 
game, can we hack them? If metrics- based standards and gaming the sys-
tem create an arms race to nowhere (or to the decline and fall of the 
research system), what would it take to get rid of them? If metrics- based 
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academic performance standards can be hacked, then perhaps hacking 
would reveal their futility as unsuited to serve as standards to begin with. 
Perhaps hacking would redirect the question of “mis”- conduct back onto 
social policies of performance evaluation and quality judgment and away 
from charges of manipulated metric outcomes and undeserved gain. My 
aim is to propose interventions leading to better questions, whether or 
not they suggest good answers to old questions.
Performance and publication metrics are of epistemological interest 
concerning how scientific practices become transformed through institu-
tional change, not only of ethical concern about the “conduct” of scien-
tists and their publishers. Studies of gaming metrics may provide insight 
to philosophy of science as well as to research ethics.
Power’s chapter and his book, The Audit Society, urge us to think 
about the kinds of problems surveyed in this volume from the point of 
view of narrative impact stories in addition to quantitative metrics (Power, 
1997). The relation between individual narratives and aggregate impacts 
is a productive way to articulate where and how the “audit society” may 
have gone off the rails into the kind of self- defeating process Goodhart 
warned of. Turning a creative individual enterprise into the bureaucratic 
one of pursuing metrics as the meaning as well as the measure of pro-
ductivity and success, of pursuing the “CV for its own sake,” as Biagioli 
remarked in our workshop, is the moment of translation of performance 
in an audit society into a potential for “mis”- conduct, that is, conduct 
that emerges as unethical or unbecoming in the system as it used to be 
but which no longer functions that way. Institutionalized “mis”- conduct 
then becomes “bad” conduct when the ethics and optics of performance 
are judged against the old system but measured in the transformed sys-
tem. Ethical evaluation lags metrical assessment, and “mis”- conduct that 
used to signal unethical “bad” conduct should now merely point to this 
misalignment, not express condemnation. The ethical judgment becomes 
misplaced and unjustified because the research system is no longer cor-
rectly understood epistemically.
Fundamentally, anyone interested in scientific practice must take into 
account how the research experience is now shaped by academic metrics. 
The “metric tide” (Wilsdon et al., 2015) demands that philosophy of sci-
ence consider that science is now conducted in a regime of metrics, not 
only for research performance evaluation, but also for judgments and 
decisions affecting workflows in the research process itself: what prob-
lems and projects to pursue, what grants to seek, what personnel to hire, 
and what schools to attend, not merely which journals to publish in.
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The comprehensive discussions and critiques in The Metric Tide 
report (Wilsdon et al., 2015) and The Leiden Manifesto (Hicks et al., 2015) 
indicate that there is a kind of balancing act going on in the metrics 
debate about what the future holds. The war on metrics seems to be over: 
metrics will not go away, even if which metrics are today’s favorites will 
face a constant churn. We can describe the central tension in various 
ways, but they boil down to the idea that expert judgment should play 
a central role in evaluating research content and that quantitative data 
should play a role in measuring research productivity. Judgment cannot 
be automated, yet productivity can in some ways be measured.
The Leiden Manifesto says the problem is that performance evaluation 
is now led by the data rather than by judgment. If balance between judg-
ment and data is the goal, then the question to ask is how to rebalance, re- 
energize, and reimagine a role for judgment in the face of the data- driven 
metrics onslaught. The metric tide can only rise because data now com-
prises a gravitational force tugging on the digital ocean; the energy of big 
data makes for ever larger waves. Solving the rebalancing problem will 
not be achieved by trying to turn back the digital ocean.
To explore how to rebalance judgment in evaluation of research, con-
sider a thought experiment to probe the alleged greater “objectivity” and 
“reliability” of measurement with data and “subjectivity” of judgment. The 
experiment is to “go meta” in a strategic gaming response to metrics- based 
evaluation. I take inspiration from Daston and Galison (1992, 2007; Gali-
son, 1998): the image of objectivity is historical, not static. They historicize 
the concept of objectivity by showing how it flip- flops between mechani-
cal and judgmental zeitgeists.
Thought experiment isn’t enough to advance our understanding of 
the problem sufficiently to pose the right questions, however. I propose 
actually doing the experiment, which I will call “hacking the metrics.” 
If we think of hacking as a form of experimentation and experimenting 
as a form of research, the idea is that hacking can be both a means of 
intervening in the metric tide and a legitimate mode of research about it.
Experimentation of this kind should challenge ethical intuition about 
conduct and at the same time transparently undermine metrics for exper-
imental purposes while redirecting questions about performance and 
rebalancing evaluation toward judgments of the work.
One way to make metrics hacking into a research enterprise is to exploit 
causal aspects of Goodhart’s law. The idea is to reframe the question of 
gaming as a problem of causality rather than representation, one that can 
be tested by experimental intervention in ways that might actually change 
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the use of metrics as standards by disrupting the policy debate. If met-
rics are subjected to hacking, then perhaps the end game of finding an 
unhackable metric will come to seem a hopeless task to policy makers 
bent on automating judgment or replacing trust with “objective” quanti-
tative measures— a fool’s errand as ridiculous as an uncrackable crypto-
graphic scheme or a winnable nuclear war.
The solution du jour to the problem of gaming performance metrics 
like citation counts, h- indexes, or impact factors is to multiply metrics and 
form a “basket” of them, each metric serving a particular component job 
well rather than hoping an all- purpose metric will emerge from the arms 
race. I am on board with the “alt- metrics” or basket approach as method-
ological antidote to the idea that some single, best all- purpose metric will 
be found to replace citation count or impact factor, but I am skeptical that 
it is going to slacken the metric tide because we are already in a positively 
reinforcing arms race with the metrics. Goodhart’s law should apply to 
baskets of metrics just as much as to any single one. This should be so 
because the only way to deploy any metric as an evaluation standard with-
out violating Goodhart’s law is to keep the metric or standard secret. The 
basket approach only does this by being too complex to understand, or 
proprietary and thus secret, so that it is de facto hidden from the day- to- 
day practice of individuals subject to performance evaluation. That strat-
egy will have only temporary success because academics are clever and are 
paid to solve puzzles of this kind, hence the inevitability of an arms race. 
Moreover, research production systems and research evaluation systems 
are inextricably linked by processes such as peer review for publication 
and grant award, which must be transparent (or would be extremely 
unethical, like not telling assistant professors what is required for tenure). 
So I don’t see an end game in the basket of metrics approach, other than 
mutually assured destruction. Now that may not be a bad thing. Creative 
destruction of an old- fashioned, biased, elite research system might be 
justified if it brings down an ill- suited, ill- fitting, conservative system of 
research evaluation with it.
However, there is more than one way to creatively reimagine a role 
for judgment alongside metrics in performance evaluation. I return to 
Goodhart’s law as a way of talking about how to reframe the question. A 
reframed question may lead to different kinds of solutions than a basket 
approach or Leiden’s policy demand that inappropriate measures such as 
impact factors be dropped as standards for individual authors.
Goodhart’s law teaches that to understand what goes on in the world 
of metrics- based academic performance evaluation, we should look 
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beyond how metrics might be gamed and beyond the question whether, 
because the metrics are used as standards, gaming the metrics is a form of 
misconduct in the bad sense of gaining something undeserved through the 
evaluation process. What we need to understand is how what individu-
als do in their research production processes in response to the standard 
changes in relation to the metrics as a consequence of their use as stan-
dards. That is not merely a matter of assessing whether, how, and to what 
extent researchers from this or that part of the globe decide to submit their 
research findings, data, figures, or code to a “predatory” or “junk” journal 
rather than to a “legitimate” one— nor whether they decide to analyze 
other people’s hard- won published data rather than go to the trouble and 
expense of generating their own data, nor to Photoshop old figures rather 
than produce new ones based on new data. It is a matter of understand-
ing deeply, and on a fine- grained scale, how research production— the 
whole content of research activity, and not just “publishing”— is chang-
ing in an environment where performance metrics function as standards.
Assessing the content of research activity is not the kind of problem that 
can be solved with more data captured in metrics with the digital discovery 
methods discussed in this volume. Transformations of research production 
processes at the level of the conduct and decision making of individual sci-
entists and small teams in their day- to- day workflows can only be captured 
by good old- fashioned social science research that social scientists use to 
figure out what, how, and why people do what they do: interviews, par-
ticipant observation, close readings of unpublished and published work, 
surveys, and now distance communication through the internet.
The strategic intervention I propose is this: Let’s assume Goodhart’s 
law is true. If it’s true, we should expect “gaming” and “mis- ”conduct 
in the system as a normal or typical part of the workflow of any well- 
adapted research production system whenever metrics are used as stan-
dards of research performance evaluation. So, it may be more fruitful to 
look for situations in which research performance appears not to adapt 
as a means of revealing breakdown of the kinds of behaviors one should 
expect to find when metrics are made into standards.
Adaptation is the most plausible state of affairs in response to the 
imposition of the social forces represented by metrics used as standards. 
In that light, the phenomenon of “predatory” or “junk” journals is one 
kind of response we might consider interpreting as “mis- ” rather than 
“bad” conduct. Maladaptation or nonadaptation, in the sense of non-
conformity or noncompliance to a standard, should appear anomalous 
or “bad” to an institutional policy regime that expects compliance. More 
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radically, hacking metrics as a form of experimental, transparent mal- 
or nonadaptation might serve as a means of understanding the mecha-
nisms and dynamics of adaptive responsiveness to imposition of metrics 
as standards. The further point is that we can think about two ways of 
understanding what Goodhart’s law tells us about the variety of kinds of 
behavior subject to lumping under “gaming the system.” One is the sort 
of gaming discussed in this volume, and it is quite interesting.
The other kind of possible response to Goodhart’s law is to embrace 
gaming the system as a tool for experimental intervention into research 
production systems, extending the traditional observational tools of 
social science research. The idea is to make hacking the research system 
part of a research program for understanding what causal consequences, 
at the micro- level of research production, follow from the imposition of 
social forces at the macro- level of social organization. (In a sense, “pred-
atory” or “junk” journals can be viewed as leading the way in hack-
ing, provided their interventions are interpreted according to the proper 
causal- experimental framework. We can learn much from their tactics 
even if we eschew their profit motives.) To use hacking as a research tool, 
we need to adapt research production work on science metrics to a new 
goal: experimental intervention into research performance systems that 
are subjected to metrics- based performance evaluation. To do that, we 
would need to create an artificial (i.e., experimental) publication system 
in which such research work could be published and an artificial (i.e., 
experimental) research specialty that organizes it.
We need not only to multiply the metrics as in the basket approach, 
but also to actually hack gaming behaviors in order to find out how 
the causal structure of individual researcher behavior is changed by the 
imposition of metrics. Traditionalists might wonder why we couldn’t just 
interview people who may have been subjected to behavior change in 
the face of the metric tide or do longitudinal studies of people experienc-
ing different metrics environments. We could do this of course. But it 
seems unlikely we would observe appropriate contrasts among scientists 
in their experiences of metrics- as- standards to develop much insight into 
causes. Even comparison of researchers in closely related specialties or 
in different national contexts or across historical periods would have so 
many confounding variables at work as to render them of limited utility 
for discovering causal impact.
What I propose instead would be a program of intervention with individ-
ual researchers and research groups, while historians, sociologists, anthro-
pologists, and philosophers— such as science studies researchers— study 
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them, in an enhanced environment where science studies takes science 
metrics into account descriptively while also manipulating the research 
environment in which performance is evaluated. Such experiments are 
taking place within the current research system, for example, by Labbé’s 
experiments with his fictional author, Ike Antkare (this volume, chapter 
14). I propose parallel experimentation with the research publication sys-
tem itself, using methods inspired by Labbé and others.
The tension between measurement and standards deriving from Good-
hart’s law, as I’ve noted, is that because humans are reflexive, metrics 
used as standards have to be kept secret, otherwise the people who are 
measured will change their behavior in ways that defeat the value of the 
metric as a measure. On the other hand, a standard has to be transparent: 
it is unfair and unproductive to hold people to a standard they cannot 
strive to meet. The problem is that secrecy and transparency don’t work 
so well together.
I propose we use our own reflexivity as technoscience researchers and 
scholars of the operation of academic metrics, in the tradition of medical 
self- experimentation, to manipulate experimentally the conduct of sci-
ence studies research to find out what kind of changes can be brought 
about by exploiting and manipulating metrics- based measurement of 
performance.
In other words, a way Goodhart’s law could turn out to be true is not 
merely that people are responsive to these forces in ways that change the 
causal structure of their behavior— Goodhart’s law could be true because 
people respond reflexively to satisfy Goodhart’s law on purpose as a way 
of playing a game. Just as video game hackers improve game play by 
intentionally violating the designs of the game designers to make the game 
play differently, thereby inventing a new game, science studies research 
might engage in experimental manipulation of their own metrics as a 
means of understanding contemporary science in the age of metric tides.
That would be to change the causal relationships of the game— to make 
it a different game, not merely to play “the game” by explicitly engaging in 
“mis”- conduct or “bad” conduct with respect to the institutionalized rules 
of the game, but to invent a new game by hacking the old one. What can 
we do to investigate metrics on a par with the kind of hacking that goes 
on in the video game world?
One way to do it is to create a collection of journals designed to pub-
lish research on science metrics but which includes in their mission the 
explicit “gaming” of metrics that are used as standards in performance 
evaluation. Call them “PuLP” for “Public Library of Philosophy” on the 
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model of PLoS— Public Library of Science. (Thanks to Jonathan Eisen for 
suggesting the acronym PuLP.)
The mission statement for “PuLP- ONE” would include:
 1. Reviews and surveys of current performance measures/metrics and 
which ones are used by whoever’s policies as standards. As it happens, 
journals are already beginning to appear that have this scope, for exam-
ple, Research Integrity and Peer Review (http:// researchintegrityjournal 
. biomedcentral . com).
 2. Success and failure impact narratives authored by individuals and 
groups about what metrics have done for/to them.
 3. Science studies research on practices considering the role of science 
metrics in the conduct of research or its evaluation, such as the chap-
ters in this volume.
 4. Overt hacking of metrics by publishing work of the above three kinds 
and of any other kind (including machine- generated papers) in what-
ever nominal field of study so as to explicitly and transparently attempt 
to manipulate metrics and thus to game standards.
A system of PuLP journals, a public library of hacker science studies, 
so long as it is sufficiently amusing to indicate transparently that its goals 
are not business as usual, would be designed primarily to transparently 
and openly intervene into how metrics affect research or behavior. PuLP 
would, for example, publish science studies work with, say, five hundred 
authors, citing articles in other PuLP journals and also other journals the 
authors regularly publish in. By manipulating the number of articles pub-
lished in a particular PuLP journal and the number of citations to articles 
in that journal, we could not only manipulate the Journal Impact Factor, 
as many “predatory” journals already do, we could also engineer what-
ever impact factor we wanted, showing just how arbitrary a measure it 
is and just how irrelevant to the content of research. The “h- index,” as 
a measure of author impact, could be manipulated by engineering many 
citations to works published by that author from other PuLP journals as 
well as by seeking agreement of those publishing in PuLP to cite PuLP 
journals in their works published in non- PuLP (“civilian”) journals. The 
full range of tactics discussed in other chapters in this volume would not 
only be available to authors in PuLP, but would also be part of the mis-
sion to use these methods and build new ones.
Because the journals would also be designed to publish scholarly 
research assessments and interpretations of how changes in research pro-
duction behaviors undermine metrics and at the same time reorient or 
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redirect workflows and production of whole fields of scientific research, 
PuLP journals could not be dismissed as “mere” junk, especially if their 
papers published under missions one through three are of high quality. 
PuLP journals would provide a “respectable” outlet for science metrics 
research. If this mission is held to community standards of scholarship, 
it would be harder to discount the hacker work out of hand on the self- 
serving grounds usually supporting metrics- based assessment in the first 
place: appearance in journals that meet metrics- based standards.
Scholarly publications in PuLP journals that report, assess, and inter-
pret responses to metrics- based research performance and impact nar-
ratives could serve as a basis for designing, announcing, and conducting 
new hacking techniques and experiments, as the project would presum-
ably kick the arms race into a higher gear, especially when hundreds of 
science studies researchers begin to submit experimental CVs for person-
nel evaluation with dozens of publications per month.
The primary mission of PuLP would be to undermine existing met-
rics by embracing and exploiting Goodhart’s law. PuLP- ONE would be 
a transparent journal for hacking the metrics— not designed for the sake 
of gain like a junk journal might be: to make money or earn prestige 
for authors, but for the sake of understanding experimentally how met-
rics manipulate social behavior, thereby showing how they are subject 
to gaming and to undermine their use as standards lacking a balanced 
involvement of judgment in evaluation. The goal would not be just to 
tell stories about how scientists conduct their research and the sorts of 
pressures they experience, but also to interrogate and ultimately change 
practices of research performance evaluation.
In providing a forum for review of research metrics and assessment of 
responses to metrics as standards, and thus the material platform needed 
to design hacker interventions, PuLP might help end the arms race of 
metrics and gaming by revealing the likely decline and fall of the research 
system from the inadvertent, unintended consequences of continued pur-
suit of metrics- based evaluation.
Enthusiasm for metrics is reinforced by bigger and bigger data, so it 
is probably necessary to do this experiment and not only talk about it. 
The aim is not to do away with research metrics but to return the project 
of evaluating the metrics to serve researcher valuation of the content of 
their research and to repair the damage caused by diverting this value 
into a side effect of a transformed research system that mainly values the 
advancement of auditable knowledge. If sustaining the research enter-
prise requires hacking the metrics, let the games begin!
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II
Collaborative Manipulations

Collaborative Manipulations analyzes how the pressure to “have impact 
or perish” helps to spread gaming practices on a global scale while also 
turning them into collaborative and even institutional practices. The dis-
semination, institutionalization, and increasingly collaborative nature of 
these gamings create unforeseen consequences, including the remarkably 
innovative and ever- changing nature of these manipulations. In addition 
to the peer review and citation rings mentioned above, these trends may 
be exemplified by researchers who collaborate with pharmaceutical indus-
tries to lend their names to ghostwritten articles in order to “harvest” their 
numerous citations without lifting much of a finger, or, in other cases, 
by universities that provide cash bonuses to professors who publish in 
top journals, which in turn help the university climb in the international 
rankings.
Barbara Kehm discusses why universities dedicate significant resources 
to improve their global university ranking, and how a high- ranking uni-
versity may come to be treated as a nation’s “indicator for the scientific 
and technological capacity and productive efficiency.” As governments 
often make educational reforms and funding decisions based on the 
global rankings of their universities, we see how the compounded effect 
of impact- seeking publication strategies by many individual authors 
trickles up to the institutional and then national level, eventually causing 
global effects— and gaming opportunities.
In a similar vein, Sarah de Rijcke and Tereza Stöckelová argue that 
the European research policies’ focus on a publication’s “international 
impact” as a stand- in for quality ends up reinforcing hierarchies between 
the “international” North and the “parochial” South. This problematic 
divide, however, can lend itself to gaming. Because universities’ rankings 
benefit from prolific faculty who publish internationally, these institutions 
tend to be slow disciplining the faculty who have published in journals 
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that, although possibly originating from the Global South and appear-
ing in the now- defunct Beall’s list of “predatory journals,” can still be 
counted as “international.” Universities often turn an equally blind eye, 
for very much the same reason, when their faculty list fictional “interna-
tional” co- authors on their publications, or boast to serve on editorial 
boards of questionable but “international” journals.
Focusing on a different type of publication/academic pressure, Daniele 
Fanelli makes the convincing argument that co- authorship is, effectively, 
a kind of collaborative gaming, or at least a gaming that hinges on collab-
oration. In response to publication pressures from the university, scien-
tists co- author articles with more and more authors so as to match higher 
productivity benchmarks. Rather than “salami- slicing” their research 
into multiple publications, scientists “salami- slice” their collaborations. 
As papers become increasingly co- authored, individual scientists can list 
more papers on their vitae.
Sergio Sismondo examines a different kind of “authorship gaming,” 
one with two players driven by two very different but compatible sets of 
goals. Pharmaceutical companies attribute ghostwritten articles to will-
ing and influential scientists— a practice that gives the article the “veneer 
of having been written by independent researchers, instead of by a coor-
dinated industry team.” This allows pharmaceutical companies to publish 
articles that are carefully crafted to advertise their drugs and yet appear 
under the guise of legitimate scientific publications. The “authors,” on 
the other hand, receive credit for publications they have not authored but 
that, due to their high production quality and the professional handling 
of submissions and revisions by professional writing companies, have a 
higher acceptance rate, shorter time to publication, and more citations 
than comparable articles written by independent academics.
The Ranking Game
In December 2011, the journal Science published the information that 
two Saudi- Arabian universities were massively recruiting highly cited 
research stars from Cambridge, Harvard, and other universities who had 
made it onto the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) list of most fre-
quently cited researchers. For about $70,000 per year, they were offered 
an affiliation to these universities in exchange for the obligation to be 
present once a year for a short time and to indicate in all their publica-
tions their affiliation to the respective Saudi- Arabian university. The result 
was that within two to three years both institutions made it from not 
listed at all into the group of the top two hundred to three hundred in the 
Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). 
Thus universities are buying the reputation of researchers in order to 
increase their own reputation. Not all researchers who were contacted 
could be bought. However, in March 2012, the largest Australian news-
paper, The Australian, published a list of sixty frequently cited research-
ers who had been appointed as “distinguished scientists” at one of the 
two Saudi- Arabian universities. Altogether the list comprises a number 
of researchers from top universities in the United States, Canada, Europe, 
Asia, and Australia. All of them are men, and some are already retired.
In 2012, the Australian University of New South Wales published a 
job advertisement for “Strategic Reputation Management” and the Aus-
tralian La Trobe University was looking for a “Manager for Institutional 
Rankings.” For an annual salary of $100,000, the job descriptions com-
prised among other things the task to manage the university’s relation-
ships to ranking agencies and to “maximize” or “optimize” the respective 
institution’s ranking position (Inside Higher Ed, March 22, 2013). In the 
same article, University of New South Wales’ pro- vice chancellor was 
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quoted to have stated that it was essential for a university to have a team 
that takes care of the proper presentation of the numbers.
But does this kind of manipulation work? And more importantly is such 
a practice still related to good science and scholarship? It becomes clear 
that rankings seduce and coerce at the same time. Those universities that 
want to participate in the ranking game have to internalize and institution-
alize the logic of rankings. Morphew and Swanson (2011) have pointed 
out that “rankings determine and even codify which kinds of organiza-
tional behavior and practices are legitimate.” Therefore, the players know 
that they have to be successful under the conditions of the measurements. 
Ranking positions have a signaling effect and contribute in a seemingly 
objective way to the discussions about what constitutes quality in higher 
education. Thus, universities use a number of gaming techniques in order 
to improve their ranking positions. Morphew and Swanson (2011) pro-
vide further examples from US universities: adjunct instructors are not 
counted when reporting the percentage of full- time faculty employed; 
admission data are presented in such a way that they signal a high level 
of selectivity; law schools are spending high amounts of money for glossy 
brochures to influence reputation scores.
Accordingly, the authors come to the conclusion that these forms of 
participation in the ranking game simultaneously challenge and reinforce 
the legitimacy of rankings. A classical paradox!
In her survey among university leaders published in 2007, Ellen Hazel-
korn found that ninety- three percent of the respondents wanted to improve 
the position of their university in national rankings and eighty- two per-
cent wanted to improve the position of their university in international 
rankings. Seventy percent wanted to see their university among the top ten 
percent in national rankings, and seventy- one percent wanted to see their 
university among the top twenty- five percent in international rankings. 
However, other studies have shown that variations in ranking positions are 
only temporary and mostly disappear after two years. Between 1988 and 
1998, twenty universities out of the top twenty- five identified by the U.S. 
News and World Report ranking never fell out of this top group. There-
fore, it is almost impossible for other universities to move into this group. 
It seems, however, that the multitude of specialized rankings that have 
been developed in recent years (e.g., top universities under fifty years of 
age, etc.) is, at least in part, also meant to help these other universities to 
make it to some kind of “top.”
Global rankings like the ARWU ranking of Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University or the ranking produced by the Times Higher Education 
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provide information about four to six percent of all universities glob-
ally. As a consequence, “all universities are judged on the basis of crite-
ria that are only appropriate for top universities” (Rauhvargers, 2011). 
This leads to the construction of a “deficit model” (Locke, 2011) that 
drives all universities that participate in the ranking game into a per-
petual race to improve their ranking position. At the same time, rank-
ings offer hardly a possibility to rise into the top group. So, why all the 
excitement then?
First, good ranking positions trigger the famous Matthew effect. Bet-
ter students and academics apply, donations by alumni rise, and, in many 
countries, such universities receive increased budget allocations by the 
state. Second, rankings distribute reputation. And reputation is an impor-
tant immaterial resource, difficult to build up and easy to lose. Third, 
rankings are popular among political decision makers— on the one hand, 
because they reduce complexity, and, on the other hand, because high 
ranking positions of one or more universities in the country have become 
an indicator for the scientific and technological capacity and productive 
efficiency of the national economy as such.
But rankings do not provide any information about the quality of a uni-
versity as a whole, even if they pretend to do just that. And there are only 
few players that have the capacity to play the game profitably. According to 
Salmi (2009), these are, in particular, large, preferably older and research- 
intensive universities with a broad spectrum of subjects (i.e., including 
medicine) located in the English- speaking world. In addition, they have to 
have three further features: abundant resources, a benevolent management, 
and a concentration of talent. Other potential players should better abstain 
from playing the game because it might lead to problematic management 
decisions.
Examples of Resistance
In the meantime, rankings have multiplied at national as well as inter-
national levels. Hazelkorn (2011) identified altogether nine active global 
rankings and more than fifty national rankings. And the number has prob-
ably risen by now. Despite the fact that many experts have argued that 
rankings are here to stay and the task is to improve them rather than 
ignore them, resistance against rankings has started and it is coming from 
the academic side. Without being able to provide a complete overview, just 
a few examples should suffice: the Australian James Cook University is 
ignoring the ARWU ranking; some universities in the United States, among 
96  Barbara M. Kehm
them the prestigious Annapolis Group, are boycotting the US News and 
World Report ranking either as a whole or its reputation survey part; 
and a number of Canadian universities have refused to participate in the 
Maclean’s University Ranking.
In Germany, several learned societies have by now recommended 
to boycott the ranking carried out by the Center for Higher Educa-
tion Development (CHE), among them the German Society for Sociol-
ogy, the German Society of Historians, the German Society of Chemists, 
and the German Society of Education. These organizations have issued 
appeals to both their individual academic members and the respective 
university departments not to submit any data to ranking agencies. In 
addition, four universities have announced not to submit any data for 
purposes of rankings: Hamburg, Leipzig, Cologne, and the Distance 
University of Hagen. The view of these institutional ranking opponents 
is that the generation and proper presentation of data for the CHE 
ranking would require the work capacity of more than ten full- time 
employed people, and they were not prepared to finance this any lon-
ger when the task of a university is to provide a good education to the 
students.
In March 2013, three hundred economics professors in Germany 
rebelled against a ranking of business studies and economics professors 
carried out by the Handelsblatt, a daily newspaper focusing on economic 
news. Their main argument was that such a ranking worked with wrong 
incentives, and that headings like “Germany in search of the super prof” 
were getting too tacky. For readers who are not very familiar with Ger-
many, there is a German television show called “Germany in Search of 
the Super Star” in which young talents (mostly singers) compete against 
each other. The show became known in particular for its prejudiced and 
mean comments by the jurors.
In the last part of this contribution, a few thoughts are offered about 
why rankings have met the resistance of academics but are loved by policy 
makers (and frequently university leaders as well). It is also an attempt 
to provide a more theoretical framing for the phenomena that have been 
described so far.
Rankings as a Form of Transnational Policy Coordination
It is an interesting phenomenon that rankings have become rather impor-
tant for national policy makers and institutional leaders but have met 
with resistance from the academic side. This is not the place to go into 
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the criticism of methodological flaws, the bias toward English language 
publications, the focus on research only, and other well- known critical 
aspects. It is more interesting to discuss the ways in which the phenom-
enon of rankings has been theoretically framed.
Erkkilä (2013) has framed rankings as a policy instrument of global 
university governance, and others have analyzed it as a form of transna-
tional policy coordination. What has been observed is that the outcomes 
of rankings constitute a policy problem at the national as well as, for 
example, the European level, which has led to policy changes. Although 
the ARWU ranking originally was a domestic policy instrument in order 
to evaluate how Chinese universities fare against top universities in the 
rest of the world, its outcomes have created a global narrative of higher 
education competition, which itself is used as an indicator for the com-
petitiveness and strength of national and (in Europe) regional economies. 
Thus we have a double transfer to meta levels. Rankings have become a 
symbol of economic status because it is argued that the more universi-
ties in a given country or region are ranked among the top ten, fifty, 
one hundred, or five hundred, the higher is the economic reputation and 
innovative capacity of that country or region. And, as Erkkilä argues, 
despite the fact that global rankings do not possess a norm- giving author-
ity, they have influenced policy decisions. In Germany, they triggered the 
“excellence initiative,” and at the European level, they contributed to the 
decision of funding the U- Multirank Project. And this has led to another 
paradox, namely that global rankings address individual higher educa-
tion institutions while at the same time having geographical implications 
(i.e., German versus British universities or European higher education 
versus US higher education). This contributes clearly to isomorphism in 
national policy making and institutional leadership despite the calls for 
institutional diversity.
The ARWU ranking became the start of a global assessment of higher 
education that linked to new forms of global and transnational gover-
nance building on comparison and evidence- based decision making. Basi-
cally the outcomes of the ranking served as the evidence policy makers 
needed in order to introduce reforms and overcome resistance. What we 
have here is actually the governance of complexity in the face of glo-
balization. Thus, global rankings can be understood as a “transnational 
policy script” (Gornitzka, 2013) that has diffused into different national 
contexts and has become a reference point for legitimizing higher edu-
cation reforms. Using examples from Germany and the European level 
again, the “policy script” was translated in Germany into giving up the 
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traditional legal homogeneity with which universities were treated by the 
state and introducing competition, while the “policy script” was trans-
lated at the European level by establishing a “modernization agenda” for 
European higher education.
Holzinger and Knill (2005) have described the process of transnational 
policy coordination as a form of transnational communication leading to 
policy diffusion. This transnational communication is characterized by 
four mechanisms: 1) lesson drawing; 2) transnational problem solving; 
3) policy emulation; and 4) international policy promotion.
Lesson drawing is a process where states learn from each other what 
can be done when problems occur. It implies the existence of “best prac-
tice,” which is taken as an efficient way to reform policies by using exam-
ples and models developed elsewhere. In transnational problem solving, 
solutions are sought and found in transnational networks or epistemic 
communities that— with the help of transfer agents like international 
organizations— facilitate the exchange between polities and spread the 
policy. Policy emulation is a one- directional policy transfer that basi-
cally consists of copying and implementing a policy without adaptation 
to local, regional, or national contexts. Thus, policy emulation is imita-
tion rather than innovation. In international policy promotion, finally, 
we have specialized organizations that actively promote certain policies 
while defining objectives and standards in an international setting.
It can be argued that the spread of rankings as an instrument of trans-
national policy coordination consists of a mixture of transnational prob-
lem solving and international policy promotion. Increasingly there are 
groups of academics involved in rankings, the best example being the 
European U- Multirank Consortium (see https:// www . umultirank . org), 
which is funded by the European Commission. It advocates and supports 
the idea of developing a European university ranking and thus acts as an 
agent for the promotion of such a policy in Europe.
Conclusions
If we look at the history of rankings, we can observe that they started 
out as an academic exercise focusing on disciplines or units rather than 
whole institutions. The views vary about the beginning of rankings. Dill 
(2009) identifies the first ranking as the one that was carried out in 1925 
by Raymond Hughes, a professor of chemistry and later vice- chancellor of 
Miami University. Hughes did a reputation survey of graduate programs. 
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Hazelkorn (2011) dates the first ranking earlier, namely to the year 1910, 
by referring to James Catelli, a US psychologist and professor at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. And Salmi and Saroyan (2007) observe first ranking 
attempts from 1870 onward when a commission of the US Bureau of 
Education began to publish annual statistical reports that also included a 
classification of institutions.
But while the first rankings in the United States were mostly carried out 
by active academics, the first U.S. News and World Report ranking from 
1983 was a commercial ranking that ranked whole institutions. This trig-
gered an imitation frenzy by other weeklies and dailies in order to increase 
their sold copies. To name just a few, we have the British Times Higher Edu-
cation and the British Guardian, the German ZEIT and Spiegel, the French 
Nouvel Observateur, the Irish Sunday Times, the Italian La Repubblica, the 
Russian Finance, the Canadian Maclean’s, and probably many others.
The ARWU ranking demonstrated the beginning of a reappropriation 
of rankings by academics, and we have currently more rankings that are 
carried out again by academics. But the impacts and political uses of rank-
ings have changed. Rankings are used as a policy instrument for what 
is nowadays called evidence- based political decision making. Ranking 
results present a simple, although undercomplex (i.e., not appropriately 
reflecting the actual complexity of what universities are about), hierar-
chy expressed in a positional number according to which funding can be 
allocated and legitimized by governments. Thus rankings establish a defi-
cit model (Locke, 2011) according to which no institution is ever good 
enough, except the one on the top, or let’s say the few on the top. This 
triggers a race for position that disregards issues of quality improvement 
and diversity of mission. In other words, rankings seduce and coerce at 
the same time (Locke, 2011). By now, every national government wants 
at least “one Harvard University” in their country in order to demon-
strate to the world that it is economically competitive. And thus the rank-
ing results become themselves indicators or, more exactly, proxies for 
something else, and national governments might make decisions on the 
basis of the symbolic value of ranking scales. This is a truly postmodern 
phenomenon. The positional hierarchy of universities created by rank-
ings makes the actual reality of universities and what they are about dis-
appear. The hierarchy is then shifted into the economic sphere of nations 
or regions, thereby constituting a decontextualized symbolic value that 
itself can be charged with new meaning and thus creating a new material 
reality that is no longer related to its original.
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“Be international!” This imperative can hardly be overlooked in current 
European research policy and research evaluation.1 The imports of “inter-
nationalization” manifest prominently in how particular value is attached 
to “international visibility,” “international impact,” or the international 
character of publication venues. The international is used as a trope on 
a number of levels: in EU funding schemes, in project goals that guide 
national assessment exercises, in output measurements, in the formulation 
of institutional research missions, and in tenure- track criteria. Especially 
in smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, the 
international is often taken as an unquestioned proxy for quality, proving 
recognition of value and impact beyond the “academic pods.” Conse-
quently, the international, the national, and the local constitute a clear 
normative hierarchy. For example, it is taken for granted that interna-
tional excellence encompasses national excellence and (as such) is sup-
posedly more valuable.
Inspired by Lin and Law’s discussion of “modes of international” (2013, 
2014), we argue in this chapter that gaming metrics, predatory publishing, 
and exploiting the model of gold open access (Beall, 2012) can be partly 
understood as a logical response to the imperative of internationalization 
going wild. It enacts a different, yet dubious, alternative mode of interna-
tionalization for those researchers and institutions who fail— for better or 
worse— within the established mode of international, with its epistemic 
and economic centers in the global, Anglophone North/West. In this chap-
ter, we zoom in on a recent misconduct case in the Czech Republic to show 
how the imperative of internationalization and productivity inscribed in 
the country’s research assessment framework impinges on institutional and 
individual publication strategies and produces a market for gaming in the 
academy.
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Taking the Imperatives to the Extreme
In 2015, a major debate on publishing and research evaluation was opened 
up in the Czech academy. It was provoked by controversy over a highly 
productive junior researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles 
University. At first sight, he might look like a paradigmatic case of a suc-
cessful scholar with a long list of international publications, collaborations, 
and co- authorships— exactly what the current research policy in the Czech 
Republic holds as a normative ideal. However, on second sight and when 
some of his colleagues from the department started to closely scrutinize 
his production, the case turned out to be something significantly different: 
a sophisticated attempt to game the current research assessment system 
on various levels— or rather, to take the imperative of the system to the 
extreme by some perfectly legitimate and some less legitimate ways. To 
understand what happened, let us first briefly describe the genesis and 
current state of research assessment in the country.
The post- 1989 changes in the Czech Republic concerned not only 
political and economic institutions, but also academic ones. One of the 
most fundamental changes was the establishment of the Czech Grant 
Agency in 1993 and the introduction, in various forms, of competi-
tive funding of academic research. In 2001, and largely from the initia-
tive of a few natural scientists who came back to the Czech Republic 
in 1990 after spending several years in the West, the first version of a 
new methodology for the quantitative assessment of institutional- level 
research performance was introduced. Its impact on research funding of 
academic institutions and the “value” imputed to individual scholars has 
since then gradually increased. The central building blocks of the evalu-
ation methodology are so- called RIV- points (RIV standing for “Informa-
tion Register of R&D results”2), assigned to predefined types of outputs 
(including journal articles, monographs, patents, and prototypes) and 
meant to reflect their academic and user value (Office of the Govern-
ment of the Czech Republic, 2013).3 One of the key claimed rationales 
of the evaluation methodology was to create an objective “machine” that 
would increase the transparency of the research system and depoliticize 
its governance. However, during the last fifteen years, the methodology 
developed into a convoluted metrics- based amalgamation with many 
unclear algorithms and weights that are far from transparent, not only 
for “ordinary” researchers, but even for research policy managers at the 
national level (Miholová and Majer, 2016). At present, the evaluation 
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methodology’s criteria for “quality recognition” soak through the entire 
system. They have a significant— even if, at times, indirect— impact on 
academic hiring and promotion procedures, individual research grant 
endowment, and the funding allocation of public research institutions.
A key trope of the research policy reforms since the 1990s has been 
internationalization, and this trope is also inscribed into the current eval-
uation methodology. This is understandable in a small country where 
many disciplines tended to operate in closed circles consisting of local 
scholars. However, it is more problematic that the international often-
times stands as a value in itself— unquestioned and undisputed, for exam-
ple, there is currently nearly no peer- review evaluation of journal articles 
within the national evaluation framework (a peer- review evaluation of a 
limited number of outputs submitted by research organizations as “excel-
lent” was introduced in 2015) and the journal impact metrics provided 
by Web of Science (WoS) and SCOPUS are taken for granted as proxies 
for international recognition and quality. This is the context in which 
junior academics start to build their publication record and careers.
We now return to the controversy. Having gained his PhD in 2007, 
the academic in question has claimed to have co- authored or co- edited 
seventeen “scientific monographs” between 2011 and 2013 and more 
than eighty journal articles between 2006 and 2015.4 Apart from the 
extreme productivity, four aspects of his CV are noteworthy. Firstly, the 
author also acts as an editor in chief, editorial board member, and even 
publisher of some of the “European” or “international” journals listed on 
his CV.5 All these journals are English language, target an international 
audience, and have an international review board and international pool 
of authors. Secondly, even if in SCOPUS, some of the journals on his 
publication list were also listed in Jeffrey Beall’s database of predatory 
journals.6 Thirdly, some of the co- authors on these articles in predatory 
journals were colleagues from the faculty— including the current head of 
the department.7 And, finally, as the author later confirmed, one of his 
co- authors was discovered to be a fictional character supposedly affili-
ated with prestigious Western European universities (first the University 
of Strasbourg and later the University of Cambridge).8
While some of the academic’s actions were rather extreme, or even 
“crafty” (e.g., the invented co- author; see also Marie- Andrée Jacob’s 
chapter on template, dexterity, and publication ethics), we have to 
acknowledge they have definitely been in line with the current impera-
tive of internationalization. The researcher tried to gain “Western” 
104  Sarah de Rijcke and Tereza Stöckelová
recognition and certification (listing on the WoS and SCOPUS databases) 
for his publishing activities as an author, editor, editorial board member, 
and publisher based in the East. Interestingly, he not only strove to gain 
a position in the existing international playing field (which is what the 
research policy framework in fact tries to encourage), but also, as a skill-
ful academic entrepreneur, to rework and reorder the field at one go by 
creating new journals and forging new East– West alliances (even if at 
times with fictitious co- authors). He also specifically offered his teach-
ing and publication “services” to researchers from Russia and Eastern 
Europe in relation to whom he positioned his activities as international. 
Apparently, he aimed at the enactment of a different international than 
the one of current global science, in which the international in fact equals 
the West. While in general we might have some sympathy for attempts 
at destabilizing the global asymmetry (Stöckelová, 2012), his means and 
ways of doing so are rather problematic.
As a result of a major controversy at the faculty level, during which 
“whistle- blowing” colleagues from the department filed a complaint 
to the Ethical Commission of Charles University (the complaint was 
deferred9), and following the publication of a number of articles in 
national public media, the author’s contract was terminated in Septem-
ber 2015. In response to the increasing media and academic community 
pressure, the faculty openly distanced itself from unethical publishing 
practices connected with the case. It issued “publication rules” that 
warned against predatory journals and vanity press publishers, such as 
the well- known vanity press Lambert Academic Publishing, in which 
over twenty “international” monographs of the faculty members had 
been published since 2010.10 Some other faculties and universities in the 
country followed suit.
Interestingly, the “international” standards for quality assessment did 
not seem to count equally for all involved. Though playing the game led 
to several promotions for the researcher who was later accused of mis-
conduct, when push came to shove, the same rules did not apply to the 
key whistle- blower, though he and his research group were doing quite 
well by these standards.11 Debatably, a few weeks later, after the termina-
tion of the perpetrator’s contract, the contract of the main whistle- blower 
was not renewed either— in spite of wide support for his actions from the 
social science community.12 The faculty chiefly adhered to a “bad apple” 
approach, a relatively common strategy in misconduct cases in the sense 
that measures are often taken mainly at the level of individuals.
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Cui Bono?
Calls for more transparent, trustworthy quality control mechanisms and 
more open infrastructures for communicating and publishing research are 
currently widely heard in European science policy. The European Com-
mission has introduced several framework programs that focus in par-
ticular on responsible research and innovation, and on “open science.” In 
2020, all scientific and scholarly output should be freely available by way 
of open access. Another important aim for 2020 is a fundamentally novel 
approach to data (re)use, based on open data models. But change will not 
come easily, with vested interests of established academic elites and large 
commercial actors with their entrenched infrastructures for publishing and 
evaluating research. Paradoxically, part of the answer seems to lie in the 
hands of exactly these commercial parties. At present, they appear to be 
the ultimate gatekeepers of the “international.” The critique of predatory 
journals inadvertently makes a very strong case for the value added by 
corporate, indexed outlets and black- boxed, commercially endorsed algo-
rithms. Predatory journals seem to play right in the hands of corporate 
publishers as a confirmation of the dangers of uncontrolled open access.
At the same time, the predatory publishing industry managed to 
develop a business model that taps into both the “open science” and the 
“commercial” publishing models and normative frameworks. Evidently, 
some of the appeal of predatory journals and vanity publishers lies in 
their offering cheap, accessible vehicles for the “international”— certainly 
when compared to the costlier “gold” open- access publications, with qual-
ity control and more or less US- and Eurocentric gatekeepers. Also, the 
predatory publishing business model closely mimics and reproduces the 
standards and incentive structures of the “global,” dominant publishing 
industry. This is an industry in which the journal and the journal article 
are the most valuable means of communication for international recogni-
tion and visibility, within a “market world of justification” (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006) that is enacted, among other things, through indicators 
such as the Journal Impact Factor (Rushforth and de Rijcke, 2015; de 
Rijcke and Müller, 2017). Finn Brunton (this volume, chapter 18) touches 
upon a similar logic, where he describes how spam and spam journals 
work off the same socio- technical infrastructures, institutional mecha-
nisms, and rhetoric as “reputable” or “accepted” publishing industries, 
and hence also fuel the development of these same “legitimate” forms of 
publishing. The point we make is that publication practices of predatory 
publishers are being linked to the most important and profitable value 
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systems of the dominant publishing industry and the indicator produc-
tion market. As such, predatory publishing and its concomitant practices 
are not outside of the research system but emerge at the heart of them 
and are embedded within them. These practices in effect drive the exist-
ing evaluation logic to the extreme. A crucial question then becomes, cui 
bono (Star, 1995), who actually benefits from this industry?
Generally speaking, there is of course no level playing field in the global-
izing system for academic publishing. Arguably, attempts to arrive at such 
a global, “horizontal” system can in themselves be regarded as a form of 
vertical domination. On the system level, the publishing industry fortifies 
boundaries between an “international” West or North on the one hand 
and a “parochial” East or South on the other. And the case discussed in this 
chapter shows how predatory publishing can be a vehicle for a particular 
mode of international, enacted at specific locations in the system. In the 
Czech Republic and further east, the predatory journals and vanity presses 
played a role in further empowering skillful local researchers who used 
the new industry to boost their publication records, international visibility, 
and the financial status of their institutions (for instance by gaining RIV 
points for books published by international “vanity” presses13). The, at 
first sight, useful term “predatory publishing” or “predatory journals” 
may be largely misleading, because it obscures much the agency of indi-
vidual actors in using these outlets to their advantage. In the case at hand, 
scholars were hardly “prey,” as they found clever ways of gaming the 
assessment system.
The Czech case makes clear how the predatory publishing industry 
thrives mainly by being successfully parasitic on existing forms of con-
duct and material infrastructures for publishing and evaluating research— 
without fully incorporating its quality control mechanisms (including 
absence of “proper” peer review and fake editorial boards). But this lack 
of explicit quality control procedures should not be overemphasized. Some 
of them apparently have some quality control, and rather than belonging 
on a blacklist, they operate in a gray zone— into which some established 
quality journals may now be falling as well with the increased global pres-
sures on production and auditable performance, which deprives the pub-
lication system of available competent reviewers and editors. We think 
the excessive parasitism of the “predatory” journals is much more crucial. 
Many of them deliberately operate on the edges of dominant publication 
and citation infrastructures, hosted by big commercial publishers. A lot 
of these journals originate from the “East,” and these journals perme-
ate the “global” publishing industry when they are indexed in the WoS 
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and— particularly— SCOPUS.14 The latter’s reputation is based on being 
the “largest abstract and citation database of peer- reviewed literature,” 
providing a “comprehensive overview of the world’s research output.”15 
This is obviously a rather problematic statement when the company can-
not in practice control this international certification, and is nonetheless 
taken as proxy for quality in many evaluation systems.
Although the critique of predatory publishing does indeed lead to some 
sanitization efforts (codes of conduct, blacklists, and whitelists), thus far it 
has not triggered any serious kind of more radical reform of the publishing 
and evaluation infrastructure. This may partly be because it is too soon. It 
could also be due to the fact that purification and policing efforts are often 
based on the ideal of a unified science system, with internationally shared 
views “from nowhere” about what constitutes “bad” and “proper” scien-
tific conduct. Such an ideal is doomed to fail when we see how different 
actors within science systems create and re- enforce distinctive normative 
hierarchies between the international, the national, and the local: journals, 
databases, evaluators, consultants, publishers, and also researchers. Some 
assessment systems are in fact beginning to recognize the need for contex-
tual evaluation (in terms of disciplines and fields) and the complex rela-
tion between the international, national, and local. But there still is a long 
way to go before the research policy and wider academic communities 
acknowledge that the more, the faster, and the more international need 
not always be the better.
Notes
1. Work of Sarah de Rijcke on the chapter was supported by the European 
Union– funded H2020 Project PRINTEGER and by the Technische Universität 
München- Institute for Advanced Study, funded by the German Excellence 
Initiative. Work of Tereza Stöckelová on the chapter was supported by grant no. 
15– 16452S, awarded by the Czech Science Foundation.
2. For details, see the website of the Government Office for Science, Research, 
and Innovations: http:// www . vyzkum . cz / FrontClanek . aspx ? idsekce=1028 .
3. For example, for papers in WoS journals, the value would be counted on the 
basis of the position of the journal in disciplinary ranking in WoS but it would 
include other parameters set up in the evaluation methodology. For patents, the 
value would depend on whether it is a EU, US, or Japanese patent (one hundred 
points), a Czech or other national patent (fifty points), or other patent (twenty- 
five points) (Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, 2013). For a 
detailed discussion of the evaluation system and its evolution, see Linková and 
Stöckelová (2012), Stöckelová (2012), Good et al. (2015), and Miholová and 
Majer (2016).
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4. See the archived version of his personal web page: http:// web . archive . org 
/ web / 20150514044622 / http: / www . strielkowski . com / publications (accessed 
March 30, 2017).
5. An example is the International Economics Letters, where he serves as an 
editor in chief: http:// www . ielonline . eu / journal - archive / volume - 2 - issue - 4–2013 - / 
and http:// www . ielonline . eu / editorial - board (accessed May 12, 2016). Another 
example is the SCOPUS indexed journal Economics and Sociology, where he 
is listed as a board member with the title of “associate professor”—http:// www 
. economics - sociology . eu / ? eneditorial - board,3 (accessed May 12, 2016)— a title 
that incidentally does not match with the information he provides on his own 
website, according to which he became an associated professor only in 2017 (at 
the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, Russia) (http:// www . strielkowski . com 
/ bio [accessed May 12, 2016]). The researcher also publishes a journal Euro-
pean Review of Social Sciences himself through his limited liability company 
Univerzitní Servis—http:// rejstrik . penize . cz / 29000335 - univerzitni - servis - s - r - o 
(accessed May 13, 2016), a journal of which he is also an editor: http:// erss2 
. webnode . cz / editors (accessed May 13, 2016).
6. The famous “Beall’s list” of predatory publishers and stand- alone predatory 
journals was created and maintained in the period of 2012 to 2016 by the Uni-
versity of Colorado, Denver, librarian Jeffrey Beall at https:// scholarlyoa . com . The 
list was unexpectedly shut down in January 2017 (Silver, 2017). Refusing at first 
to comment on the reasons, Beall later stated: “In January 2017, facing intense 
pressure from my employer, the University of Colorado, Denver, and fearing for 
my job, I shut down the blog and removed all its content from the blog plat-
form” (Beall, 2017).
7. A summary of the case in English from the whistle- blowers is available at 
https:// zaetickepublikace . wordpress . com / 2015 / 11 / 17 / facts - about - the - critique 
- of - questionable - publishing - practices - at - the - institute - of - communication - studies 
- and - journalism - faculty - of - social - sciences - at - charles - university - prague (accessed 
May 12, 2016).
8. It is noteworthy that his operation looks similar to various hoaxes testing 
the system, which are described in the fourth section of this volume. However, 
it was not revealed by the author but his department colleagues. Only then 
did he call it an “academic joke,” adding that “many academics enjoy playing 
similar jokes” (see http:// zaetickepublikace . webnode . cz / questionable - publishing 
- practices - or - questionable - academics - a - story - from - the - faculty - of - social - sciences 
- charles - university - in - prague [accessed June 14, 2017]). His newest joke than 
may be his letter sent to and published in Nature in April 2017 in which he 
praises the Beall’s list of predatory publishers and calls for ethics committees 
to “draw up guidelines for distinguishing reputable from disreputable jour-
nals” (https:// www . nature . com / nature / journal / v544 / n7651 / full / 544416b . html 
[accessed June 14, 2017]).
9. http:// www . cuni . cz / UK - 5554 . html (accessed May 12, 2016).
10. http:// antipredator . vedazije . cz / index . php ? action=switchvalidrecords 
& show=institution & name=8029 (accessed May 12, 2016).
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11. In the Czech Republic, that is. He did find a job at the University of 
Loughborough in the United Kingdom, and so did the perpetrator, who later 
became, for some time, a research associate at Cambridge University’s Energy 
Policy Research Group (http:// www . strielkowski . com / bio [accessed June 4, 
2017]).
12. A petition in support of the whistle- blower was signed by more than one 
hundred academics— see https:// zaetickepublikace . wordpress . com / 2015 / 12 / 02 
/ prohlaseni - za - publikacni - etiku - a - svobodu - kritiky - v - socialnich - vedach (accessed 
May 12, 2016). Only his limited individual research grant funding from an 
external agency would continue, but not the institutional funding he received up 
to this point.
13. http:// antipredator . vedazije . cz / index . php ? show=institution & name=8029 
(accessed May 14, 2016).
14. See the study by Macháček and Srholec (2017) documenting the sharp 
rise in recent years of the number of predatory journals identified according to 
Beall’s list in Scopus, with authors of the paper primarily based in the middle- 
income countries of Asia and North Africa.
15. https:// www . elsevier . com / solutions / scopus (accessed May 15, 2016).
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Concerns for the negative effects of pressures to publish date back at least 
to the 1950s (Siegel and Baveye, 2010; see also Alex Csiszar in this vol-
ume, chapter 1) and today are more widespread than ever. There is virtu-
ally no contemporary article that, in analyzing or commenting on issues of 
research integrity, will fail to suggest that scientists might be increasingly 
engaging in problematic research practices. At the very least, it is typically 
argued that scientists may be cynically “salami- slicing” their results (i.e., 
fractioning them to maximize publication output), but multiple other det-
rimental practices, right up to the most egregious scientific crime of data 
fabrication, are suggested to represent plausible strategies to “game” a 
system that imposes increasingly unreasonable productivity expectations 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017). Such 
“pressures to publish” might be imposed upon scientists explicitly by 
their employing institutions but also implicitly, through the institutional 
use of faulty metrics of publication quantity and quality (figure 8.1).
This narrative is logically consistent and plausible, but is it correct? 
The empirical evidence that is most typically invoked in support of the 
pressures to publish hypothesis comes from anonymous surveys and 
qualitative studies that observed a connection between reported pressures 
to publish and likelihood to observe or indulge in questionable behav-
iors (De Vries, Anderson, and Martinson, 2006; Davis, Riske- Morris, 
and Diaz, 2007; van Dalen and Henkens, 2012; Tijdink, Vergouwen, and 
Smulders, 2013). This evidence, however, has clear limitations. Surveys 
can valuably inform us about what researchers believe, what they say, and 
what they think they have experienced, but surveys do not necessarily tell 
us what actually occurs in the general population of scientists. Moreover, 
results of surveys and interviews are not easy to compare across studies, 
making it hard to verify whether the problem of pressures to publish has 
worsened over time as suggested.
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A second and seemingly more direct source of evidence about scientific 
misconduct appears to be provided by data on retractions of scientific 
papers. Retractions are mostly the consequence of scientific misconduct 
(Fang, Steen, and Casadevall, 2012), and the fact that they are more fre-
quent in high- impact journals and that their total number has grown 
over the years seems to confirm the worse predictions of the pressures 
to publish narrative (Fang and Casadevall, 2011). Such interpretations, 
however, are demonstrably premature and likely incorrect. Retractions 
are an editorial tool of recent invention, and the number of retractions 
issued per year reflects primarily, if not entirely, the growth in the number 
of journals that have retraction policies. Back in 2004, only twenty- one 
percent of high- impact medical journals had a policy to retract papers, 
whereas in 2014, the percentage had increased to sixty- five percent 
(Resnik, Wager, and Kissling, 2015). This datum illustrates, on the one 
hand, how much progress has been made in setting up a system of retrac-
tions and yet, on the other hand, how far the system still is from operating 
at full regime. It is easy to show that the number of retractions no longer 
appears to be increasing if it is adjusted by the number of journals that 
are actually issuing retractions, indicating, in other words, that the num-
ber of retractions per retracting journal has remained stable for decades 
(Fanelli, 2013). Moreover, high- impact journals were the first and most 
proactive adopters of retraction policies (Resnik, Peddada, and Brunson, 
2009). This fact alone can explain why high- impact journals have higher 
Figure 8.1
Schematic summary of hypothesized causal links between pressures to publish and 
research malpractice, as widely discussed in the literature.
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retraction rates, even ignoring additional factors like the higher level of 
scrutiny that these journals are subject to (see chapter by Ivan Oransky, 
this volume, chapter 10). Therefore, patterns characterizing the preva-
lence of retractions are not a valid indicator of a possible growing prob-
lem with pressures to publish.
The most solid— but still observational and indirect— evidence of a 
growing problem with pressures to publish comes from statistical analy-
ses of the literature. At least three independent studies suggest that, over 
the last few decades, abstracts of scientific papers have reported increas-
ingly positive or statistically significant results (Pautasso, 2010; Fanelli, 
2012a, 2014; de Winter and Dodou, 2014). Furthermore, at least one 
study noticed that positive results might be more likely to be reported 
by abstract of papers from academically productive areas in the United 
States (Fanelli, 2010a), and at least four meta- meta- analyses in the social 
and behavioral sciences observed that academically productive countries, 
and particularly the United States, might publish findings that system-
atically overestimate underlying effects (Doucouliagos, Laroche, and 
Stanley, 2005; Munafo, Attwood, and Flint, 2008; Fanelli and Ioannidis, 
2013; Fanelli, Costas, and Ioannidis, 2017).
Even meta- analytical evidence, however, offers no conclusive proof of 
a negative effect of pressures to publish. By drawing correlations at the 
national level, all the studies listed above are at risk of “ecological fal-
lacy,” because correlations observed at the national level might not reflect 
correlations occurring at the individual level. Moreover, higher rates of 
positive, statistically significant, and/or extreme results could be produced 
by mechanisms that have little connection to conscious biases, let alone 
scientific misconduct (see further discussions in Fanelli [2010a, 2010b]).
Two Empirical Blows to the Pressures- to- Publish Narrative
The most direct assessment of the pressures- to- publish narrative (figure 
8.1) comes, to the best of my knowledge, from a series of studies that I 
recently conducted with several colleagues, which tested multiple hypoth-
eses about determinants of research integrity, misconduct, or bias. The 
earliest such study, a collaboration with Rodrigo Costas from Leiden 
University and Vincent Larivière from University of Montréal, examined 
a large sample of retractions and corrections issued in the years 2010 
and 2011 (Fanelli, Costas, and Larivière, 2015). We retrieved the original 
papers to which the retraction and correction notes referred, and for each 
of these papers, we retrieved two matched controls— that is, papers that 
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had been published in the same journal and issue but that had not been 
corrected or retracted. For each of these papers (a total sample of 611 
retracted papers, 2,226 corrected papers, and 5,466 controls), we recon-
structed the publication profile of first and last authors and recorded 
other characteristics of study and authors that common hypotheses made 
in the literature would predict to represent risk factors for scientific mis-
conduct. We predicted that pressures to publish and other risk factors for 
scientific misconduct should increase the likelihood of retractions and be 
neutral or decrease the likelihood of corrections, because retractions are 
usually the consequence of scientific misconduct (Fang, Steen, and Casa-
devall, 2012), whilst corrections are usually spontaneously solicited by 
authors (Fanelli and Ioannidis, 2013).
Results showed that the likelihood to be the author of a corrected 
paper was similar across countries, whereas that of a retracted paper 
varied substantially. The variance in a country’s risk of retraction was 
partially explained by national publication incentive policies, but not in 
the direction predicted by the pressures- to- publish narrative. Countries in 
which high- impact publications are rewarded with cash, such as China, 
Turkey, and Australia, registered the highest risk of retractions. Countries 
with career- based publication incentives such as the United States, in which 
pressures to publish are imposed on the individual through the require-
ments of tenure, showed intermediate levels of risk. Surprisingly, the risk 
was lowest in countries such as the Netherlands or United Kingdom, in 
which universities receive public funding in proportion to their ranking in 
national research assessments. Since in these latter countries researchers 
have in theory no choice but to comply with their employer’s expectations, 
these are arguably the only countries in which “pressures to publish” are 
occurring in a literal sense, and in any case represent countries in which 
pressures are perceived to be highest (van Dalen and Henkens, 2012).
Therefore, our findings were quite different from what the classic 
pressure- to- publish narrative would have predicted. The countries at 
greater risk of misconduct appeared to be those in which researchers are 
not under institutional pressures to publish, but those in which researchers 
are lured by cash bonuses. If misconduct can be directly ascribed to a cause, 
that cause seems to be the corruption and greed of individual scientists.
When we looked at the publication profiles of individual authors, 
these surprising results were confirmed. The most prolific authors, and 
those who publish in high- ranking journals, were equally or less likely 
to produce retracted papers, and equally or more likely to author papers 
that were later corrected— arguably manifesting higher research integrity. 
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This pattern was visible even when analyses were limited to authors 
working in the United States.
These findings were remarkably corroborated by two later studies 
co- authored by Rodrigo Costas, myself, and others. These studies tested 
exactly the same hypotheses and the same author characteristics as the 
study described above, but on completely different proxies of research 
quality and integrity. One study retrieved a total of over three thousand 
meta- analyses to test if these parameters predicted the likelihood that a 
study would report overestimated effect sizes, possibly due to research and 
publication bias (Fanelli, Costas, and Ioannidis, 2017). The other study 
used a matched- control approach similar to the one used on retracted 
papers, but this time on papers that had been identified, by direct inspec-
tion, as containing image duplications that are likely to result, at least in 
part, from intentional misconduct (Fanelli et al., 2017). Both of these stud-
ies led to very similar conclusions with regards to the pressures to publish 
hypothesis: the most prolific authors, those who publish in high- ranking 
journals, and those working in countries in which pressures to publish 
are supposedly greater were less likely to report exaggerated findings and 
less likely to publish papers with image duplications. These results are all 
observational of course, and therefore do not prove that being a prolific 
author, or working under high pressures to publish, makes you more 
honest. However, they are clearly completely at odds with a simplistic 
narrative that associates publishing too much or too ambitiously with 
being a cheater.
A second blow to the standard pressures- to- publish narrative came 
when, in collaboration with Vincent Larivière, I assessed whether sci-
entists are actually publishing papers at an increasing rate (Fanelli and 
Larivière, 2016). In order to do so, we tracked the individual publication 
profiles of researchers in all disciplines throughout the twentieth century. 
From an initial sample of over 540,000 individual authors that we could 
identify with relative accuracy, we selected those whose main affiliation 
was in North America, Europe, or Australia/New Zealand, and further 
limited the sample to authors who had published at least two papers over 
a period of fifteen years following their first recorded publication (collect-
ing a total sample of 41,000 authors who had co- authored over 760,000 
papers between the years 1900 and 2013). Our analysis focused on the 
first fifteen years of research productivity, because this is an early- career 
phase in which pressures to publish are presumably highest.
A superficial look at the total number of papers ascribed to each indi-
vidual author would support the perception that scientists are publishing 
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more. The total number of papers associated with an author’s name has 
increased in most disciplines, including in recent decades, a period in 
which pressures to publish have arguably become more intense and for 
which our data is likely to be more accurate. However, the average num-
ber of co- authors of these papers had increased as well, and at an accel-
erating rate. This factor cannot be ignored when estimating scientists’ net 
publication rate.
When we counted publications fractionally, by dividing scientists’ total 
number of publications by their average number of co- authors, the result-
ing publication rates show no marked increase, and were actually flat or 
declining in most disciplines. One could argue that co- authorship criteria 
have simply changed, and that not all names in a manuscript have contrib-
uted an equal amount of effort to the publication. However, we also limited 
the analysis to papers in which our sample of researchers had appeared as 
first author, a position that in most disciplines identifies the team member 
who mostly contributed to the publication. Again, we observed no increase. 
These trends occurred similarly across countries, and multiple secondary 
analyses suggest that these results are not only robust, but actually rather 
conservative. For example, when we extended the career time window to 
twenty- five years, results were very similar, whereas when we restricted 
it to eight years, publication rates were significantly declining for most 
disciplines (all robustness results and primary data are provided in the 
supplementary information of Fanelli and Larivière [2016]).
It must be emphasized that the conclusions of all these large- scale, 
quantitative studies apply to the average trend. As one should expect, 
our sample included cases of extremely productive individuals (e.g., 
researchers who managed to co- author hundreds of papers in just a few 
years). The number of these cases is likely to have increased during the 
century, if anything because the total number of scientists has increased. 
These highly productive individuals are, almost by definition, likely to 
be widely known, and their higher visibility might reinforce the percep-
tion that scientific productivity has risen to excessive levels. However, 
these extremely prolific authors are amply counterbalanced, at the other 
extreme, by individuals who publish few papers and yet seemingly do not 
drop out of a scientific career. On average, therefore, the publication rate 
of scientists has not increased.
An effect of overexposure similar to the one described above might 
explain why data fabrication tends to be associated with hyperproductiv-
ity. In the aforementioned study on retractions, we noticed that names 
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associated with multiple retractions tend to be, not too surprisingly, highly 
productive authors (Fanelli, Costas, and Larivière, 2015). The more retrac-
tions a case of misconduct brings about, the more exposure it will get in 
the media (not in small part thanks to the work of Ivan Oransky, this vol-
ume, chapter 10), and this might reinforce the public perception that sci-
entific misconduct and unrealistic publication performance are connected.
In sum, according to our findings, scientists today are not publishing, 
on an individual basis, at higher rates than their colleagues in the 1950s. 
Today’s scientific CVs do list more papers than they used to, but this 
occurs primarily because scientists today collaborate much more, sharing 
their efforts as well as their publications. Our results confirmed, with a 
more rigorous analysis of individual publication patterns, what a simple 
comparison of the yearly numbers of papers and authors had suggested 
long ago (de Solla Price, 1980).
Salami- Slicing Collaborations and Sandwiching Results  
as Alternative Gaming Strategies
In the past, I have published evidence that I interpreted as supporting the 
pressures- to- publish hypothesis (see Fanelli 2010a, 2012a). In light of 
these new findings, I am keen to revise my beliefs. Do I believe that pres-
sures to publish are a myth and that we have nothing to worry about? 
Not at all. The rise of metrics- based performance evaluation is a his-
torical fact, and if scientists claim to feel pressured to publish, there is 
no reason to doubt them. If these facts didn’t suffice, my own personal 
experience leads me to believe that important and questionable changes 
are occurring in scientific practices, and that publication performance 
evaluation has much to do with these changes.
However, I believe that the popular narrative that links pressures to 
publish to a growing problem of misconduct might be incorrect. Upon 
closer scrutiny, the direct connection this narrative draws between pres-
sures to publish and misconduct is too simplistic, and the claim that scien-
tists today are publishing at increasing rates is not supported by evidence. 
It is therefore a double mistake to combine the two claims and conclude 
that scientific misconduct and other questionable research practices are 
becoming more prevalent because of growing pressures to publish.
If overproductivity is not directly distorting contemporary science, then 
how can we explain the aforementioned evidence that null and negative 
results are proportionally decreasing and especially so in scientifically 
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“productive” countries? I will suggest two phenomena, neglected by past 
analyses, that might mediate the connection between pressures to publish 
and questionable research practices.
The first phenomenon is the growth in collaboration size, a trend 
amply documented in all disciplines and confirmed by my own research, 
as discussed above. Scientists are likely to have increased their collabora-
tion rates in response to pressures to publish, following a strategy that 
was openly recommended in the literature (for example, Hayer et al., 
2013). Indeed, the growing complexity of research appears to be insuffi-
cient to justify, alone, the recent rise in co- authorship, at least in biomedi-
cal research (Papatheodorou, Trikalinos, and Ioannidis, 2008).
Larger collaborations might run a higher risk of bias and misconduct. 
Collaborations represent an investment of resources and professional 
reputation of considerable size; their members, therefore, might be under 
comparably high pressures to make such investment “pay off.” We can 
therefore hypothesize that the design and conduct of collaborative stud-
ies might be exceedingly oriented toward producing “publishable” results, 
possibly at the expense of scientific rigor and integrity. Errors, bias, and 
misconduct, moreover, might be more likely to escape scrutiny in collabo-
rations from different fields and institutions, because cultural and geo-
graphic distances impede mutual criticism and supervision. Preliminary 
data support this hypothesis, by suggesting that long- distance collabora-
tions are associated with higher rates of positive results (Fanelli, 2012b) 
and do not protect against the risk of retractions (Fanelli, Costas, and 
Larivière, 2015; Fanelli, Costas, and Ioannidis, 2017; Fanelli et al., 2017).
Collaborations might be proliferating excessively because the h- index 
and other popular metrics of research productivity and impact are not 
adjusted for co- authorship or actual contribution. From a technical point 
of view, this is a highly questionable choice, which presumably was made 
not for sound mathematical reasons, but to keep publication metrics 
simple and to encourage collaboration, which is assumed to be a positive 
force in science. Paradoxically, however, by not imposing any costs to co- 
authorship, current metrics might discourage real cooperation, because 
higher “performance” scores can be accrued by scientists who fragment 
their effort into as many collaborations as possible and contribute the 
minimum possible to each (Kaushal and Jeschke, 2013). Scientists, I am 
suggesting, might be increasingly “salami- slicing” not their results, but 
their collaboration efforts.
The second phenomenon is a general increase in the length and infor-
mation content of scientific papers. Such a trend has been documented 
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in biomedical research (Vale, 2015) and was supported in our cross- 
disciplinary data, which showed that the average page length of papers 
has increased throughout the twentieth century (Fanelli and Larivière, 
unpublished observation). This phenomenon, which openly contra-
dicts the hypothesis that scientists are increasingly “salami- slicing” their 
results, is likely to reflect the growing complexity of scientific research 
and the availability of ever more powerful computational tools. Pressures 
to publish might reinforce this trend, by compelling scientists to “pad” 
their papers with unnecessarily large numbers of data points and second-
ary analyses, in order to boost their papers’ chances of acceptance by the 
journal. Sheer quantity of data and analyses might be increasingly used as 
a cheap substitute for quality (that is, for convincing conclusions drawn 
from well- researched studies and cleverly designed experiments). More-
over, pressures to publish might prompt scientists to overpromote their 
work by emphasizing, simplifying, and perhaps exaggerating the strength 
and originality of their findings. Under this scenario, negative and nonsta-
tistically significant results might not be, as usually suggested, left lying 
in the proverbial file drawers but might be buried instead into longer and 
more complex papers, which in titles and abstracts highlight only posi-
tive findings. The salami slices, in other words, are not taken apart and 
published individually, but used to pad large and seemingly rich panini, 
only the juiciest fillings of which are allowed to stick out and be exposed 
in titles and abstracts. Rather than “salami- slicing” and selecting results, I 
suggest, scientists may be increasingly “sandwiching” them. 
In conclusion, contrary to what is commonly argued in the literature, 
there is little direct evidence to suggest that pressures to publish have 
increasingly undermined the integrity of scientists. However, it is rea-
sonable to hypothesize that such pressures might have contributed to 
alter scientists’ publication and collaboration practices. Scientists might 
be gaming metrics by “sandwiching” their negative results and “salami- 
slicing” not their publications, as commonly believed, but their collabo-
rations. These strategies might have been effective to the point of going 
largely unnoticed by generations of scholars concerned by the negative 
effects of pressures to publish.
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In his chapter in this volume (chapter 1), and echoed in a number of the 
other chapters here, Alex Csiszar describes how gaming metrics of sci-
ence productivity was an immediate, possible consequence of the use of 
metrics— recognized in Goodhart’s law— and an immediate concern in 
early discussions of metrics derived from the Science Citation Index. Gam-
ing the system occurs when moves that are not against the rules, or that can 
be made to appear to be not against the rules, lead to some kind of surplus 
value. The truth of Goodhart’s law, then, is a consequence of a more gen-
eral kind of opportunism that fills “economic” (in a broad sense) niches. 
Particular instances of gaming can reveal both some possible opportunistic 
actions and the economic structures that make them possible. In this chap-
ter, I focus more on the former, but try not to lose sight of the latter.
Here I describe an arena where related economies meet, and where 
various goods can be created by moving resources from one into another. 
The economies in question are those of medical science, medical practice, 
and pharmaceutical marketing. One of the results of the meeting is the 
publication of medical journal articles that look like reports of academic 
science, but that have been largely or wholly created by many corporate 
actors working together, with the ultimate goal of influencing prescrip-
tions. Pharmaceutical companies and their agents control or shape, in 
ways that are not entirely visible, multiple steps in the research, analysis, 
writing, publication, and dissemination of significant amounts of medical 
science. I call this the “ghost management” of medical science.
Most of the clinical trial research that the pharmaceutical industry 
funds is handled by contract research organizations (CROs), companies 
that can run all different aspects of clinical trials. The data that CROs 
produce is typically analyzed by pharmaceutical company statisticians, 
reported in articles written by medical writers, and guided through to 
publication by dedicated publication planners. Publication plans parcel 
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data and other information for journals in ways that will be recognized 
and respected by various important physician and researcher audiences. 
Typically, it is only after the articles are drafted that authors are recruited. 
Authors are generally seen as “key opinion leaders” or “KOLs”: doctors 
and researchers valued for their status within— or at least participation 
in— their specialties, and with whom the companies have established rela-
tions. In addition to having credibility, authors may be chosen because 
they already agree with the conclusions of the articles, or because they 
are prospective speakers on the drugs at issue. The articles form the basis 
of company- funded presentations by KOLs at conferences, in continuing 
medical education courses, and in innumerable small- scale events in clin-
ics and restaurants, as part of what are known as “speaker programs.” 
Company sales representatives and medical science liaisons— the latter 
are staff who interact with physicians and researchers primarily about 
the science that supports products— also distribute articles in visits to and 
exchanges with physicians.
Even in the sketch in the previous paragraph, we can see the pharma-
ceutical industry leveraging academic value by gaming academic com-
munication. Pharmaceutical companies have joined the communication 
structures of academic science, making contributions that look as much 
as possible like good academic science, but that help to support com-
mercial aims, in the form of encouragement to physicians to prescribe. 
In their speaker programs and door- to- door delivery of information, the 
companies have added new forms of communication, built on top of tra-
ditional academic forms. The medical science that pharmaceutical com-
panies produce and circulate leads to drug prescriptions. In the following, 
I add some details to the picture I have just presented, displaying different 
forms of the leveraging of academic value, including one that takes us 
into the realm of metrics.
My research here draws on a wide variety of kinds of communica-
tions internal to the industry. In particular, it is largely based on my and 
two research associates’ attendance at a number of industry conferences 
between 2007 and 2017, where people who are insiders make presenta-
tions on issues of publication planning, KOL management, or speaker 
programs (for more details see Sismondo and Chloubova, 2016; Sis-
mondo, 2018). Much of my work focuses on what Finn Brunton (this 
volume, chapter 18) calls “secondary markets” around pharmaceutical 
research and marketing. For the sake of prudence and in accordance with 
my research protocol, I anonymize all sources, even though some of them 
were speaking in essentially public venues.
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Publication Planning
The construction of industry- sponsored articles almost always involves 
publication planners. According to planners, their work can and should 
start even before the research does, contributing to research design, 
mapping out key messages, and designating different articles for differ-
ent audiences and journals. Once the research is available, publication 
planners hire medical writers, contact potential authors, negotiate with 
various interests and departments within the pharmaceutical companies, 
and shepherd the articles through journals’ submission and revision proce-
dures (Auti et al., 2016). Ms. I, a planner working within a pharmaceutical 
company, says:
This is what utopia looks like from an industry perspective. We have agree-
ment and alignment on a plan, not even just a publication, a full plan, inves-
tigators on board, agencies lined up, everybody ready to play and we’re going 
to get this done in a timely way, in an orderly fashion, and things work like 
clockwork.
The best publication plans comprehensively address research, develop-
ment, presentations, and publications; appendices give the relevant data 
for each of the meetings and journals to which abstracts and papers will 
be submitted— the audiences they reach, their impact factors, their rejec-
tion rates, and publication lead times (Complete Healthcare Communica-
tion, 2006). A plan may also describe other communication opportunities, 
such as symposia and roundtables, journal supplements, advisory board 
meetings, monographs, slide programs, formulary kits, and more. Plan-
ners have been known even to create entirely new journals for particu-
lar projects, though that seems to be a rare and scandalous occurrence 
(Grant, 2009).
At the same time, planners should be responsive to changing circum-
stances and to the changing priorities of the company. Thus they might 
need to arrange for the production of a letter to the editor in response to 
an unfavorable study or the needs of a public relations campaign. Mr. D, 
a planner working for a large pharmaceutical company, illustrates this 
when he talks about supporting his company’s key messages:
At the beginning of the year, we kind of have a scientific strategy for every 
product, saying, y’know, these are the key messages that we’re hoping to get 
out, depending on what clinical data we have available. We’ll look at all the 
points that the upper management folks would like us to try and see if we 
have the data to address, and then we’ll go through it point by point and 
try to see.
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The biggest growth of publication planning occurred in the 1990s and 
probably was connected to other changes in the global pharmaceutical 
economy. That decade saw an enormous increase in global sales of phar-
maceuticals, at an average rate of over ten percent per year (World Health 
Organization, 2004). This surge was spurred by an increasing number of 
blockbuster drugs and consistent high sales growth in the United States. 
There was also a change in the structure of research: in 1990, seventy 
percent of pharmaceutical industry research funding went to universities 
and teaching hospitals, whereas in 2000, seventy percent went to CROs 
(Mirowski and Van Horn, 2005), a level that now seems stable (Westrock, 
2016). The simultaneous rise of the publication planning and CRO indus-
tries almost certainly is not coincidental, since CRO research can be 
planned and harnessed to marketing goals more easily than can academic 
research: CROs, unlike academics, have little interest in publishing the 
results of their studies.
Planners recognize that their work has marketing value, and publica-
tion planning agencies often advertise their work in terms of the contribu-
tion it can make to marketing. Tongue in cheek, industry consultant Ms. S 
asks the audience at one meeting, “By the way, is anything you do ever used 
in a promotional context? Oh yeah!” The promotion can be very broad. 
A publication plan accompanying the launch of a likely blockbuster drug 
can include more than fifty articles published over three or so years (Healy 
and Cattell, 2003; Ross et al., 2008). A chart presented at an industry semi-
nar entitled “Publication Planning 101,” showing the number and type of 
publications per year for a fictional new product, displays roughly ninety 
articles to be published over the course of five years. These are labeled: 
clinical efficacy, clinical pharmacology, review, case report, letter to the edi-
tor, and quality of life. In another context, Ms. S says, “The newest thing 
right now is disease states. … You all know what I’m talking about, where 
you don’t mention the name of the drug but you talk about the disease.”
Pharmaceutical companies typically arrange for KOLs to serve as all 
or the majority of authors on manuscripts. By using KOLs as authors, 
publication planners can give articles a veneer of having been written by 
independent researchers, instead of by a coordinated industry team. A 
KOL author thus increases the perceived credibility of an article and also 
hides features of the research process and analysis. Because of pressure 
from journal editors, the work of medical writers is increasingly being 
recognized in the acknowledgments sections of articles, but company 
statisticians and researchers, reviewers from an array of departments, 
and publication planners are rarely mentioned.
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In general, KOL authors are very unlikely to have worked closely with 
the data they are reporting. Pharmaceutical companies initiate and fund 
the planning, research, analysis, writing, and placing of articles, and typi-
cally maintain control of data throughout. Industry representative Dr. Q 
even argues that authors should not be given access to the data, because 
they may lack skill, and they may have their own agendas: “As the own-
ers of the study database, the sponsors will decide who will have access to 
the database. … PhRMA [Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
of America, the US industry lobby group] companies commit to making 
a summary of the results available to the investigators.” According to Mr. 
B, working for an independent planning agency, fifty percent of compa-
nies show only the penultimate draft to authors, to solicit their input. 
As a result, ghost- managed articles almost always violate naïve read-
ers’ expectations about their trajectories, and generally violate journals’ 
authorship criteria— though publication planners try to make it possible 
to make a case that their authors technically meet those criteria.
The KOLs may have multiple reasons for agreeing to serve as authors 
on these manuscripts. They add articles to their CVs, and, as I discuss 
below, these articles are likely to be amply cited. Although pharmaceuti-
cal companies do not pay for authorship, they may ask authors to give 
presentations of, or related to, the research, for which the authors are 
generously paid. Finally, it can be flattering to be targeted as an expert, 
and the manuscripts themselves may even contain more flattery, as this 
short excerpt from a legal deposition of a publication planner, discussing 
a ghost- managed review article, shows:
Q. All right. So before Dr. M. Brincat [the eventual author] saw the out-
line, Designwrite [the publication planning firm involved] had done the 
medical research, the literature research, to determine whether there 
was sufficient scientific evidence to support a scientific platform for this 
article. An outline was drafted and then Mr. … approached Brincat and 
Brincat agreed to be an author; is that correct?
A. That is correct, because it mostly cited Dr. Brincat’s research. (US Dis-
trict Court, 2006)
Editors of all of the important medical journals are aware of the pro-
cess, and almost every publication planning conference includes a panel 
of editors. While the editors typically condemn ghostwriting, they seem 
to accept that the strong pharmaceutical industry presence in medical 
research necessitates the ghost management of research and publication. 
These editors and their journals also value the articles, which, again, tend 
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to be respected and amply cited, and which may turn into immediate 
revenue if the companies sponsoring them want to buy reprints for distri-
bution. It is striking that, despite the occasional exposé revealing ghost-
written articles, retractions because of industry ghosting are extremely 
rare or nonexistent (Jones, 2009).
Speaker Programs and Other KOL Activities
For fifty years or more, sales representatives, medical science liaisons, and, 
recently, independent firms have been identifying potential KOLs, estab-
lishing relations with them and developing them into more effective speak-
ers and advocates for companies: “A key task of a pharmaceutical rep’s job 
is to help transform influential doctors into speakers and consultants who 
know the rules of the game and are quite adept at negotiating a stipend and 
‘working the crowd’” (Oldani, 2004; see also Sismondo, 2018).
The industry recognizes different kinds of KOLs, requiring different 
forms of interaction. Ordinary physicians— either general practitioners 
or specialists— are paid to speak to other physicians as members of 
speaker bureaus for particular drugs: they might address other physicians 
at lunchtime talks organized by sales reps, or serve as after- dinner speak-
ers at physicians’ events, also organized by sales reps. Medical research-
ers’ value to pharmaceutical companies might stem from any number of 
activities: they might be paid to speak to researchers or patient groups 
or at continuing medical education sessions; they might be consulted on 
any number of medical, marketing, or research issues; they might serve 
as authors of ghost- managed medical journal articles; or they might con-
tribute to research either by recruiting patients for trials or by initiating 
their own trials.
Like publication plans, speaker programs can be large. Pharmaceutical 
company manager Mr. E, presenting at a KOL management conference, 
raises the specter of an investigation of a speaker program: “When you 
say ‘I need seven hundred to one thousand speakers in this activity,’ the 
questions [that are] going to get pushed back to you in investigations are, 
‘Why do you need so many? How many is each speaker going to do? 
Why did you need a thousand?’” Mr. E’s concern is that investigators 
will conclude that some speakers are being trained and paid not because 
they are effective communicators but because they are important pre-
scribers. There is a continuum from KOLs employed primarily to change 
other physicians’ prescribing patterns to those employed primarily to 
change their own prescribing patterns (which is generally illegal). The 
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latter suggests a devious way of leveraging academic- like communication 
structures, influencing people by hiring them to speak.
With physician KOLs, the goals and consequent relationships are 
straightforward, since the physicians are simply hired to give talks and 
typically are given zero latitude in their delivery. Researcher KOLs, though, 
are treated so that they feel more like partners in medical science and edu-
cation. Interactions with them need to be subtle, especially since much of 
KOLs’ value to the companies stems from their independence from those 
companies, creating a real tension. Still, the needed independence does not 
stop KOL management experts from repeatedly indicating that KOLs can 
be used as important mediators for pharmaceutical companies. Here is 
Ms. C speaking to an audience of KOL managers and others:
[A] KOL point person can help you and the organization make sure that you 
are … identifying the right expert for the right need and able to work with 
them at the right place and time and be able to deliver a KOL plan that’s 
aligned to their scientific objectives. … Particularly as you start to enter Phase 
One, Phase Two [trials], and, you know, these molecules are moving along, it 
looks to have some promise— okay there are unique aspects perhaps about the 
mechanism of action— it’s going to be very important to help start to educate 
the community, the physician community, the patient community, the profes-
sional societies on this mechanism of action [and] on the disease state itself.
Researcher KOLs can smooth the path to acceptance of drugs and 
diseases by helping to shape the background of accepted issues and opin-
ions in a field. They might participate in industry- sponsored workshops 
and author key papers, thereby becoming the experts to whom the FDA 
could turn for advice on drug submissions and to whom the media could 
turn for interviews and information. In this way, they act as mediators 
between pharmaceutical companies, the FDA, physicians, and potential 
consumers (Fishman, 2004).
A Citation Puzzle
The ghost management of medical research presents a citation puzzle 
linked to companies’ gaming of academic communication systems. 
Gorry (2015) analyzes a group of ninety- two articles known to be ghost- 
managed, identified in documents from three legal proceedings. Among 
other things, Gorry notes that ghost- managed articles were cited approxi-
mately ten times more often than were typical other articles in the same 
journals— and almost none of the difference is explained by a difference 
in prestige of the authors (personal communication). Healy and Cattell 
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(2003) had earlier analyzed a subset of that group, and, unsurprisingly, 
the two studies come to some overlapping conclusions. Healy and Cattell 
compare their group of fifty- five ghost- managed articles on a particular 
drug with other articles on the same drug published in the same period: 
ghost- managed articles were cited between 2.4 and 2.9 times more fre-
quently than matched counterparts.
I suggest three possible explanations of the high citation rate of ghost- 
managed articles, all of which are very likely right, though I can only 
point to factors that make each one plausible.
First, ghost- managed articles may be more cite- worthy than their 
various counterparts. Pharmaceutical companies sponsor the majority 
of medium- sized and large clinical trials, the kind of study that is most 
valued in the medical world. The resources of pharmaceutical compa-
nies enable them not only to run solid trials, but also to produce articles 
that have all the hallmarks of good science. If ghost- managed articles 
are “counterfeits” and independent ones are “authentic,” in this case the 
counterfeit appears to be as high quality as is the authentic.
Second, ghost- managed articles may be more cited because they have 
better distribution than their counterparts. As marketing vehicles, these 
ghost- managed articles need to be read, or at least seen. Pharmaceutical 
companies have excellent distribution systems for their articles and for 
the information contained in them. The companies pay for presentations 
by KOLs at conferences, continuing medical education courses, clinics, 
and after- dinner events. Sales representatives and medical science liaisons 
provide reprints of articles to physicians, including academic physicians. 
Occasionally, companies engage in mass mailings of reprints. Ghost- 
managed articles, then, are tremendously better circulated than are inde-
pendent articles.
Third, the ghost management process likely leads to an interesting ver-
sion of self- citation. A publication plan that involves fifty or a hundred 
articles provides many potential entries in a reference list. Later articles 
can cite earlier ones, and all can cite articles from earlier publication 
plans, and not just earlier articles by particular authors. Describing an 
episode in her work as a medical writer, Larkin (1999) writes:
I agreed to do two reviews for a supplement to appear under the names of 
respected “authors.” I was given an outline, references, and a list of drug 
company- approved phrases. I was asked to sign an agreement stating that I 
would not disclose anything about the project. I was pressured to rework my 
drafts to position the product more favorably.
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Presumably, the list of references she was given was just as drug 
company- approved as was the list of phrases— medical writers and publi-
cation planners describe the literature review as a key step in the develop-
ment of an article. Indeed, it would be curious if reference lists were not 
skewed toward the company’s previous articles, because those articles 
would tend to support the company’s commercial interests and because 
those would be the articles or references to hand. If such self- citation 
exists, it is unusually invisible, in that the self- references are not to an 
individual, a laboratory, or a department, but rather to a set of publica-
tion plans and a company.
Conclusion: Multiple Leverage Points
Pharmaceutical companies have joined academic medicine’s research and 
communication structures. They participate both covertly and overtly, 
sometimes choosing to build medical knowledge minimally marked by 
conflicts of interest, and sometimes choosing to establish strong connec-
tions between scientific evidence and brands.
Not only do companies participate, they participate with more and 
better resources than are available to independent academics. Their abil-
ity to hire CROs allows them to run randomized, controlled trials world-
wide, on drugs for varied conditions; clinical trials produce the kind of 
knowledge that is most valued within medicine. Companies produce arti-
cles for academic journals that look like independently produced articles 
and have independent academics as authors, but that are likely to be 
more influential than are independently produced articles.
Not only do companies participate, they innovate. Building on forms 
like academic conferences and continuing medical education, they have 
developed sponsored research workshops and speaker programs, at 
which their KOLs give presentations that have the look and feel of pre-
sentations in academic research and education contexts, and sometimes 
might even be confused for independent work. Along the way, the com-
panies may be using these forms to convince the KOLs themselves to 
prescribe their products.
The intersection of different economies means that various different 
goals and metrics are at play here. A ghost- managed article contributes to 
medical knowledge. For pharmaceutical companies, the content of arti-
cles is important, because it can serve as a justification for prescriptions 
of their products. For those companies, at issue is the monetary return on 
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investment of the publication of research. Although this can be difficult 
to measure, there are attempts to measure the increased prescriptions 
resulting from particular articles. For a KOL author, an article represents 
another line on a CV and a contribution to prestige; it also may lead to 
industry- paid speaking engagements and to new citations. For a journal, 
a ghost- managed article contributes to its positive reputation for publish-
ing clinical and other research; the article is also likely to contribute to 
its impact factor, and if the sponsoring company uses reprints of it for 
promotion, the article could provide cash revenue.
Consistent with the insights of Marie- Andrée Jacob in this volume 
(chapter 19), ghost- managed articles are not simple counterfeits or fakes, 
standing in opposition to authentic or real articles. They are developed 
and constructed with considerable resources and skill, and rely on rich 
data. They are widely distributed and have real- world impact in the form 
of prescriptions. They are often exemplary pieces of medical science— 
albeit medical science created for marketing purposes, and with com-
mercial interests driving the work. Moreover, these articles rely for their 
effectiveness on at least a limited amount of collaboration with academic 
medical science— in the form of offering authorship of articles, with the 
endorsement that that implies. While, because authors typically do not 
meet journals’ authorship criteria, there is typically misconduct, there is 
a sense in which the misconduct needs to be carefully teased apart from 
more prototypical misconduct, such as faking data. Instead, pharmaceu-
tical companies are now the biggest contributors to the evidence base of 
medicine, ghost- managing apparently high- quality, interest- driven scien-
tific knowledge: gaming academic communication and leveraging aca-
demic value for commercial goals.
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III
Interventions: Notes from the Field

The detection of new forms of manipulation exceeds the reach, resources, 
and perhaps even the mandate of traditional governmental agencies like 
the US Office of Research Integrity. These constraints, however, have 
been balanced by the emergence of a new generation of collaborative 
grassroots watchdogs, carnivalesque pranksters, independent organiza-
tions, and bloggers. The watchdogs often operate websites featuring pub-
lic discussion or anonymous tips about publication misconduct that is 
often propelled by metrics. While watchdogs are often humorous, prank-
sters use humor and satire as their primary mode of critique to reveal 
spammish journals and easily gamed metrics. This section offers “notes 
from the field” by and about some of these new actors—notes that give 
us a glimpse of how they have emerged, how they operate, and how they 
have assumed increasingly important roles and credible voices despite a 
lack of governmental or university affiliations. They also tell us about the 
criticism, challenges, and legal threats they face.
Ivan Oransky co-founded the Retraction Watch to tell the stories 
behind article retractions, their typical opacity, and their increasing fre-
quency. Virtually unknown a few decades ago, retractions have become a 
daily occurrence, their quantity allowing for qualitative and quantitative 
studies of their patterns. The Retraction Watch website, coupled with its 
daily email updates, looks at the retractions themselves and what their 
nature, distribution, and causes can tell us about general, even global, 
trends in misconduct and metrics manipulations. Brandon Stell’s and 
Boris Barbour’s chapter shows that PubPeer—initially fashioned as a 
web-based journal club—shares many of the motivations that animate 
Retraction Watch, but focuses on providing a publicly accessible plat-
form for the detailed discussion of scientific articles chosen by the partici-
pants. Some questions and doubts are quickly answered by the authors of 
the articles (who are welcomed to jump into the public discussion), but in 
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other cases, the public questioning unearths more serious problems that 
may eventually lead to retractions. According to PubPeer, many of these 
problems are directly relatable to the craze for publishing in high–impact 
factor journals.
PubPeer has been very successful largely because it ignores metrics and 
engages in good old reading and critiquing. And while it does not take a 
position on the claims and allegations put forward by its largely anony-
mous commentators, these claims and the evidence they are based on is 
open for everybody to see, even when they may not be too eager to see 
it. For instance, Catherine Guaspare and Emmanuel Didier document a 
high-profile case—the “Voinnet affair”—that unfolded largely due to dis-
cussions on PubPeer and Retraction Watch. They argue that that case (in 
which a renowned French scientist lost an academic post and was banned 
from funding after the discovery of his frequent image manipulations) 
exemplifies a new “ecology” of misconduct detection in which the new 
watchdogs, despite having virtually no institutional authority, are able to 
create such a widespread publicity that forces the authorities to intervene 
or else appear to condone the misconduct.
Unlike the probing but formally polite discussions that animate Pub-
Peer, Paul Brookes’s blog “Science Fraud” chose to deploy snarky lan-
guage, and to do so from behind the mask of anonymity. This was a 
strategic choice, hoping that the somewhat “carnivalesque” tone of his 
commentary would draw additional attention, and thus put pressure on 
the authorities to investigate its claims. Anonymous and pseudonymous 
readers emailed him their discoveries of potential misconduct, which he 
blogged about humorously and sarcastically, while crediting his (masked) 
tipsters. After six months, however, Brookes’s identity was exposed. As a 
result, he was threatened with lawsuits by those accused of misconduct (a 
fate that has since been shared by PubPeer)1 while his university—fearing 
liabilities—demanded that he choose between the blog and his profes-
sorship. The forced termination of “Science Fraud” and the recent legal 
challenges to PubPeer show how independent watchdogs, thanks to their 
“crowdsourcing” approach, can be quicker and more effective than tra-
ditional “misconduct police” agencies like the Office of Research Integ-
rity. At the same time, their lack of institutional resources and authority, 
or of a governmental mandate, forces them to develop creative uses of 
anonymity (for themselves or their sources), which can backfire not only 
because anonymity can be breached, but also because its use may lead 
to accusations of opacity and unaccountability. Analogies between the 
predicament of PubPeer and WikiLeaks are not too far-fetched.
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Through a humorous experiment, Cyril Labbé confronts the problem 
of quantifying academic excellence through ranking scholars according 
to their citation counts. He created an imaginary persona—“Ike Antkare” 
(I Can’t Care)—as the author of dozens of computer-generated papers, 
which he then proceeded to publish to demonstrate how easily Google 
Scholar’s ranking could be gamed. Thanks to citations from these and 
other computer-generated articles by other fictional scholars, Ike Antk-
are rose to the twenty-first position of most cited scientists on Google’s 
Scholarometer, beating Albert Einstein in the process.
Burkhard Morgenstern describes possibly the most hilarious prank 
involving the creation of fake scientists (with fake bios) to join edito-
rial boards of spammish journals. He first became “Peter Uhnemann” 
(a character created by a German satirical magazine to troll a conser-
vative politician), whose bio listed his research interest as “oximologi-
cal microbiology, nonlinear submorphological endosaccharomorphosis, 
and applied endoplutomomics.” After Dr. Uhnemann was welcomed on 
a variety of editorial boards, Morgenstern decided to raise the bar by 
mobilizing “Hoss Cartwright” from the television show Bonanza. Dr. 
Cartwright was immediately welcomed on the editorial board of the Jour-
nal of Primatology, no doubt because of an impressive vitae featuring 
his affiliation with the Ponderosa Institute of Bovine Research, which he 
joined after extensive training in “Dunnowhat,” a postdoctoral fellow-
ship at “Cowboy University” followed by a second postdoc at “Some 
shitty place in the middle of nowhere.” His last listed position was “senior 
cattle manager.”
In a different, more serious register, independent organizations—like 
CrossRef and Sideview—also work to critique gaming metrics in schol-
arly publishing. Not keen to make metrics history, Jennifer Lin describes 
the successes, future potential, and challenges of “altmetrics”—a large 
family of indicators that map references to publications and statements 
well beyond journal downloads, citations, and so on. It also does so 
across different media and platforms (including social media) rather than 
just journals or books. Perhaps because it is not one thing but many, and 
because it is rarely used by universities to evaluate faculty performance, 
altmetrics has not shared the criticism leveled against traditional metrics, 
nor has it provided widespread incentives for its gaming.2 Furthermore, 
because of its complexity, the gaming of altmetrics “requires manipulat-
ing measurements across a diverse set of independent platforms [which] 
involves extensive coordination of multiple methods specific to each 
metric.” So far so good, but what will happen when altmetrics develops 
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a more clearly defined market and a specific set of users and uses, like 
today’s impact factor?
Elizabeth Wager too targets the downsides of metrics, but sees jour-
nals as part of the problem, not the solution. She proposes—simply and 
radically—to terminate the use of journal articles as the canonical genre 
of research dissemination—a convention that, while seemingly set in 
stone, is in fact nonobvious. The standard length of an article is unlikely 
to match the nature and scope of the topic, thus creating both “salami-
sliced” and redundant publications. Also, the expectations of the genre 
tend to disincentivize the publication of large datasets and trials. Finally, 
the growing pressure to publish in high-impact journals may lead to 
hyping the importance of one’s claim, or even to misleading reporting 
and data manipulation. Focusing specifically on data-intensive research, 
Wager argues that all these problems could be avoided by switching to 
research reports (rather than articles) structured in a way to make their 
data machine readable. Operating outside of any regime of metrics, these 
would be “outputs” rather than “articles”—outputs to be used and built 
upon rather than evaluated (in the sense that metrics give to evaluation). 
Of course, articles discussing and commenting on published data would 
still be produced, but they would not be the “main course” of science 
publishing anymore, thus forcing universities and government agencies to 
articulate “new methods for measuring research productivity.”
Notes
1. Ivan Oransky, “Lawsuit Involving PubPeer Unmasks Commenter as Pseud-
onymous Whistleblower Clare Francis,” Retraction Watch, April 13, 2015. 
http:// retractionwatch . com / 2015 / 04 / 13 / lawsuit - involving - pubpeer - unmasks 
- commenter - as - pseudonymous - whistleblower - clare - francis / (accessed October 
10, 2016).
2. But there are exceptions, like Yves Gingras, Bibliometrics and Research 
Evaluation: Uses and Misuses (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), pp. 67– 68.
Adam Marcus and I founded Retraction Watch (http:// retractionwatch 
 .com) in August 2010 for two reasons: As longtime journalists, we often 
found that retraction notices were opaque. And sometimes opacity was 
the best you could hope for; often, notices were misleading or even wrong. 
We also found that there were great stories behind retractions.
We have our own metrics at Retraction Watch, mostly just having to 
do with traffic to the site each month; we now have, on average, 150,000 
unique visitors, and half a million page views. (However, we are not 
beholden to these metrics, as our revenue does not depend on advertising; 
we have at various times had generous funding from three foundations, 
and other income streams including freelance writing fees.) In terms of 
more traditional metrics, I can say we have been cited in the literature more 
than a hundred times. That means that if a blog could have an H index, 
we would have a good one. And it does not hurt when we talk to funders 
about the impact we are having on publishing practices and transparency.
Retraction Watch posts often begin with a tip— mostly a notice of 
retraction. But we also receive long emails from frustrated researchers, 
who have been laboring to correct a perceived wrong for months, if not 
years. We empathize and sympathize with their frustration— it is incred-
ibly hard to get papers retracted from the literature, or even corrected or 
noted in some way.
As an illustration, take a piece by nutrition researcher David Allison and 
colleagues that appeared in Nature (Allison et al., 2016). They scanned 
the nutrition literature and found more than two dozen papers that they 
thought were deeply problematic. And they kept a pretty high bar. You 
can judge for yourselves, but if you look at the kinds of problems they 
were looking at in these papers, it was pretty clear something needed to be 
done. In a few cases, the journals retracted the paper, or published a letter 
from Allison and his team critiquing the findings, but in many cases the 
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journals did nothing. It was very, very frustrating. We wrote a commen-
tary on this eye- opening article (Oransky and Marcus, 2016) and a Q&A 
with the authors as well (McCook, 2016a). And although retraction is not 
always the best way to correct the scientific literature— corrections and 
correspondence, for example, may serve the purpose— the nuclear option 
is sometimes necessary. But it is very, very difficult to get a paper retracted. 
That is for a number of reasons, but one is clearly the stigma attached to 
retractions— although I will present some surprising findings on that in 
the conclusion of this chapter— and the fact that publishing papers in cer-
tain journals is the only way to earn grants, tenure, and promotions. They 
are, in a word, the metrics. Researchers will do anything to publish papers 
in some journals, including even creating fake authors (Marcus and Oran-
sky, 2016). The opposite side of that coin is that many authors are very 
reluctant to admit to flaws in their work, and, by extension, to retract. 
I would put Allison and his colleagues in a “still relatively patient and 
professional” category in terms of their approach to trying to correct the 
record. But there are others who let their exasperation show. Some of our 
frequent commenters fall into that category, and they often find it difficult 
to maintain their equanimity. It can be very frustrating to try and correct 
the literature. Often well- meaning researchers who care about the public 
record use their free time to correct it, but it does not go well and they are 
vilified. To put it another way, whistle- blowers often fare far worse than 
those they are accusing of misconduct— and most problematic papers do 
not even earn an Expression of Concern, let alone a retraction. In short, 
the most common outcome for those who commit fraud is: a long career.
There is a really robust source of these conversations about the lit-
erature: PubPeer (Barbour and Stell, this volume, chapter 11). The site 
became a great resource for us, because we had a place to refer all the 
readers who were sending us allegations that we are not equipped— in 
terms of time, resources, and expertise— to properly vet and write about. 
PubPeer comments are a great resource for us, but so are the comments 
on our own site, in response to particular posts. There is much debate 
over comments and whether or not commenters should be allowed to 
remain anonymous (Blatt, 2015). We have chosen to allow commenters to 
post anonymously, because of the hierarchy of science and the dangers of 
speaking out against the powerful. But we moderate each comment heav-
ily, and won’t post any allegations that cannot be supported by evidence.
Here is an example of why we believe in the importance of anonymous 
comments. In 2014, we learned of a series of retractions from diabetes 
researcher Cory Toth, who used to be at the University of Calgary. We 
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reported on them, and he actually said some very interesting things. “I am 
significantly apologetic, remorseful, and embarrassed that this occurred 
under my watch,” he told us. “Please know that I will not be publishing 
in the world of science in the future” (Marcus, 2014). The university had 
done an investigation, and they found misconduct, so he left.
Once we posted about four retractions, things became even more 
interesting. Readers started leaving comments that said, basically, “Oh, 
what about this paper that wasn’t retracted? You should look at this 
other figure. It looks a little bit odd. Something else here, there, and every-
where.” The university— unbeknownst to us— saw these comments and 
followed up on them. They reopened their investigation, and he ended up 
with five more retractions. And when Margaret Munro, then a reporter 
for Postmedia, called the university, they told her it was because of the 
Retraction Watch comments (Munro, 2014).
That story, and PubPeer, are important reminders that we are part of 
an ecosystem. What happens on PubPeer can result in a retraction (Keith, 
2015). I can point to dozens of cases we have covered where the allega-
tions first appeared in PubPeer. But it is not just us and PubPeer. There 
are many people out there focusing on similar issues. Some, like Science 
- Fraud . org, have been forced to shutter because of legal threats (Brookes, 
this volume, chapter 13; Oransky, 2013). And PubPeer faced legal action 
brought by a scientist who lost a job offer at least in part due to com-
ments on the site. The scientist wanted PubPeer to unmask a commenter, 
but with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, earned a judge’s 
ruling that allowed them to refuse (McCook, 2016b).
While we face those kinds of threats, too, we have yet to be sued, which 
we attribute to having worked in journalism for more than a decade and 
having developed a clear sense of libel laws and how they apply to our 
efforts. Also, because we are journalists, rather than practicing scientists, 
we can write critically of researchers, publishers, and institutions with-
out fearing reprisals from those in power that would damage our own 
careers. There are others in our ecosystem, like Ben Goldacre, who are 
going from strength to strength. Many of us have been funded by the 
Arnold Foundation, whose support of this area should be acknowledged. 
It is very important if you get involved in this work to think of yourselves 
as part of an ecosystem.
To put it another way, there are lots of people out there who are as 
obsessive about their niches as Adam and I are about retractions. We are 
eager to host those fellow obsessives, in guest posts— such as a post about 
the Collaboration Score from its creator, Sarah Greene (Greene, 2016).
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What did we learn in our first five years? One clear trend is that the 
retraction rate is on the rise. The number of retractions has also gone 
up, not surprisingly, as there are more papers. From 2001 to 2010, as 
very ably demonstrated in Nature by Richard Van Noorden, the number 
of retractions increased from about forty a year to four hundred. The 
number of papers only went up forty- four percent (Van Noorden, 2011). 
The number of retractions went up again to somewhere between five 
hundred and six hundred, and in fiscal year 2015, it was close to seven hun-
dred, according to PubMed. And there are more retractions that are not 
captured by typical databases. (Keep in mind that despite the increase, 
the rate of retraction remains quite small— less than 0.05 percent of all 
papers.) Our database of retractions, made available in October 2018 at 
retractiondatabase . org years after the conference from which this chapter 
originated, demonstrated that those trends continued but that the rate of 
retraction may be leveling off (Brainard and You, 2018).
Does this mean that fraud is on the increase? We do not know, but we 
are certainly better at catching it. The introduction of plagiarism detec-
tion software changed a lot, as it enabled anyone to scan the millions of 
online papers. It is like the introduction of a new screening test: you would 
expect to see an increase in diagnoses once you start screening. At the 
same time, we have some evidence that misconduct of at least one kind— 
inappropriate image manipulation— is on the rise, thanks to a painstaking 
effort by Elisabeth Bik to scrutinize the Western blots in more than twenty 
thousand papers. Bik and her colleagues found that one in twenty- five 
papers contained problematic images— and that the rate of such issues 
had grown dramatically since 2000 (Bik, Casadevall, and Fang, 2016).
These are some of the reasons papers are retracted, in a fairly random 
order:
• Plagiarism: This is responsible for about ten percent of retractions.
• Duplication: You cannot really plagiarize yourself, but you can 
duplicate your own work. That is probably about fifteen percent of 
retractions.
• Image manipulation: Photoshopped photos of Western blots are a 
common reason for retraction, and a frequent source of comments on 
PubPeer.
• Faked data: Diederik Stapel may be the most well- known recent case 
of this, but it is not uncommon among reasons for retraction.
• “For legal reasons”: This one is sort of strange to us because it sug-
gests that all the notices that do not include that term are illegal.
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• Fake peer reviews: This is a trend we have been reporting on since 
2012. It is relevant to a discussion of metrics because you can manage 
to have your paper accepted if you do your own peer review, taking 
advantage of the way editorial management systems are set up (Fergu-
son, Marcus, and Oransky, 2014). More than six hundred papers have 
now been retracted for that reason. And the fact that researchers do 
this in response to “publish or perish” pressures suggests a direct link 
to metrics.
• Honest error: This is responsible for about twenty percent of retrac-
tions, and when we see authors going out of their way to correct the 
record, we call attention to it by adding the case to our “doing the 
right thing” category.
• Publisher error: This is not a particularly important reason for retrac-
tion, and not all that common, but sometimes publishers print the same 
paper two or even three times. Apparently, the only way they know to 
correct the record is to issue a retraction, which means an author has a 
retraction— and the stigma that comes with it— for no fault of his or her 
own.
• Authorship issues: These can be a real headache for journals and uni-
versities. We have seen cases in which authors appear on papers they 
had nothing to do with, and other cases in which rightful authors are 
not named.
• Lack of reproducibility: This is controversial. Most scientists we speak 
to argue against retracting a paper just because later work overturns 
it, but some decide to retract their own papers for this reason.
Overall, two- thirds of retractions are due to misconduct, as Fang, 
Steen, and Casadevall showed in 2012. Sometimes, however, it is hard to 
tell. Here is a notice that was typical in a particular journal until quite 
recently: “This article has been withdrawn by the authors.” That is not 
very helpful, but the Journal of Biological Chemistry, where the “article 
has been withdrawn by the authors” retractions appeared, must have 
become tired of having us beat them up after five years, so they changed 
their policy and now include details (Guengerich, 2015).
Speaking of metrics, here is how they might be related to how long it 
takes to retract. The average is about three years (Steen, Casadevall, and 
Fang, 2013). To be a conspiracy theorist for a moment, it is worth noting 
that three years is a year longer than the amount of time citations count 
toward a journal’s impact factor. That means if journals can drag out the 
process, they would not take an impact factor hit. Similarly, authors and 
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universities can drag out the process to make it less likely that a retrac-
tion will affect promotion or funding decisions.
And retracted papers keep being cited, often as if they had never been 
retracted (Budd, Coble, and Anderson 2011). As an illustration, we have 
a leaderboard of the top ten cited retracted papers (Retraction Watch, 
2016b). Number two on the list at the time of this writing was Andrew 
Wakefield’s infamous Lancet paper claiming a link between autism and 
vaccines (Wakefield et al., 1998). (Look, I just cited it.) And number one 
has had far more citations after it was retracted than before. Whether 
those are positive or negative citations, we do not know.
Which journals retract most? It turns out that journals with the highest 
impact factor— there are those metrics again– also have the highest rate 
of retraction. Again, we think that is mostly due to the fact that there are 
more eyeballs on those journals, although it is certainly possible that sci-
entists are pushing the envelope to publish in those journals in ways that 
would constitute misconduct. “Meta- scientists” continue to debate the 
data on whether “publish or perish” plays a significant role in misconduct 
(Fanelli et al., 2017). And which researchers retract most? We like our 
leaderboards and our rankings at Retraction Watch. The top retraction 
holder has 183 (Retraction Watch, 2016a).
Let me leave you with an interesting finding that relies on metrics. A 
study— whose findings have been replicated by another group (McCook, 
2015)— found that when people retract papers for fraud, you see what 
you would expect: their citations drop (Lu et al., 2013). In fact, citations 
in their whole subspecialty drop by about ten percent to fifteen percent. 
That is bad news, which, again, you would expect. But if you retract for 
honest error, however, and it is clear in the notice that the mistake is the 
result of honest error, you do not see that drop. So there is an example of 
using citations— a metric— to figure out what happens after a retraction. 
And it is also good news, in that good behavior is not punished.
Metrics: we just cannot get away from them.
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“She has a Nature paper!” How many times have you heard that sen-
tence? And how many times was it accompanied by a discussion of what 
was in the paper? Maybe not so often, which is symptomatic of the prob-
lems in scientific research today. Worse, the obsession with the journal, at 
the expense of the result, is a pragmatic adaptation to the incentive struc-
ture of research today. Success in the competitions for jobs and grants 
will follow that publication, independently of its substance (or lack of it).
Publishing in Nature or one of several “glamour” journals is supposed 
to be synonymous with high- quality research of great significance. It repre-
sents a metric— a shorthand representation of the quality of research output 
that is often given numerical form as the “impact factor,” described else-
where in this volume. The lure of metrics is incredibly strong, because they 
offer an apparently efficient and objective basis for allocating resources 
such as grants and jobs, for which competition is fierce.
But every metric distracts our severely limited attention from the sub-
stance of the research. And, in doing so, metrics allow career success 
(or survival) to become dissociated from research quality. Defenders of 
the most sought- after journals will stress that stiff competition, stringent 
criteria for general interest, and attentive refereeing ensure that only the 
highest quality papers are accepted. Yet there are numerous examples 
of papers of dubious quality and with overblown interpretations being 
accepted in even the best journals. In many ways this is hardly surprising, 
because the true scientific impact of a paper is extremely difficult to judge 
when it is new.
The “top” journals distort science in other, more subtle, but equally 
pernicious ways. Their criteria for acceptance require papers to pres-
ent “revolutionary concepts.” Of course revolutions sometimes happen, 
but the reality is nearly always more prosaic. This means that aspiring 
authors feel pressured to adapt their presentations to fit these criteria, 
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quite often exaggerating interpretations and misleading readers. Even 
worse, our whole approach to research has become governed by the desire 
to strike gold, even if most risky bets simply don’t pay off and authors are 
obliged to spin their often useless results in some misleading way. All man-
ner of solid, incremental, and useful work is deemed of too low impact to 
stand a chance of reaching a top journal and is therefore neglected by the 
grant evaluation committees and hiring committees in charge of identify-
ing and nurturing the most promising research. We thus find ourselves in 
a situation where all of our research is constrained by the need to create 
whatever the high- impact journals consider to be high- impact stories. We 
are caught in a self- perpetuating game where the score is a publication that 
suits one of the top journals.
It is often stated that “science is self- correcting.” If it is, then maybe the 
occasional excess won’t be too damaging? However, as we have argued 
in our blog post “A crisis of trust,”1 we believe that a combination of 
the pressures to publish high- impact research, the acute competition in 
research careers, and multiple levels of conflicts of interest have created 
an environment today that is hostile to any form of self- correction.
The traditional form of correction is the publication of a new paper, 
presenting contradictory findings and explaining how the original study 
was in error. But such studies are vanishingly rare today. Probably the 
major discouragement is editorial policy, because although the top jour-
nals often seem happy to accept somewhat shaky work raising an inter-
esting possibility, they are almost never keen to publish a paper ruling 
out that sexy conclusion they previously published. There is a conflict of 
interest here, because the journal editors obviously prefer to avoid even 
implicit criticism of their evaluation process and brand.
A further obstacle is financial. Obtaining funding is extremely com-
petitive and most funding bodies seek to identify the “revolutionary” 
work that will be publishable in the top journals. Proposing to redo some-
body’s experiments will in most cases be laughed out of the committee. 
A rare but hopeful counter- example was the large- scale project to repli-
cate one hundred psychology experiments under the auspices of the Open 
Science Foundation, funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.2 
Famously, fewer than one- half of the experiments replicated. Replications 
often require human resources as well as financial resources, but if it is 
neither possible to hire somebody to do the work nor to offer them a real-
istic chance of publishing in a top journal, it becomes doubly difficult to 
motivate people to carry out the replication. A final obstacle is social. Rep-
licating work is almost uniformly seen as a sign of mistrust (it often is), 
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and this can rapidly lead to poor relations with the original researchers 
and be perceived as aggressive by the community. Replicators risk expos-
ing themselves to reprisals via the many anonymous decisions governing 
their careers (reviews of papers, grants, job applications, promotions).
An alternative and more lightweight method of correcting science is 
through correspondence and commenting. Indeed, issues in papers often 
don’t require additional experiments or complete new manuscripts to be 
identified; such issues could include errors of experimental design, anal-
ysis, or interpretation. However, current journal systems for correspon-
dence and for commenting have proved almost totally ineffectual. In the 
case of correspondence, many journals simply do not have a correspon-
dence section. For those that do, it remains extremely constrained in terms 
of the number of items a journal will publish and the allowed size of those 
items. Less apparent, but equally inhibiting, editorial policies repress or 
dissuade most if not all attempts to publish correspondence. At times, the 
discouragement and obstacles faced by correspondents are almost comi-
cal. Although there should be no space limitation for commenting on jour-
nal websites (at least for those that offer the facility), many of the same 
discouragements operate. In sum, there is a widespread and self- fulfilling 
perception that journals do not welcome correspondence or comments 
that criticize their publications. The result is that correspondence and 
commenting on journal websites make no significant contribution to the 
correction of science.
Some journals have shown recent signs that they are becoming aware 
of this problem, but, as set out in our blog “Nature editors: all hat and 
no cattle,”3 even thought leaders such as Nature are struggling to develop 
a coherent “correction” strategy within the constraints of their business 
model and presumptions of excellence. At the time of writing, the journal 
Circulation Research has formulated a promising policy, in which they state 
that refutations will be considered to have the same impact as the original 
work they address. This would remove one huge barrier at glamour jour-
nals, which almost invariably have judged refutations to fall below their 
general interest thresholds.
Thus, the present combination of career incentives and journal edito-
rial policies has led to a situation where most researchers actively avoid 
criticizing directly or indirectly any published work. The self- correction 
of science is sick, although there are now some signs of progress.
It was in this context that PubPeer was developed and launched almost 
five years ago. The goal of PubPeer is to offer a web platform (https:// 
pubpeer . com) for centralized discussion of publications, in order to create 
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a community of “post- publication peer reviewers” and offer a new mech-
anism of scientific assessment. The website is independent of the journals, 
removing many of the psychological barriers and conflicts of interests 
inhibiting discussion and criticism of papers. Shortly after our launch, we 
introduced a key feature— - strong user anonymity— - and from that point 
on our comment volume climbed rapidly. It has become clear that a large 
number of substantive and critical comments had never before found an 
outlet. Specifically, a very large number of comments (concerning thou-
sands of papers) have been posted that highlight manifest misconduct 
in the preparation of figure data. Typical issues include fabrication of 
western blot data through duplication of bands. Through observing these 
numerous cases, we have come to believe that the suppression of self- 
corrective mechanisms in science has enabled a surprisingly large number 
of researchers to build very successful careers based upon the most dubi-
ous of research practices.
Anonymity is PubPeer’s most controversial aspect, but we remain con-
vinced that its benefits strongly outweigh its disadvantages. (Our analysis 
of this is laid out in our blog “Vigilant Scientists.”)4 Although anonym-
ity apparently introduces the possibility for people to be defamed with 
impunity, there are in fact layered safeguards to minimize this. First and 
foremost, our guidelines make clear that comments must be based upon 
public facts and/or logic, such that other readers can verify each com-
ment’s conclusions for themselves; hearsay is forbidden. These guidelines 
are enforced by moderation and reporting facilities for all posted com-
ments. Of course, there are additional guidelines regarding politeness in 
posts, avoiding ad hominem arguments and discouraging speculation. 
These guidelines, combined with the constraints of the scientific discourse, 
which is inherently fact based, have, we believe, enabled a very high accu-
racy of user comments and allowed the site to avoid most of the problems 
associated with anonymous commenting elsewhere on the internet. In 
addition, authors are alerted to comments and encouraged to respond to 
any questions or criticisms by defending and explaining their work. Many 
of the issues raised on PubPeer would be solved instantly by posting the 
original data, yet most authors have not chosen this course of action.
Most of the arguments against PubPeer, and more specifically its ano-
nymity, have focused on the belief that it will enable unfounded denigra-
tion of researchers. However, the site’s critics are rarely able to produce 
even a single example of a career that has been unjustly harmed by criti-
cism on PubPeer, despite the large number of comments now in the Pub-
Peer database. For sure there are researchers who commented on PubPeer 
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whose careers have been harmed, but in all of the high- profile cases that 
we are aware of, the criticisms have been found to be accurate and justi-
fied. In truth, only criticisms that are valid are damaging.
Against this perhaps surprisingly slight “defamatory” risk, we balance 
the benefit of the strong encouragement of post- publication peer review 
by anonymity on PubPeer. The kind of information posted to PubPeer can 
benefit readers in a number of ways. Comments typically highlight research 
that is unreliable in some way. Knowledge of this can prevent researchers 
wasting their time and (taxpayers’) money attempting to build upon some 
apparently exciting but flawed breakthrough. Furthermore, since public 
policy and medical guidelines are, at least in theory, based upon evidence, 
often in the form of published research, early warning of potential prob-
lems can guard against erroneous policy and even save lives. The guid-
ing policy at PubPeer can be summarized as putting first the readers and 
users of published research, even if that can sometimes be uncomfortable 
for the authors of the publications discussed. As we stated on our blog: 
“… a few ruffled academic feathers pale into insignificance when patients’ 
lives, taxpayer billions, and young researchers’ careers are at stake. We 
also suspect that the researchers’ employers— those same taxpayers and 
patients— would share this point of view.” We also believe that defenders 
of authors’ rights not to be criticized have forgotten that publication is 
a choice, freely made by the authors. To put things bluntly, authors who 
don’t wish their work to be criticized or questioned are always free not 
to publish.
At the time of writing, PubPeer is approaching five years of operation. 
It is clearly here to stay and is exercising a growing influence on research, 
both through a number of spectacular scandals that have been brought to 
light via the site, but also via a cumulative effect on journals, institutions, 
and researchers themselves, as the site becomes integrated into research, 
editorial, and administrative workflows. Although no journals or data-
bases currently integrate PubPeer comments, users can install browser 
plugins that provide as- you- browse alerts to papers with comments.
With those five years of experience, what has emerged is that most com-
ments are indeed critical. Clearly the most effective motivation to comment 
is when a reader perceives a problem in a paper. In a way this is unsurpris-
ing: firstly, science proceeds by falsification; secondly, most papers are of 
necessity written to present the work in the most positive light possible. 
Decline and decay is the fate for many papers.
Post- publication peer review, which PubPeer facilitates, is compatible 
and synergistic with two other key trends refocusing our attention on the 
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substance of research. The first is the use of preprints; servers such as the 
ArXiv and bioRxiv offer instant access to papers as soon as they are ready, 
eliminating a delay of many months and even years. Arguments about low- 
quality papers no longer being filtered by peer review can be countered by 
the extremely successful example of the ArXiv and by the flood of journals 
without meaningful quality controls. We recall moreover that even the top 
journals are clearly susceptible to allowing “impact” to compensate for 
rigor in the papers they publish. PubPeer accepts comments on preprints 
for both ArXiv and bioRxiv and would implement others if and when 
they come online (we are however personally in favor of a few, centralized 
preprint servers).5
The second trend is toward full data access. Several publishing groups 
(including PLoS and NPG at the time of writing) require authors to share 
their data upon request or even before publication the full set of their 
original data. Although the systems and processes of this are by no means 
reliable or routine, the direction is clear. Access to the data will enable 
much more meaningful post- publication review and discussion. Authors 
and journals will no longer be able to suppress checks and reanalyses 
by controlling (usually refusing) access to the data. One consequence of 
this will be that many of the kinds of issues that appear on PubPeer and 
currently lead to somewhat ungracious and inconclusive discussions will 
in future be resolved directly, by access to the original data that is today 
withheld. In some respects, we are in a transition period.
What should the future of scientific research look like? What we would 
like to see and what we are working toward is an environment that is 
much more accepting of discussion, criticism, reanalysis, and replication. 
This in turn will focus attention on the substance of publications (whatever 
their format), with the consequence that authors will be under pressure 
to publish good quality work. This contrasts with the current situation 
where authors can largely escape criticism once a “definitive” publication 
has appeared. Intensive post- publication review also places pressure on 
authors to provide “after- sales service.” Those that publish low- quality 
work will have to spend more time explaining and defending their work, 
which is as it should be.
Will we need journals in the future? Preprint servers could certainly 
satisfy the requirements of publication at a tiny fraction of the cost. 
We are quite unconvinced by journal claims of a high added value for 
their reviewing, formatting, and indexing.4 Many publishers also try to 
argue that preprints would produce a flood of low- quality work and that 
researchers do not have time to trawl through millions of preprints to 
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find those that are of high quality and of interest to them. Yet it is unlikely 
that the current system prevents publication of low- quality work (a bad 
paper eventually gets published in one of the more than ten thousand 
currently existing journals). Furthermore, physicists all use the ArXiv, 
which divides papers into broad subjects (an approach replicated by 
bioRxiv), and don’t seem to have any greater difficulty in keeping abreast 
of new work than researchers in other fields. Once the community grows 
to a critical mass, post- publication review on sites such as PubPeer could 
replace (or complement) some if not all of the evaluation that is currently 
carried out with pre- publication review, although the volume of the latter 
obviously greatly exceeds post- publication review at this time.
Finally, we return to the issue of metrics, be they explicit (e.g., number 
of citations) or implicit (the journal). As we have argued above, we believe 
that all metrics are dangerous attempts to measure the unmeasurable, 
encourage gaming of the metric, and distract attention from the substance 
of the science. We consider it unlikely that any metric will prove beneficial 
to the management of science.
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In the 1980s, it was already obvious that large companies were using 
metrics to track numerically the efficacy and efficiency of their employees. 
Management methods based on quantification gained widespread recogni-
tion during this decade (Camp, 1989; Hammer and Champy, 1993). Since 
the 2000s, these metrics seem to have migrated far beyond the borders of 
the corporate world, permeating the public bureaucracies of most liberal 
states, giving rise to what has come to be called the “New Public Manage-
ment” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Education was one site where these 
new metrics were first applied. While their success proves that they have 
been useful to some constituencies, their use has also been accompanied 
by drawbacks and complaints, which have often focused on the gaming 
practices that metrics fostered (Bruno and Didier, 2013). There are now 
suggestions that the problem may be worse than that. As universities and 
research institutions have adopted metrics of performance evaluation 
(Lawn, 2014), it has also become clear that the life sciences are plagued 
with widespread misconduct. Is there a correlation?
The literature offers some explanations for the apparent increase of 
misconduct cases (Steen, Casadevall, and Fang, 2013). One could argue 
that the barriers to publication have been lowered in the last twenty years 
or so, thus letting more scientists publish fraudulent articles. But this 
argument has limitations. First, it does not explain why the barriers to 
publications have been lowered. Second, over the same period, we have 
witnessed a series of public scandals triggered by findings of misconduct. 
Given that one of the social functions of scandal is precisely to enforce 
norms (Dampierre, 1954; Molotch and Lester, 1973; Boltanski, Claverie, 
and Offenstadt, 2007; Adut, 2008), we should not expect to find scandals 
if there was a simple lowering of the quality requirements in science. A 
different explanation is offered by the scientists themselves who often 
complain that they are under pressure, which may tempt them to produce 
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subquality science. But the problem with the word “pressure” (which, by 
the way, is shared with many other professions from the police to medi-
cal doctors [Bruno and Didier, 2013]) is that it is mainly a complaint, a 
denunciation. It is not analytical.
Our hypothesis is that certain dimensions of the practice of science have 
experienced important transformations in the last twenty years, caused in 
part by the performative effects of metrics. These innovations have blurred 
the previous norms regulating scientific practices. At the same time, a new 
ecology (Star, 1995) of watchdogs and fraud detection has emerged that 
gives increased visibility to cases of misconduct, which in turn stir public 
controversies or “affairs” through which norms are re- instantiated.
Rethinking Misconduct Through High- Visibility Affairs
The practice of science has changed in the last twenty years. The digitali-
zation of scientific images and the accessibility of image- processing soft-
ware (such as Photoshop) have completely reshaped the way images are 
used and processed in the laboratory, posing questions about the accept-
able limits of image manipulation (Rossner and Yamada, 2004). At the 
same time, changes to the way laboratories are managed (caused by the 
increased size of research teams and changes in the funding structure) 
have deeply transformed the role of Principal Investigators (PIs), who are 
now managers as much as researchers. In turn, this has changed the dis-
tribution of responsibility within the laboratory concerning the handling 
of the images (Frow, 2012).
Since science is a competitive community where all try to succeed, there 
are incentives to use new tools up to the limit, which sometimes leads scien-
tists to lose the sense of where those limits are, especially in regard to new 
practices like digital image processing and use. The main scientific journals 
are stepping in trying to establish guidelines but, until now, they have not 
resolved all of the ambiguities that emerge from the use of these new tools 
(Frow, 2012). Practitioners, therefore, may not know for sure what are the 
limits that should not be crossed given that the community is still elaborat-
ing and stabilizing them.
Controversies and scandals are defining events in making social norms 
explicit (Boltanski, 1990; Bloor, 1991; Claverie, 1998). They are oppo-
sitional moments when ethical and epistemological standards become 
unstable and have to be newly decided upon, breaking up the scientific 
community into groups advocating for a certain set of norms against 
The Voinnet Affair  159
another set, forcing them to make their conception of the norms explicit. 
For example, some scientists have recently expressed a sentiment of injus-
tice when witnessing practices that they found shocking but brought suc-
cess to those who deployed them:
The climate of distorted incentives has been exploited by some scientists to 
build very successful careers upon fabricated data, landing great jobs, publish-
ing apparently high- impact research in top journals and obtaining extensive 
funding. … Honest scientists struggle to compete with cheats in terms of pub-
lications, employment, and funding. (PubPeer, 2016)
Some who felt this type of resentment did not simply express it but also 
helped establish a whole new ecology of watchdogs to scrutinize scientific 
production. And when they identify something disturbing or puzzling, they 
find ways to have the scientific community confront these issues. They are 
social actors that put science to a test.
To analyze the ways in which a specific scandal becomes the moment 
when norms are expressed, we focus on a recent well- known example. 
In 2014 and 2015, a set of publications authored or co- authored by a 
renowned French life scientist, Olivier Voinnet, became the target of a 
series of public critiques. They were posted on the website PubPeer, one 
of the main new watchdogs that allows scientists to anonymously discuss 
and criticize scientific papers (Boris Barbour and Brandon Stell, this vol-
ume, chapter 11).
Public Critiques and the Mediatization of the “Voinnet Affair”
In 2014, Voinnet was a forty- three- year- old, high- profile plant molecular 
biologist widely recognized for his work on RNA interference, a defense 
mechanism that allows plants, but also invertebrates and mammals, to 
fight viruses. After a thesis completed under the supervision of David 
Baulcombe (a major plant scientist and a pioneering researcher in gene 
silencing), Voinnet was recruited by the French National Center for Sci-
entific Research (CNRS) as a permanent researcher and appointed at the 
“Institut de Biologie Moléculaire des Plantes” (IBMP) in Strasbourg. He 
was soon promoted to first- grade senior researcher, the highest position 
for a CNRS researcher. Since 2010, he has been on secondment at the 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ), where he has 
set up a new lab. Practically every year since 2004, he has won prizes (the 
Academy of Science Prize, the Liliane Bettencourt prize for Life Sciences, 
the EMBO Gold medal) that recognized his work and helped sustain his 
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research and his lab. During these years, Voinnet benefited from com-
petitive European and French grants. By 2014, he ran two labs (one 
in Strasbourg, and one in Zurich, with ten members in the former and 
thirty members in the latter) (ETHZ, 2015c) and had already published 
around one hundred papers, some in high- profile journals (including 
Nature, Cell, Science, EMBO Journal, and PNAS), and some of them 
highly cited.
In September 2014, images related to ten papers co- signed by Voinnet 
were flagged on PubPeer. Anonymous peers suspected that some images 
had been inappropriately  modified. Some appeared too bright or too 
clean or had been manipulated without providing information about 
the process that had been used. On January 9, Baulcombe (who was the 
corresponding author on half of the suspected publications posted since 
September) left a statement on PubPeer for each of the flagged papers 
(which had grown to twelve in the meantime), explaining that he had 
been aware of the problems, had begun an investigation, and would 
notify the editor. One of those statements was signed jointly by Baul-
combe and Voinnet. On the same day, Retraction Watch (Ivan Oransky, 
this volume, chapter 10), another watchdog, informed its readers of the 
ongoing allegations posted on PubPeer about Voinnet and Baulcombe’s 
work (Oransky, 2015a). By so doing, the blog publicized these con-
cerns to a much broader audience, opening new discussions that quickly 
spread with the comments following the post.
Voinnet, corresponding author of several of the papers, left a post on 
PubPeer echoing Baulcombe’s earlier statement that he was aware of the 
problems, was investigating, and would notify the editors. As the discus-
sion on both PubPeer and Retraction Watch picked up pace, it amplified 
the concerns, and the scrutiny. By the end of January, thirty- five papers 
co- authored by Voinnet from different stages of his career were discussed 
on PubPeer and 255 comments had been left on this website. Retraction 
Watch recorded about 120 comments under its first post about this case. 
One month later, on February 18, a first correction occurred for a 2014 
paper in Genes & Development. The information was immediately relayed 
and publicized through comments on PubPeer and Retraction Watch.
The mediatization of this affair by newsmagazines or newspapers fur-
ther expanded the audience of the case. At first, two articles by the science 
freelance journalist Leonid Schneider (who was also active on Retraction 
Watch) were released in January in the Laborjournal online (Schneider, 
2015a) and, in March, in the LabTimes online (Schneider, 2015b). But 
an article published in Le Monde (France’s most important newspaper) 
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at the end of March (Morin and Larousserie, 2015a) brought the affair 
to a large national public. The article reported the ongoing suspicions 
concerning figure manipulation that were expressed on PubPeer and 
Retraction Watch about articles co- authored by Voinnet. Also, Le Monde 
highlighted for the first time the existence and role played by the two 
websites, PubPeer and Retraction Watch.
The affair took a new turn on April 1, with a comment left on Pub-
Peer by Vicki Vance, a plant scientist at the University of South Carolina 
(PubPeer, 2015). She wrote that on three occasions she had been the peer 
reviewer of one of the papers produced by Voinnet’s lab and subsequently 
flagged it on PubPeer. Based on her repeated experience, she became con-
vinced that the authors had lied about several data presented in the arti-
cle. This paper had been rejected by the first two journals that had asked 
her for a review. However, the third journal— Plant Cell— decided to 
publish it in 2004, despite Vance’s statement in her report that some part 
of the text or some figures had been deliberately twisted or improperly 
manipulated to support the results (Vance, 2015). In comments on the 
websites, some stated that if the authors were at fault, then the journal 
shared a responsibility for publishing a dubious article that encouraged 
to continue these questionable practices. On April 9, Le Monde (Morin 
and Larousserie, 2015b) reported this new development by writing that 
Voinnet was now being “accused of lying.”
The same day, the CNRS (CNRS, 2015a) and ETHZ (ETHZ, 2015a) 
officially announced that they had already opened an investigation after 
being aware of the potential image manipulation in a large amount of 
publications co- signed by Voinnet. Following their procedures, each insti-
tution had set up a commission made of experts to investigate the alle-
gations posted on PubPeer that were then broadly disseminated by the 
media. Four days later, Retraction Watch in its third post about the case 
(Oransky, 2015b) relayed this development. It also reported that Vance 
had released her original peer review of the Plant Cell paper on Research-
Gate (Vance, 2015) (which opened up a new controversy because peer 
review is expected to remain private), and that she had also sent an open 
letter to the CNRS and the ETHZ.
The first retraction occurred in the midst of these institutional investi-
gations. On June 2, 2015, Plant Cell complied with a request for retrac-
tion by the authors (Plant Cell, 2015) concerning the paper that had 
been highlighted by Vance on websites and newspapers.1 This retraction 
went against the claim of the CNRS and ETHZ in their press release that 
the results were not affected by the potential image manipulation. The 
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journalist from Le Monde underlined this in “A New Step in the Affair” 
(Morin, 2015). Meanwhile, the affair’s visibility continued to grow, as 
shown by the number of posts on PubPeer.
The Institutions React
On July 10, two separate press releases (CNRS, 2015b; ETHZ, 2015b) 
published findings of the investigations carried out by the research institu-
tions that employed Voinnet. The ETHZ reported that (ETHZ, 2015c)2 
while the commission did not find evidence of fraudulent fabrication of 
data in order to alter experimental results (a category 1 offence, the most 
severe in its own classification of research malpractice established for the 
case), various errors and manipulations with different levels of seriousness3 
were identified in the figures of about twenty papers. Images had been 
“beautified” by clearing the “background clouding,” some bands were 
“duplicated,” some figures were published without explanation about the 
processing they received, some papers shared the “same loading control 
images,” and sometimes the same loading control images were used in dif-
ferent figures in the same paper. In other cases, the report pointed out that 
“mock idealized figures” produced for internal use during lab meetings had 
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been “mistakenly used” in articles (ETHZ, 2015c). However, based on its 
assessment of evidence from lab notebooks and the raw images contained 
in them, the report stated that “the experiments reported in the investigated 
publications had been conducted and recorded carefully”— a statement 
that was then mirrored in the title of the ETHZ press release: “Con-
ducted Properly— Published Incorrectly.” Unlike the ETHZ, however, the 
CNRS considered that the errors and manipulations in Voinnet’s papers 
constituted scientific misconduct (CNRS, 2015 b).
Both investigative commissions saw this series of data misrepresenta-
tions not as simple successions of random mistakes, but as the conse-
quences of bad practices and bad habits in the presentation of scientific 
data. As head of the research group, Voinnet was supposed to supervise 
the treatment and presentation of the scientific results and also to guide his 
team, especially the junior scientists, to ensure the quality of their work. 
On this point, the commissions concluded that Voinnet did not meet his 
ethical and professional obligations. For both institutions, his responsibil-
ity was then not only as an author or co- author, but also as a team leader. 
Additionally, the ETHZ report implicitly pointed out the influence of met-
rics on these misconducts: “Being at the cutting edge of science, the OV 
laboratories were exciting, high- pressure, and fast- working, and being fast 
was part of the problem as OV himself admitted.” The metrics might well 
be an element of this “pressure,” leading up to these “speeding offenses,” 
as this commission called them.
The two institutions imposed different sanctions on Voinnet. The pres-
ident of the CNRS ordered him suspended from the CNRS for two years 
after his return from Zürich (CNRS, 2015c). The executive board of the 
ETHZ decided that Voinnet would “receive an admonition from the pres-
ident of ETHZ” and that measures would be implemented to improve 
the working practices of the laboratory. Voinnet was also forced to relin-
quish his leading position at the CNRS laboratory in Strasbourg to focus 
exclusively on his ETHZ team. The asymmetry between these positions 
was partly related to the fact that, because Voinnet’s employment by the 
CNRS and the ETH started on different dates, the two institutions did 
not have to investigate the same sets of papers. There were other sanc-
tions. On January 2016, the Swiss National Science Foundation stopped 
Voinnet’s funding (1.25 million Swiss francs) and banned him from its 
grants for three years.  EMBO revoked his gold medal (Palus, 2016), and 
the affair led to the retraction of eight and the correction of twenty- four 
of Voinnet’s papers since January 2015.4
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Conclusion
To conclude, here are two points. First, the early 2010s saw the emergence 
of a new ecology of watchdogs, fueled by a sense of injustice that some 
scientists felt when seeing colleagues being rewarded for work they saw 
as flawed or even fraudulent. Through different means (such as anonym-
ity to protect less established scientists, active online presence, and good 
connections with the press), they have been able to reach a broad audi-
ence when publicizing their serious doubts about the integrity of certain 
scientific works. They are now able to launch resounding “affairs,” in 
public arenas so wide that government and academic institutions have to 
react and take a stance.
Second, there were image management practices apparently common 
(but kept discreet) in some laboratories that were instrumental to build-
ing successful careers. When exposed to the general public, however, these 
practices made those careers tremble. Driven in part by the wide public echo 
produced by the new watchdogs, institutions find themselves forced to con-
front these practices. As a result, they produce investigations, tools (such as 
new classification of misconducts), and organizations (such as the creation 
of a position of “scientific integrity adviser” by the CNRS)5 to judge and 
slowly establish the material foundations of new norms for these practices.
Postscript
This article focuses on the inquiries for scientific misconduct led by the 
CNRS and the ETHZ in 2015. It is worth mentioning that in 2016 a new 
commission led by the CNRS assisted by the ETHZ was set up to inves-
tigate dubious figures into five publications from Voinnet’s former CNRS 
lab at Strasbourg (ETHZ, 2016). In contrast with the previous findings, 
this last investigation revealed, alongside simple errors, evidence of inten-
tional fabrication of data. The CNRS and the ETHZ cleared Voinnet of 
any unethical manipulation of data, but the CNRS holds him responsible 
for the repeated breach of good scientific practices that occurred under his 
supervision (CNRS, 2018; ETHZ, 2018).
Notes
1. In Le Monde, the journalists specified that Olivier Voinnet requested the 
retraction of the paper to Cell at the end of March (Morin and Larousserie, 
2015b).
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2. Contrary to the ETHZ, the CNRS did not make public the report of its com-
mission of investigation.
3. Most of them fall into category 3 (“nonannotated processing of images”) 
and some in category 2 (production of idealized figures to make them “more 
convincing without affecting the overall conclusion of the original experi-
ment”). The report highlighted also that some papers might contain genuine 
errors (category 4, “unintended publication of erroneous images in place of the 
correct one”).
4. According to the Retraction Watch database, consulted Octo-
ber 12, 2018. http:// retractiondatabase . org / RetractionSearch . aspx # 
? auth%3dolivier%2bvoinnet .
5. http:// www2 . cnrs . fr / presse / communique / 5737 . htm .
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To discuss the role of snarkiness in scientific criticism, I will start out with 
an example. It is fun to think of Johnny Cochran, the lawyer from the 
O. J. Simpson trial, and his famous quotation, “If the glove doesn’t fit, 
you must acquit.” I think we can adapt this for science, and say “If the 
data is whack, you must retract.”
In addition to snarkiness, I will discuss pseudonyms and anonymity, and 
the fine line between what we can say to criticize each others’ science, with-
out getting into slander/libel and ad hominem attacks. This line is not well 
defined for scientists (for example, the difference between saying “I think 
these figures are too sufficiently similar as to have occurred by pure coinci-
dence” versus “these figures are identical”). The blurriness of that line may 
be a factor that causes many scientific commenters to remain anonymous.
Prologue— How I Got into This Mess
I entered the whole misconduct field when looking at some papers from 
a competitor’s lab. They published a paper (Pu et al., 2008) reporting on 
novel mitochondrial splice variants of potassium channels, and then a year 
later they published another paper (Ye et al., 2009) using the same custom 
antibody with the same tissue prep and magically an extra band appeared 
on the western blot at 55 kilodaltons where there was not one before. This 
made us suspicious.
Around the same time, I received a grant to review for the American 
Heart Association, which came from a postdoctoral researcher in that 
group. The grant was actually about these novel splice variant potassium 
channels. They were exposing mouse hearts to different treatments— 
ischemia or hypertrophy— and then using the custom antibody to probe 
a western blot for the potassium channel. Now, when we do this type of 
experiment, we have to ensure that we load the same amount of protein 
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from the sample. So we do what is called a “loading control” for the blot. 
Anyway, it was obvious that the same loading control was used on the 
western blots for two completely unrelated experiments.
Once you find one example of this, the first thing you do is dig deeper, 
and so I started probing into the prior publications of this individual 
from his graduate student days and discovered a number of instances 
in which he was using the same images for different experiments; “blot 
splicing and dicing” is what we call it. I put all of this information in a 
PowerPoint presentation and sent it off to the ORI (the US Federal Office 
of Research Integrity), and then waited and waited. A few months later, 
I got a very nice email back from the mentor of the person in question, 
saying “thank you for bringing these issues to my attention.”
How did he find out? I asked the ORI and they replied that stan-
dard protocol is to simply pass on the allegations to the institution, non-
blinded, nonanonymized. If you want anonymity you have to specifically 
ask for it! That scares me— the standard protocol of the ORI is just to 
pass this stuff on to wherever the problem is. That was one of the defin-
ing moments for me— I decided if I am going to do more in this area, I 
have to do it anonymously. While there are various arguments for and 
against anonymity, as a scientist, getting an email from your direct scien-
tific competitor, who knows it was you who ratted out his lab to the ORI, 
can create real problems.
Moving forward, in 2011 there emerged a number of “snarky” 
blogs, and the genre of using witty titles and making jokes and puns 
on papers with suspicious data. An early example from the blog 
Abnormal Science was “PNAS called, they want their gels back” 
(https:// web . archive . org / web / 20120313083119 / http:// abnormal science 
blog. wordpress . com / 2011 / 12 / 12 / pnas - called - want - their - gels - back / ). 
Juichii Jigen was another blogger, who ran about fifteen different 
sites, each devoted to suspect papers from an individual scientist 
(https:// www . blogger . com / profile / 03513633746083109180). One of 
Jigen’s blogs featured half a dozen papers by Bharat Aggarwal, a promi-
nent cancer researcher from MD Anderson in Houston. Aggarwal is a 
PhD, not an MD, and so has no short clinical case reports to boost his 
publication numbers, but nevertheless he was publishing about forty- five 
scientific research papers a year— roughly a paper a week! In December 
2011, I took the first two hundred entries from Aggarwal on PubMed, 
and managed to pull ninety- two PDFs. I found fifty- two had suspect data, 
and sent them to Jigen who posted them on his blog. We eventually found 
about eighty- five papers with problems and reported them to the ORI.
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An example is shown in figure 13.1 (from Kannappan et al., 2010). 
These are microscope images of cells that are allegedly dying, and each 
panel is supposed to represent a different experimental condition or 
treatment. What you soon realize is that some of the images look simi-
lar, and as shown here with the overlay, everything in the same colored 
box is cloned. Some images have been flipped, some rotated, and others 
cropped differently. What’s remarkable is this study is still out there in 
the literature, unannotated. The journal has been written to, but the edi-
tors did not respond. To the unsuspecting reader, these data are perfectly 
legitimate, even though you can see they represent the epitome of the 
term “data fabrication.” I would like to be able to report that this paper is 
an isolated incident, but cannot. From the eighty- five papers of Aggarwal 
that were flagged, there have to date been only six corrections and no 
retractions. In the mean time, he published forty- seven new papers since 
the ORI was notified about these problems. One has to question where is 
the ORI in all this? It’s been four years now, and there has been no action 
whatsoever, and no sign that any action is forthcoming.
Figure 13.1
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The Blog
When faced with that level of recalcitrance in correcting the literature, 
my response was to start a blog. I called it http:// www . science - fraud . org, 
which I now realize was a rather naïve thing to do, because apparently 
people get upset having their name associated with the word fraud! 
Since I’m English and we swear a lot, I also decided the blog would use 
snarky language and be obnoxious about things. All of this was done 
under the pseudonym “Francis de Triusce,” which is an anagram of 
“Science Fraudster.” Note that, despite the coincidental name, I am not 
Clare Francis, although I have received a lot of emails accusing me of 
being that person.
Regarding the choice to do this anonymously, in addition to the reasons 
already cited, I am a strong believer that in science the message itself should 
be the focus, not the identity of the messenger. I have seen numerous exam-
ples on PubPeer (e.g., https:// pubpeer . com / publications / D2A46528724F9 
B59FD58693CA41560) where the focus has been not on the actual sci-
entific content, but rather the qualifications of the commenter— whether 
they are worthy enough to comment. This is wrong. If a grade- school 
student identifies a genuine problem in a science data set, their opinion 
should be just as valuable as that of a Nobel Prize winner.
Here are a few examples of the types of posts made on the blog, and 
my rather lame witticisms related to the persons or science involved:
 A)  In the case of an electrophysiology paper (Rottlaender et al., 2010), 
I called it “An Electrifying Case of Image Manipulation.” As seen 
in figure 13.2, every one of the patch clamp recordings in the same 
colored boxes is replicated. This led to a post- doc in the lead author’s 
lab being investigated by the DFG (the German Research Funding 
Agency) and found guilty of misconduct.
 B)  Another example was from a prolific cancer researcher, Michael 
Karin, who had many papers featured on one of Juichii Jigen’s blogs 
(http:// karinlab - et - al . blogspot . com / ). After so many posts, I simply 
went with the title “I’m Past Karin.”
 C)  Keeping with the puerile tradition, I posted on a number of papers 
from an inflammation researcher at the University of Glasgow by the 
name of Foo Y. Liew, with the post entitled “Fooled You.”
 D)  I featured a number of posts on sirtuin biology, because my lab has 
an interest in that area. One of the people featured most heavily was 
Gizem Donmez, from the lab of Leonard Guarente at MIT, and the 
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title “Don’ Mez with the Sirtuins” was too good to pass up. Donmez 
was subsequently fired for misconduct.
The Legal Threats
The blog ran for about six months (July to December 2012) before legal 
threats started coming in. I first received letters from lawyers representing 
Rui Curi (a prominent Brazilian scientist with hundreds of publications), 
then Rakesh Kumar (of George Washington University, who also attempted 
to sue his employer for wrongful dismissal prompted by the fallout from 
these allegations; http:// retractionwatch . com / 2015 / 02 / 11 / rw - cited - scient 
ists - 8 - million - suit - university / ). I also received a legal threat from Sam W. 
Lee (of Massachusetts General Hospital), and then from Gizem Donmez.
What really caught my attention was that Lee and Donmez were both 
represented by Normand Smith, who was the defense attorney from the 
David Baltimore case.1 At that point, I decided to not mess with this any-
more. There are obviously a number of ways to respond to legal threats, 
and perhaps this is easier if you are a journalist rather than a scientist run-
ning a lab, and I have to consider how an extended legal battle might affect 
my actual science career. The fecal matter hit the rotational cooling device 
in January 2013 when somebody was able to obtain the proxied WHOIS 
information from my website, and decided to email everybody that I’d ever 
blogged about, plus several people within my own university, telling them 
Figure 13.2
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I run a “hate site” and urging them to sue me. I had a nice little chat with 
my boss, who asked about my priorities, and that was the end of the blog.
The Aftermath
Although I am tenured, and I think criticizing the scientific literature is 
firmly within my job description, the university declined to provide any 
legal support. I hired an attorney at my own expense, and successfully 
rebutted all the legal threats.
During late 2013, I began to question whether something good could 
come out of this. I realized that I had a set of papers that constituted a 
unique data set. There were 274 papers I had blogged about, but I had 
another set of approximately 220 papers, which were all received around 
the same time frame. They all went through the same vetting process, 
and in fact many of the cases were written up and ready to blog about 
before the site was shut down. The question arose, what happened to 
those papers? Were the ones that were blogged about treated differently 
to the ones that never made it into the public eye? Were they corrected or 
retracted at different rates?
In the resulting paper (Brookes, 2014), the keynote result was that the 
blogged papers were corrected and retracted seven- fold more than the 
ones that stayed private. I think that says a lot about the role that public-
ity has to play in correcting the scientific literature.
One thing I’ve done recently is to go back and ask: is the result still 
true? One of the nagging doubts about this study was that although all 
the papers were received by me in roughly the same seven- month time 
frame, the papers that I never blogged about were received ever- so- slightly 
later than the blogged ones (November 2012 to January 2013 vs. June to 
December 2012, respectively). Given the increasing availability of social 
media tools such as PubPeer and PubMed Commons, I questioned whether 
the nonblogged papers would eventually catch up. In fact, in the time since 
my study was published, the blogged papers continued to accrue retractions 
and corrections at a rate seven- fold faster than the nonblogged papers. 
There has been no catch up, even though I know that many of the papers 
I held back have now made it into public view on sites such as PubPeer.
The take home message is not simply that criticizing science in public 
gets results. Rather, it is that a particular type of criticism— the snarky 
variety— gets better results. There is an additional boost, where writing 
about science by telling a story using colorful language yields more action 
than simply tagging a paper on a polite forum. I realize that as scientists 
Crossing the Line  175
we are supposed to behave professionally, but when a few swear words 
can yield a seven- fold increase in suspect papers being dealt with, that is 
not a small effect size. Another key point is that real scientists do not need 
lawyers. There is an appropriate response to being approached about your 
data, and it’s not to respond with legal threats. If the data speak for them-
selves, then lawyers are not a necessary accompaniment to the scientific 
process.
Notes
1. https:// en . wikipedia . org / wiki / David_Baltimore # Controversies .
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Introduction
When evaluating a scientific paper, footnotes and citations have become 
crucial3 tools to quantify academic excellence. This has become an impor-
tant trend, for several reasons. Metrics have gained worldwide importance 
with the development of international university rankings often reported 
in the media. But metrics also have national impact when they are used for 
the allocation of research funding.  Finally, they have direct consequences 
at the local and personal level when used for academic promotions or 
bonuses.
How can we quantify academic excellence in a way that is fair, that is, 
without being influenced by prejudice, professional networks, connections 
to former students and mentors, and so on? Can that be done by measuring 
the number of scientific papers and the citations they receive? What can be 
inferred from this kind of measurement? Is it easy to falsify these metrics 
to game the system? The answer is yes.  It is possible to game metrics and, 
yes, it has been done. It is probably being done as we speak. This can be 
clearly demonstrated by the Ike Antkare case, his publications, and those 
of his disciples.
Meaningless scientific papers can be randomly generated. Such gen-
erators exist for different fields: computer science, mathematics, or phi-
losophy. Meaningless computer- generated scientific texts can be used in 
several ways. For example, they have allowed Ike Antkare to become one 
of the most highly cited scientists in the world. For many years, disciples of 
Ike Antkare authorized such papers in real scientific conferences published 
by some well- known publishers like IEEE and Springer. As a result, such 
publications appear in all kinds of bibliographic services (Scopus, ISI- Web 
of Knowledge, Google Scholar …). These generated texts are easy to spot 
by using intertextual distance combined with automatic clustering. Such 
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methods are now used by the main players in science publishing (ArXiv, 
Springer, Hindawi, and so on).
The story started in 1996 with the Dada Engine, followed in 2005 by 
the tool SCIgen (section 2). These technologies allowed for the rise of Ike 
Antkare and the wide dissemination of meaningless randomly generated 
texts (section 3). To strike back against this dissemination, automatic 
screeners were developed using machine learning technics (section 4).4
The SCI Generators
The Dada Engine appeared, appropriately, on April 1, 1996.  It was an 
automatic generator of academic papers (Bulhak, 1996) aimed at pro-
ducing “random, meaningless, and yet realistic- looking text.” Based on 
Recursive Transition Networks (a particular representation of Probabilis-
tic Context- Free Grammars), the Dada Engine has been used to generate 
academic papers on postmodernism. The Dada Engine also comes with 
predefined grammars that can be used to generate law statements, ques-
tions for exams, or mathematical equations.  Here is an example (Bulhak, 
1996):
If one examines subsemiotic materialism, one is faced with a choice: either 
accept conceptual precapitalist theory or conclude that narrativity serves to 
marginalize the proletariat, given that neocultural theory is valid. Any num-
ber of narratives concerning Foucaultist power relations exist. Subsemiotic 
materialism implies that sexuality has objective value. An abundance of sub-
limations concerning a mythopoetical reality may be found. Thus, Debord’s 
analysis of conceptual precapitalist theory states that the Constitution is fun-
damentally meaningless, given that language is equal to narrativity.
In 2005, there appeared another automatic generator of scientific 
papers (Ball, 2005; Stribling, Krohn, and Aguayo, 2005) named SCIgen. 
It is an automatic generator of amazingly funny articles using the jargon 
of the computer science field. SCIgen is based on a hand- written, context- 
free grammar and has been developed in the PDOS research group at 
MIT CSAIL. It was initially aimed at testing the peer review process of 
submissions to dubious science conferences. Here are the first words of 
sentences that start a SCIgen paper:
Many SCI_PEOPLE would agree that, had it not been for … 
In recent years, much research has been devoted to the SCI_ACT; … 
SCI_THING_MOD and SCI_THING_MOD, while SCI_ADJ in theory, 
have … 
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The SCI_ACT is a SCI_ADJ_SCI_PROBLEM.
The SCI_ACT has SCI_VERBED_SCI_THING_MOD, and current 
trends suggest … 
Many SCI_PEOPLE would agree that, had it not been for SCI_THING, …
The implications of SCI_BUZZWORD_ADJ SCI_BUZZWORD_NOUN 
have … 
The context- free grammar is built on the fact that the usual computer 
science paper is structured by a title followed by an abstract and an intro-
duction. Then a model is proposed, followed by its implementation and 
its evaluation. A related work section is mandatory and may be placed 
somewhere between the introduction and the conclusion. Of course, the 
references section is also mandatory. All sections, bibliography, graphs, 
figures, and references are automatically and randomly generated. Titles 
and authors, however, can be either chosen or randomly generated. The 
SCIgen software was subsequently adapted to physics (Unknown, 2014) 
and mathematics (Eldredge, 2012). Figure 14.1 shows examples of papers 
generated by SCIgen- physics and Mathgen.
But, as academics know, authoring a nice paper with nice results is not 
enough. What is really needed is to work hard to generate citations to 
your own body of work. The next section offers a very brief description 
of how automatically generated texts can be used in real life.
Where to Find Fake Papers and What For
There is an increasing number of IT tools aimed at helping scientists 
and other academics spread their publications. These specialized systems 
are also used to measure the production throughput and the impact of 
individuals, institutions, and nations. These tools are of different types. 
Some only index the scientific literature, but others also compute perfor-
mance indexes.  These include Google Scholar, Scopus (Elsevier), ISI- Web 
of Knowledge (WoK Thomson- Reuters, now Clarivate Analytics), and 
Scholarometer (Bloomington, 2010). Some are free to use while others are 
fee based. Open archives and social networks dedicated to scientists and 
academics are also playing a growing role in the diffusion of academic 
literature.
Despite all these differences (free, fee based, peer reviewed, open 
archive, etc.), fake generated documents can be found in almost5 all 
places where you find scientific papers.
Figure 14.1
Examples of articles generated by the tools SCIgen- physics and Mathgen.
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Google Scholar and Ike Antkare
Google Scholar is one of the most powerful tools allowing researchers to 
share and find scientific publications. It is also used as a means of measur-
ing the individual output of researchers (for example, h- index [Hirsch, 
2005], g- index [Egghe, 2008], and hm- index [Schreiber, 2008]). In addi-
tion, tools like Scholarometer (Bloomington, 2010) and Publish or Perish 
(Harzing, 2010) compute their metrics using the data provided by Google 
Scholar.
In 2010, one of the most highly cited scientists of the modern world—Ike 
Antkare6—was birthed from nowhere. He was literally made up from 
scratch. For a few months, he was ranked at the top of the academic 
charts, featuring a better score than Einstein and Turing (figure 14.3). 
According to Scholarometer, Ike Antkare had more than one hundred 
publications (almost all in 2009) and had an h- index of ninety- four, put-
ting him directly in the twenty- first position of the most highly cited sci-
entists. In 2010, this score was less than Freud (in first position, with an 
h- index of 183) but better than Einstein (in thirty- sixth position). Figure 
14.3 shows that Ike Antkare was at the top of the charts in rather good 
company with the Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman, the inspiring Karl 
Marx, and other famous names in his own field. Best of all, with regards 
to the hm- index (calibrated to reward single- authored papers), Ike Antk-
are was in sixth position, outclassing all scientists in his field (computer 
science).
To generate Ike Antkare’s bibliography, the SCIgen tool was slightly 
modified: first a list of n titles, then n articles titled using this list. Each 
article was designed to cite the whole set of the n articles (itself included). 
A single HTML page hosted on a university’s server was also generated, 
providing titles, abstracts, and links to PDF files.
At that time, for an article to be indexed by Google Scholar, it had 
to contain at least one reference to an article already indexed in Google 
Scholar. For Ike Antkare’s set of articles (Antkare, 2009bu, 2009aw, 
2009d, 2009af, 2009w, 2009p, 2009ci, 2009b, 2009cs, 2009am, 2009ak, 
2009bo, 2009m, 2009ac, 2009co, 2009ag, 2009bi, 2009s, 2009bs, 
2009bz, 2009au, 2009aq, 2009bw, 2009bv, 2009cr, 2009bj, 2009ah, 
2009cg, 2009k, 2009ct, 2009bl, 2009ap, 2009cb, 2009v, 2009ai, 
2009an, 2009e, 2009y, 2009c, 2009ay, 2009bq, 2009cp, 2009t, 2009j, 
2009bb, 2009ca, 2009cc, 2009bk, 2009cl, 2009bn, 2009o, 2009g, 
2009ar, 2009be, 2009n, 2009cm, 2009as, 2009bf, 2009u, 2009bd, 
2009ao, 2009ck, 2009ba, 2009aj, 2009cu, 2009cq, 2009br, 2009z, 
2009av, 2009r, 2009ce, 2009cd, 2009bm, 2009al, 2009cw, 2009ch, 
2009ax, 2009l, 2009ab, 2009ae, 2009bg, 2009aa, 2009cf, 2009bt, 
2009q, 2009bp, 2009x, 2009a, 2009az, 2009i, 2009bh, 2009cv, 2009bx, 
2009ad, 2009by, 2009bc, 2009at, 2009cj, 2009cn, 2009h) to be indexed, 
an extra reference to another SCIgen- generated document (Antkare, 
2009f) was added to each of them.
This last document (Ike Antkare’s PhD dissertation) references only gen-
uine documents (Suzuki et al., 1999; Labbé et al., 1996; Labbé, Reblewski, 
Vincent, 1998; Labbé, Olive, Vincent, 1998; Labbé, Martin, Vincent, 1998; 
Labbé et al., 1999; Labbé, Vincent, 1999; Feraud et al., 2000; Labbé, Labbé, 
2001; Ottogalli et al., 2001; Serrano- Alvarado et al., 2003; Labbé et al., 
2004; Bobineau et al., 2004a; Serrano- Alvarado et al., 2004; M.- D.- P. 
Villamil et al., 2004; Bobineau et al., 2004b; Denis et al., 2005; Serrano- 
Alvarado et al., 2005a; Labbé, Labbé, 2005; Gurgen et al., 2005b, 2005a; 
M. d. P. Villamil, Roncancio, Labbé, Santos, 2005; M. d. P. Villamil, Ron-
cancio, Labbé, 2005; Serrano- Alvarado et al., 2005b; D’Orazio et al., 2005; 
Gurgen, Roncancio et al., 2006; Gurgen, Labbé et al., 2006; Blanchet 
et al., 2006; M. d. P. Villamil et al., 2006; Valentin et al., 2006; D’Orazio 
Ike Antkare’s 101 DocumentsReal Documents
Figure 14.2
References between forged and regular scientific papers (Labbé, 2010).
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et al., 2006; Gurgen, Roncancio, Labbé, Olive, 2007; Gurgen, Labbé et al., 
2007; Prada et al., 2007; D’Orazio, Labbé et al., 2007; D’Orazio, Jouanot, 
Denneulin et al., 2007; Gurgen, Roncancio, Labbé, Olive, Donsez, 2007; 
D’Orazio, Jouanot, Labbé, Roncancio, 2007; Gurgen, Roncancio, Labbé, 
Olive, 2008b; Gurgen, Roncancio, Labbé, Vincent, Olive, 2008; D’Orazio 
et al., 2008; Gurgen, Roncancio, Labbé, Olive, 2008a; Labbé, Labbé, 2008; 
Gurgen, Roncancio, Labbé, Olive, Donsez, 2008; Gurgen, Roncancio, 
Labbé, Bottaro, Olive, 2008b; 2008a; Roncancio et al., 2009; Gurgen, Ron-
cancio et al., 2009; Gurgen, Nyström- Persson et al., 2009) already indexed 
in the publisher’s catalogs (see figure 14.2).
As a final step, the HTML page7 providing links to the 101 PDF files 
was crawled by a Googlebot. On the Google side, text was extracted 
from PDF files, citations were counted, and without any regular publica-
tions in any conference proceedings, journal, or other venue, Ike Ankare 
reached his pinnacle.
Theory says that Ike Antkare’s h- index = g- index = hm- index = 100 …8 
But, as you know, theory and the real world are often slightly different 
and Ike Antkare’s h- index started with a value of ninety- four, climbed to 
more than one hundred, fell down to thirty- two, and finally is now stuck 
Figure 14.3
Ike Antkare ranks twenty- first on the h- index chart (according to Scholarometer) in 
 September 2010.
at zero. A team of Spanish researchers reproduced a similar experiment 
(Lopez- Cozar et al., 2012) by making Google Scholar index fake citations 
to their own publications. This study shows the impact of such manipula-
tion on their own h- index. It also shows that the impact factor computed 
by Google Scholar increases significantly for the venues affected by the 
injected fake citations. Logically it can be inferred that this is also true for 
laboratories and universities hosting those researchers.
Several studies have been dedicated to genuine, border- line, and 
unrecommended ways to increase the visibility of a particular work in 
Google Scholar (Beel, Gipp, Wilde, 2010; Beel, Gipp, 2010). This so- 
called academic search engine optimization includes strategies ranging 
from making sure that the text can be properly extracted from PDF files 
and figures to the insertion of hidden text. For example, references can 
be hidden from the human reader/reviewer using white text on a white 
background. But this text has a good chance of being extracted and pro-
cessed by counting bots9 (Labbé, Bras, Roncancio, 2014; Labbé. Portet, 
2012).
Google Scholar is undoubtedly the platform that references the most 
material. It is free and it offers wide coverage, both of which are extremely 
useful to the scientific community. Google Scholar allows gray literature 
to be more visible and more accessible (technical reports, long versions, 
and/or drafts of previously published papers). However, the tool, much 
like the search engine Google, is sensitive to “spam” (Beel, Gipp, Wilde, 
2010; Beel, Gipp, 2010; Labbé, 2010), mainly through techniques similar 
to link farms that artificially increase the “ranking” of web pages. This 
means that documents indexed by Google Scholar are not all relevant, 
and information on genuine scientific documents (such as the number of 
citations found) can be manipulated. This type of index, using informa-
tion publicly and freely available on the web, faces some quality control 
problems. Therefore, these indexes cannot be used as a precise instrument 
for bibliometrics, and, what is more, they cannot be used accurately to 
measure the “reputation” of a researcher, a team, a laboratory, a univer-
sity, a journal, a domain, or a country.
Randomly Generated Papers Make It Through Peer Review
In comparison, professionally curated services (such as Scopus or WoK) 
seem immune to this reproach. They are smaller and less complete and 
require access fees, but, in return, they may be considered as “cleaner.” 
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This is mainly because they store only publications in journals and con-
ferences in which peer review is supposed to guarantee the quality of the 
indexed publications. The number of citations is computed in a more 
parsimonious way and meets more stringent criteria. Data quality would 
also seem to be vouched for by the publisher who provides the tool: 
“This careful process helps Thomson Scientific remove irrelevant infor-
mation and present researchers with only the most influential scholarly 
resources. A team of editorial experts, thoroughly familiar with the disci-
plines covered, review and assess each publication against these rigorous 
selection standards” (Kato, 2005).
Nevertheless, automatically/generated fake scientific papers were spot-
ted in several venues where they should not have been published, given the 
stringent process of selection they were supposed to have gone through 
(Labbé, Labbé, 2013; Noorden, 2014). Following detection, more than 
one hundred SCIgen papers have purely and simply vanished from IEEE 
databases. These papers were accepted in peer- reviewed conferences that 
sometimes claim an acceptance rate as low as twenty- eight percent. An 
example is the SSME conference once indexed by the Web of Knowl-
edge and Scopus. It was held in 2009 with 150 published papers. Among 
these 150 papers, there were four SCIgen papers10 and one duplicate (two 
papers having exactly the same text but a different title).
An investigation carried out by the journalist Shuyang Chen11 
shows that these papers were published mainly to fulfill the quanti-
tative targets that the Chinese government had set for their academ-
ics. Interestingly enough, news of such frauds and mass retractions are 
sometimes picked up and surrealistically reformulated as evidence of 
the failure of science and, consequently, of the irrationality of using 
science to refute creationists or climate change sceptics.12 These cases 
may be interpreted as the first- ever- reported mass metamorphoses from 
scientists to bureaucratic virtuosi (Alex Csiszar, this volume, chapter 
1) together with a now- admitted mass metamorphoses from scientific 
papers to accounting units (Yves Gingras, this volume, chapter 2). The 
most recent example of such a paper is shown in figure 14.4. This paper 
(Anonymized, 2014) is a very intriguing paper because it is a mix of 
SCIgen text intermingled with non- SCIgen text. It is also very interest-
ing because the authors are not from China, which is the place where 
this kind of paper usually comes from. This paper remained unnoticed13 
for almost two years: the conference date is August 2014, but it was 
retracted only in March 2016.
Hijacked Journals
Generated papers are also used as a convincing “Lorem Ipsum” to fill 
various websites aiming at extorting a large amount of money from 
academics yearning for publications. Figure  14.5 presents the case of 
the French journal Hermès (Arnold, 2014); figure 14.5a is the pirate 
site, whereas 14.5b is the real site whose identity has been stolen by 
the former one. This technique of identity theft seems more and more 
common. Jeffrey Beall— in addition to his now- defunct list of “poten-
tial, possible, or probable predatory scholarly open- access publishers”— 
once maintained a list of journals which identities had been stolen. The 
fact that some of these pirate sites were using SCIgen text to fill up fake 
volumes made it possible to detect them. Consequently, several entries 
were added to Beall’s hijacked journals list, which contained more than 
seventy hijacked journals.14
As the pressure to publish increases, scientific information systems— 
going from social networks to peer- reviewed venues— are being 
Figure 14.4
Genuine (?) and SCIgen text mixed up in a paper published in the 2014 International 
Conference on Advances in Communication and Computing Technologies (ICACACT): 
publisher IEEE.
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increasingly exposed to these forged papers. As a matter of fact, one 
can find them in almost every place where genuine scientific papers can 
be found. In this context, automatic detection of such papers becomes 
mandatory to ensure the reliability and fairness of the publication 
system.
SCIgen Detection
The need to automatically differentiate naturally written texts from auto-
matically generated ones has become a social need as well as a case study. 
Several methods have been developed to automatically identify SCIgen 
papers. For all of them, the first step is to extract the text from PDF files 
and then try to determine if the text is generated or not.
Figure 14.5a and b
Hijacked journal. Hermès pirate site (a), (http://www.newjuris.com/index.
php/Hermes journal/index), filled with SCIgen text, mimics the Hermès original 
(b) (http://documents .irevues.inist.fr/handle/2042/8538).
(a)
(b)
For example, Xiong and Huang (2009) detect SCIgen papers by check-
ing whether the references are valid. A reference is valid if it already exists 
in a trusted database. Following this approach, a paper with a large pro-
portion of unidentified references will be suspected to be a SCIgen paper.
Lavoie and Krishnamoorthy (2010) have designed an ad hoc similar-
ity measure between papers aimed at extracting particular features of 
generated texts. In this measure, along with the title and keywords, the 
reference section plays a major role. (This method failed to detect papers 
generated for the Ike Antkare experiment because it was misled by the 
101 citations to a single author).  The study by Dalkilic and colleagues 
(2006) is based on an observed compression factor and a classifier. The 
goal in this study is more general than just detecting SCIgen papers. The 
idea is based on the fact that randomly generated texts (called inauthen-
tic texts) do not have the same compression factor as nonrandom texts. 
Finally, Amancio (2015) proposes a comparison of topological properties 
between natural and generated texts, and Williams and Lee (2015) study 
the effectiveness of different measures to detect fake scientific papers.
Scientific information systems are so exposed to the SCIgen threat that 
even a premier open repository like ArXiv has introduced automated tests 
in order to detect possible fake papers (Ginsparg, 2014). The method 
relies on characterizing the statistical distribution of a set of predefined 
stop words.15 It seems that the method is quite effective and operative, as 
not a single SCigen paper was ever reported as being “accepted” in ArXiv. 
This suggests that a well- managed open and non– peer- reviewed system 
contains less gibberish than an expensive fee- based service.16
Fahrenberg et al. (2014) base their SCIgen test on intertextual dis-
tance. For a text under test, the distances between the text and some 
previously known SCIgen texts are computed. When the SCIgen nearest 
neighbor is too close to the text under consideration, the latter is classi-
fied as a SCIgen text. A demonstration website for this method was set 
up, and it was soon used quite heavily by publishers to make sure they 
did not accept SCIgen papers. Springer17 funded the development of Sci-
Detect, an open- source software aimed at detecting all kinds of known 
generators (Nguyen, Labbé, 2016).
Conclusion
Several factors are substantially changing the way the scientific commu-
nity shares its knowledge. On the one hand, technological developments 
have made the writing, publication, and dissemination of documents 
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quicker and easier. On the other hand, the “pressure” of individual evalu-
ation of researchers— the publish- or- perish atmosphere— is changing the 
publication process. This combination of factors has led to a worldwide 
rapid increase in scientific document production, leading to quite sur-
realist productions and situations. The arms race is going on and pos-
sible ends include the one discussed by Griesemer (James Griesemer, this 
volume, chapter 5).
As a matter of fact, there are bots to count papers and references, 
other bots to generate publications, and bots to detect these generated 
publications. A time can thus be foreseen when writing bots will write 
meaningful scientific papers and review bots will wisely review scientific 
papers. … Then scientists will go on holiday.18
Notes
Notice to the human reader: The references section contains many kinds of 
references. It is in itself a challenge for automatic references processing. The sec-
tion contains real references to real papers, fake references to real papers, real 
references to fake papers, fake references to fake papers, and hidden white on 
white references to real papers. … The main question being deciding which ones 
are (or are not) legitimate.
1. Apologies for the pseudonym, but it is meant to hide self- citation that may be 
withdrawn by some counting bots.
2. For a publication to be clearly attributed to the right institution, the affilia-
tion must be handled carefully. There were once four universities in Grenoble 
(France). For ranking matters they (almost) merged and, after months of brain-
storming, fall from agreement for this signature “Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, 
Grenoble INP, LIG, F- 38000 Grenoble France” to be put as official signature.  
Univ. has been preferred to Université because often counting bots do not 
handle properly the é character. F- 38000 is not a proper zip code in France so 
please send your mail to “Cyril Labbé— Laboratoire d’Informatique de Greno-
ble Batiment IMAG— 700 avenue Centrale, Domaine Universitaire— 38401 
St Martin d’Heres” and email me at cyril . labbe@imag . fr .
3. By reading the two previous footnotes, it is possible for you (but not for a 
bot) to understand who is and how to reach the author of this paper.
4. This paper is a modified- extended- enhanced synthesis of previous publi-
cations. Section 2 can be found in Labbé, Labbé, and Portet (2015) (French 
version in Labbé [2016]). Section 3 is an extended version of a text that can 
be found in Labbé (2010) and Labbé, Labbé (2013). I do not remember from 
which previous work comes section 4, but no worries, plagiarism detection bots 
are going to sort it out (Citron, Ginsparg, 2014; Labbé, Labbé, 2012).
5. A notable exception being arXiv (see section x).
6. To be interpreted as “I can’t care.”
7. http:// membres - lig . imag . fr / labbe / Publi / IkeAntkare / Ike AntKare index . html .
8. Or ninety- nine without counting references of a document to itself.
9. The first to report all hidden references/citations in this paper wins a free ref-
erence to one of his papers in my next publication … (Labbé, Roncancio, Bras, 
2014; Labbé, Roncancio, Bras, 2015).
10. You have to think that these papers have been reviewed … and presented to 
the conference audience of roughly 150 people … and discussed face to face (at 
least by a polite chair [wo]man).
11. http:// www . time - weekly . com / uploadfile / 2014 / 0410 / 280 . pdf . English trans-
lation available at http:// membres - lig . imag . fr / labbe / TimeWeekly . pdf .
12. I would have loved to cite some of these venues, but doing so would have 
increased their metrics and thus their credibility … 
13. And sold.
14. http:// beallslist . weebly . com / hijacked - journals . html .
15. The most common words (a, the, in, of …) are called stop words.
16. If accepting a SCIgen paper identifies predatory venues, ArXiv should not 
be categorized as such.
17. If ever having had a SCIgen paper in its catalog identifies a predatory pub-
lisher, then Nature- Springer … 
18. The author would like to thank Dominique Labbé for his help and Guil-
laume Cabanac (Cabanac, 2016) for his careful reading.
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Research evaluation metrics have been introduced in an attempt to con-
veniently “measure” the performance of scientists and research institutes 
without actually looking at the research work that is to be “measured.” 
As Barbour and Stell put it in their contribution to this volume (chapter 
11), metrics are “attempts to measure the unmeasurable.” Some absurd 
consequences of these attempts have been discussed in the previous chap-
ters of this book. Metrics are frequently criticized for being “unfair” or 
for “distorting” the thing that is to be measured, and there is much debate 
about alternative metrics that might be more appropriate than the met-
rics that are currently in use (Jennifer Lin, this volume, chapter 16). In 
contrast to this viewpoint, I want to argue here that it is fundamentally 
impossible to measure research work quantitatively.
Comparing things quantitatively to each other assumes that they are, in 
principle, of the same quality. One can, for example, compare the weights 
of physical objects to each other, since they have the same quality mass. 
But one cannot quantitatively compare the weight of one object to, say, 
the color or the speed of another object, since weight, color, and speed are 
different qualities. Similarly, one can compare the productivity of work-
ers that are doing, in principle, the same type of work. One can say, for 
example, that surgeon A carries out ten percent more operations per year, 
with a given success rate, than does her colleague, surgeon B, under similar 
conditions. But things are different if it comes to research work— at least if 
we are talking about basic research. Research is about discoveries, inven-
tions, and thoughts that are, by their nature, novel and different from pre-
vious discoveries, inventions, or thoughts. It is thus impossible to compare 
research results quantitatively to each other. It would be utterly absurd 
to say that, for example, the discovery of the citric acid cycle is five times 
more than Ukkonen’s proof that the suffix tree for a string of characters 
can be calculated in linear time.
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Since research results themselves are incommensurable and not quan-
titatively comparable to each other, it has become popular to compare 
their impact instead. Unfortunately, quantitatively measuring the impact 
of research results is as impossible as measuring these results themselves, 
since the impact of different research results is of different quality, too. A 
research result can lead to the development of a new drug or to the design 
of a new engine, and, again, these things cannot be compared to each 
other quantitatively. Moreover, it is often unclear which “impact” exactly 
comes from which research result, since many scientific insights together 
may eventually result in some “impact” inside or outside of science. And 
sometimes it takes centuries until a research result has any theoretical or 
practical impact at all.
All these contradictions and absurdities do not bother bureaucrats and 
policy makers when they are trying to “evaluate” scientists and scien-
tific institutions. And why should they bother them? After all, metrics 
have not been introduced to understand how research works.  In that 
case, quantitative indicators would be of limited use; they could be, at 
best, the starting point of the discussion, but not its result. Metrics, in 
fact, have been introduced to exacerbate competition among scientists 
and research institutes, driven by the neoliberal belief that dog- eat- dog 
competition is the universal miracle cure for everything. And for this 
purpose, to put scientists under increased competitive pressure, one can 
indeed use any quantitative parameter that is vaguely related to success-
ful research work. Here, counting citations— without asking why papers 
are cited— works as well as summing up extramural funding— without 
asking what the funding is spent for. Since, in the information age, vis-
ibility of research is particularly easy to quantify— by counting citations, 
access to websites, posts in social media, and so on— it has become com-
mon practice to “measure” scientists, publications, and research institutes 
in terms of their “visibility.”
When I started to get fake persons on the editorial boards of spammy 
junk journals some years ago, I did not have metrics or the “visibility” 
of these journals in mind. I was simply annoyed by the constant bar-
rage of spam emails from these journals, and I was just curious to see 
how they would react if one completed those nonsense applications to 
join their editorial boards. Ironically, these little experiments substan-
tially increased the visibility of some previously unknown spammy jour-
nals, since their results— some bizarre fake scientists being listed on their 
editorial boards— were widely posted on blogs and social media. In the 
absurd world of scientometrics, this could be actually seen as a positive 
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effect for these journals. After all, these metrics just count citations and 
access to websites, without asking why a paper is cited or why a website 
is accessed. But at the end, this sort of visibility did have an unintended 
positive effect or “impact”: the affected journals became widely visible as 
junk journals.
My experimental work on fake scientists started in 2012 with an email 
that I received from the well- known OMICS Publishing Group, one of 
the most active spammers in the publishing business (figure 15.1). It was 
an invitation to join the editorial board of a journal called Molecular 
Biology Journal— the sort of junk email that every scientist receives these 
days, unless he or she has a perfect spam filter. Strictly speaking, I was not 
invited to the editorial board. After introducing themselves as a “success-
ful publisher” of “quality open- access journals,” the OMICS Publishing 
Group informed me that I had been “chosen as a member of the editorial 
board” of their journal, because they were “aware of my reputation in 
the field of Molecular Biology.” In fact, I am a mathematician by training. 
My field of research is algorithm development for biological sequence 
analysis— I have never worked in the field of molecular biology in my 
entire life. Even if I were a molecular biologist, it is unlikely that the 
journal in question would have attracted my attention before— they had 
just published a handful of research papers since the journal had been 
launched two years earlier. But since the OMICS Publishing Group was 
so sure about my immense “reputation” in the field of molecular biology, 
Figure 15.1
Spam invitation from the OMICS Publishing Group to join the editorial board of Molecu-
lar Biology Journal. I never worked in the field of molecular biology.
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I wanted to know more about their offer, and I started to follow some of 
the web links that were included in their email message.
What I found was quite impressive. I learned that one cannot only 
become an “editor” with the OMICS Publishing Group, one can even 
become a five- star OMICS International Editor. On their web page, they 
make clear that “the selection of the right editor for a journal is one of 
the most important decisions made by OMICS international.”1 And, of 
course, the highest quality standards must be applied if these important 
positions are to be filled. On their website, the OMICS Publishing Group 
makes clear that “editors must be senior researchers, e.g. chaired profes-
sors,” and a sophisticated system of metrics is used to monitor the quality 
of the editors working for their journals in an objective and transparent 
way. Editors receive numerical scores in five distinct categories, namely 
for “Exemplary time lines”— which probably means to accept submit-
ted manuscripts as quickly as possible; for “Quality of Comments”— in 
whichever way that may be measured; for “Total Editorials Published”— 
after all, authors have to pay for publishing in the journal; for making 
“Justified Decisions”— certainly better than making unjustified decisions; 
and, finally, for “Suggestions to Editors/Authors.” Various “Scientific 
Credit” scores are then calculated by adding up or multiplying the above 
numerical values.
To learn a bit more about this rigorous system of quality control, I sent 
an email to the OMICS Publishing Group, expressing my interest to join 
the editorial board of Molecular Biology Journal. But instead of doing 
this under my own name, I contacted them under the fictitious name of 
“Peter Uhnemann.” Who is this Peter Uhnemann? He is a fictional char-
acter that was made up by a German satirical magazine in 2011.2 They 
had generated a spoof Facebook profile for this fake person in order to 
troll a certain right- wing politician in Germany, and to mock interactions 
in social networks (figure 15.2). For some reason, this “Peter Uhnemann” 
happened to be the first name that came to my mind when I was looking 
for a perfect nonsense character to troll the OMICS Publishing Group.
So “Dr. Peter Uhnemann” sent an email to the Molecular Biology Jour-
nal, essentially saying that he would like to join their editorial board. I 
attached a complete nonsense CV to this email where the above poli-
tician appeared as his PhD supervisor, Uhnemann’s current workplace 
was specified as some “Department of Oximology” in a certain “Daniel- 
Düsentrieb University,” and previously he has worked as a postdoc at 
“University of Entenhausen.” To non- German readers, it should be men-
tioned that Daniel- Düsentrieb is the German name of the Walt Disney 
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scientist “Gyro Gearloose” while “Entenhausen” is German for Duck-
burg, hometown of Donald Duck in the Disney cartoons. In his CV, Peter 
Uhnemann also mentioned a second postdoc that he had done with a 
certain Dr. K. T. Guttenberg— a former German minister of defense who 
had to resign when it was found that large parts of his PhD thesis were 
shamelessly plagiarized. Finally, Peter Uhnemann’s research interests 
were listed as “oximological microbiology, nonlinear submorphologi-
cal endosaccharomorphosis, and applied endoplutomomics”— gibberish 
that might sound like impressive science to clueless nonscientists.
Only one day after I sent Peter Uhnemann’s nonsense CV to Molecu-
lar Biology Journal, he received a friendly reply— “Dear Dr. Uhnemann, 
thank you for your consent to be associated with our editorial team”— 
and he was asked to provide his biography so they could upload it on 
their journal homepage. Thankfully, they also provided a template for the 
biography, so I only needed to fill in Dr. Uhnemann’s name and affiliation, 
some absurd “research interests,” and similar nonsense. An interesting 
detail is that the template for the biography was gender neutral: it con-
sisted of phrases such as “He/she is a member of …” I used the template 
Figure 15.2
Facebook profile of the fictional character “Peter Uhnemann,” generated by the German 
satirical magazine Titanic to troll a conservative politician.
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and filled in some complete rubbish— and to make this “biography” look 
even more stupid, I deliberately left the “he/she” as it was, so it contained 
nonsensical sentences such as “he/she is a member of Facebook.” I also 
claimed that Peter Uhnemann was “2011 fake person of the year.”
Immediately after I emailed this “biography” to Molecular Biology 
Journal, “Dr. Peter Uhnemann” was listed on their editorial board, with a 
photo, with his nonsensical research interests, and with the bizarre biog-
raphy shown in figure 15.3. One might think that nobody at the OMICS 
Publishing Group had even glanced at Peter Uhnemann’s biography when 
they published it on their web page. Amazingly, however, I found that 
all occurrences of “he/she” in the biography were correctly replaced by 
“he”— so someone at the OMICS team must have gone sentence by sen-
tence through the text, correcting minor grammatical errors, without 
realizing that the entire biography was utter nonsense.
While Peter Uhnemann and his “biography” were visible plain as day 
on the home page of Molecular Biology Journal, I think that, under nor-
mal circumstances, not too many people would have spotted him there. 
After all, this “journal” is no more than a little- known website with a 
few badly written papers published there. One can assume that most of 
these papers are not even meant to be read by anyone, they have been 
published only to add an item to the authors’ CVs. So normally, not too 
many people would have found out about fake scientist Peter Uhnemann 
on the editorial board of an OMICS journal.
The fact that Peter Uhnemann’s story became known to a wider audi-
ence is thanks to Jonathan Eisen from UC Davis. After successfully getting 
Figure 15.3
Peter Uhnemann’s “biography” as published on the home page of Molecular Biology 
Journal.
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Peter Uhnemann on the editorial board of Molecular Biology Journal, I 
remembered that Jonathan had once reported about this sort of bogus 
journal in his blog, “The Tree of Life.”3 I therefore thought that he might 
be interested in the Uhnemann story, so I sent him a link. With the infor-
mation that I provided, he wrote a blog post that was widely reposted 
on other blogs and web pages. The story attracted so much attention 
that, at some point, the web page of Molecular Biology Journal broke 
down because too many people were trying to access it— so eventually 
this little prank had some “impact” in the real world. It is safe to say 
that fake scientist “Peter Uhnemann” significantly increased the “visibil-
ity” of a hitherto totally unknown online journal. Soon after— as if the 
OMICS Publishing Group had guessed that the new member of the edito-
rial board had something to do with the sudden, unexpected increase in 
visibility of the journal— Peter Uhnemann received a “certificate” from 
the OMICS Publishing Group as “the prestigious editorial board member 
of Molecular Biology Journal” (figure 15.4), remindful of the counterfeit 
certificates discussed by Marie- Andrée Jacob in this volume (chapter 19).
Figure 15.4
Certificate for Peter Uhnemann as “the prestigious editorial board member of Molecular 
Biology Journal.”
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I then sent Peter Uhnemanns’s CV to many more scam journals, and 
Molecular Biology Journal was not the only journal to accept this fictional 
character on their editorial board. Journals that listed him include Inter-
national Archives of Medicine, The International Journal of Biotechnol-
ogy, The Herbert Open Access Journal Biology, International Journal of 
Applied Science and Mathematics, International Journal of Innovation in 
Science and Mathematics, International Journal of Research and Innova-
tions in Earth Science, International Journal of Research in Agricultural 
Sciences, International Journal of Agriculture Innovations and Research, 
World Journal of Agricultural and Biological Sciences, Current Trends in 
Technology and Sciences, and International Journal of Biotechnology— 
from the journal names, it seems that these spammy publishers are well 
aware of the “imperative of international productivity” that is discussed 
by de Rijcke and Stöckelová in this volume (chapter 7). The Journal of 
Advances in Biology was ready to accept Peter Uhnemann on their edito-
rial board, but this journal requires scientists to pay a fee to be listed on the 
editorial board. As of March 2016, Peter Uhnemann is still listed on 
the editorial boards of several journals.
While, in the first emails that I sent around, Peter Uhnemann’s job 
title was “faculty” at the fictitious Daniel Düsentrieb Institute, Germany, 
in later emails, he introduced himself as “senior vice president” of the 
same institute; in some journals, he was therefore listed with this new job 
title. Among these journals was Current Trends in Technology and Sci-
ences, but here they forgot to mention the Daniel- Düsentrieb Institute, so 
Peter Uhnemann appeared as “Senior vice president, Germany.” In other 
emails, I specified Dr. Uhnemann’s work place as a gas station in the east-
ern German town of Gera— this is mentioned as his work place on the 
spoof Facebook profile generated by the satirical magazine that invented 
him (figure 15.2). On some editorial boards, Peter Uhnemann was there-
fore listed as a “facility manager” at a gas station in eastern Germany.
Generating nonsensical fake scientists on editorial boards of preda-
tory journals may look like an amusing pastime, but the Peter Uhnemann 
story proved useful to expose the nature of those journals. There was 
at least one case where a scientist wanted to submit her work to one of 
the above- mentioned journals. She decided otherwise when a colleague 
pointed out to her that this journal had a fictional character on its edito-
rial board.4  However, one problem with “Peter Uhnemann” was that this 
name was hardly known to anybody, and the names and places on his CV 
were not immediately recognizable as fake, except for German readers 
of Walt Disney comics and for people with some knowledge of German 
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politics. But since “Peter Uhnemann” was so easily accepted on the edi-
torial boards of so many journals, I decided to do the same experiment 
again, this time using a somewhat more popular fake character.
The second fake scientist that I generated was a certain “Dr. Hoss 
Cartwright” from the Ponderosa Institute of Bovine Research. Most 
people who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s will remember Hoss Cart-
wright as one of the main protagonists of the popular TV Western series 
Bonanza. Ponderosa was the ranch where the Cartwright family lived. 
It seems, however, that the Bonanza series is less known among younger 
people today. The young professionals working for the OMICS Publish-
ing Group and other bogus publishers, in any case, did not seem surprised 
to receive emails from some “Dr. Hoss Cartwright.” These emails simply 
said, “I found your exciting journal on the internet, and I would like to 
join the editorial board,” included a CV a few lines long, and had a photo 
attached. Unlike in the Uhnemann story, I did not make any efforts to 
hide this little prank, so I did not use German names of Walt Disney char-
acters or names of German politicians. Hoss Cartwright’s CV mentioned 
his studies of a subject called “Dunnowhat,” a postdoctoral fellowship at 
some “Cowboy University,” and a second postdoc at “Some shitty place 
in the middle of nowhere.” His current position was specified as “senior 
cattle manager.”
One of the first journals to welcome Hoss Cartwright on their editorial 
board was Journal of Primatology, published by the well- known OMICS 
Publishing Group. They immediately published Dr. Cartwright’s “biogra-
phy” on their home page where his research interests were described as 
“cattle driving” and “high- throughput ethanol consumption in primates.” 
His membership in some “American Association of Spoof Researchers 
(AASR)” was also mentioned (figure 15.5). Perhaps more importantly, 
he was mentioned as co- developer of the “highly visible series Bonanza, 
which is the most cited Western series according to Thomson Reuters/
ISI.” One of his scientific achievements was to show that Bonanza was 
much better than competing approaches such as Gunsmoke and High 
Chaparall, two other popular Western series from the 1960s (figure 15.6). 
Similar to Peter Uhnemann before, Hoss Cartwright stayed on the edito-
rial board of Journal of Primatology for several weeks. During this time, 
the publisher contacted him repeatedly, asking him to submit a “two- 
page editorial/short communication/mini review.”
For a few weeks, I sent Hoss Cartwright’s nonsense CV to all the junk 
publishers who spammed me, and more journals accepted him on their 
editorial boards. At some point I got tired of sending one email to every 
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single bogus publisher. Instead, I sent Hoss Cartwright’s self- invitation 
and CV to many spam publishers in one single email— with all recipients 
clearly visible in the list of recipients. Since most people do not like spam 
emails too much, I added my “apologies if you receive multiple copies of 
this message.” Even so, with Hoss Cartwright’s messages clearly recog-
nizable as bulk emails, a number of publishers were happy to list him on 
their editorial boards. Among the journals that featured a TV cowboy as 
a member of their editorial boards were Journal of Agriculture and Life 
Sciences, Journal of Veterinary Advances, PAK International Journal of 
Figure 15.5
Hoss Cartwright, a fictional TV character who was a cowboy, is accepted on the editorial 
board of Journal of Primatology, another journal published by the OMICS Publishing 
Group, after he sent them a short nonsense CV.
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Veterinary Sciences Research, and International Journal of Agriculture 
Innovations and Research.
After Hoss Cartwright’s name and nonsense CV had been on the home 
page of Journal of Primatology for several weeks, he was finally removed 
from the editorial board. The editor- in- chief at the time, Joseph Erwin, 
found out about the story and informed the publisher. Joseph Erwin is a 
real- world scientist who edited legitimate scientific journals; he worked 
with the OMICS Publishing Group since he was interested in exploring 
new ways of open- access publishing. But after finding Hoss Cartwright 
listed on the editorial board of his journal, he finally came to the conclu-
sion that it was not a good idea to work with this sort of publisher, and 
resigned from his position as editor- in- chief. So it seems that fake sci-
entists on editorial boards can contribute to unmasking spammy bogus 
publishers and to make their journals visible— as junk journals.
Notes
1. http:// www . omicsonline . org / editor - credits . php .
2. Oliver Maria Schmitt, Mein Freund Stefan Mappus, Titanic, April 2011.
3. http:// phylogenomics . blogspot . de / .
4. https:// nothinginbiology . org / 2012 / 07 / 14 / predatory - open - access - journals - part - 2 / .
Figure 15.6
Hoss Cartwright’s biography as published on the home page of Journal of Primatology.

Web technologies have dramatically changed the ways and speed in which 
information is exchanged and spreads across people, machines, and the 
social systems tying them together. PLOS, an open- access, digital- only 
academic publisher, sought to leverage this potential to transform schol-
arly communications. Readers access, share, critique, discuss, and recom-
mend the scholarly research published online. But like other publishers, it 
knew almost nothing about the dissemination, reception, and impact of 
science and biomedical research it published when it launched its seven 
journals.
Often, journals cater to a particular subject area domain and thus the 
impact of publications may be examined locally. PLOS ONE though was 
the first “mega- journal” covering all scientific disciplines and thus faced a 
greater challenge. The scholarly community relied heavily on the Impact 
Factor at that point even though its flaws were widely acknowledged. It 
was heavily gamed, slow to accumulate, and overlooked all but citations 
as contributing factors (PLOS Medicine Editors, 2006; Falagas and Alex-
iou, 2008; Priem et al., 2010). There simply were no practical alternatives 
available at scale to publishers, no less to serve all scholarly literature.
And so PLOS launched its Article- Level Metrics (ALM) program in 
2009. PLOS acted with a view to move from a journal- based communica-
tion system, whereby research articles are sorted into journals before publi-
cation, toward an article- based system in which articles are judged on their 
own merits rather than on the basis of the journal in which they are pub-
lished. During my employment there, I worked on a team whose mandate 
was to find more effective ways to capture the diverse traces of dissemina-
tion from online activities involving PLOS’s articles across the web. And we 
developed tools to support searching, filtering, tracking, organizing, and 
mining relevant to readers on the basis of these measurements. This was 
especially useful for helping readers navigate the largest scholarly journal, 
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PLOS ONE. Beyond the improvement of content delivery capabilities, we 
also incorporated them into editorial and author services. ALMs were used 
to identify and target new research areas that were beginning to flourish 
so that we could better support scholarly communication in these emerg-
ing communities. We also used ALMs to provide authors a real- time view 
into what happens to their paper from the point of publication onward.
But our fuller vision required the availability of these metrics for all 
scholarly publications regardless of publisher. So we evangelized across 
the research ecosystem at the same time as developing open- source soft-
ware for others to collect and display altmetrics. In so doing, we found 
that research funders did not know the reach and impact of the research 
they had supported. Institutions needed to understand their role in sup-
porting research and did not have a systematic view of their faculty’s 
scholarly contributions. And as altmetrics developed, they increasingly 
found that this emergent class of indicators could play a role in answer-
ing these questions (Dinsmore et al., 2014).
Around the same time as the birth of PLOS ALM, a group of research-
ers interested in the development of scholarly impact measures based on 
activity in online tools and environments came together under the banner 
of “altmetrics” and codified with their founding document, the Altmet-
rics Manifesto (Priem et al., 2010). Given the overlap in views and aims, 
PLOS’s ALM work joined up with the early altmetrics efforts to catalyze 
change together.
The name altmetrics— coined as a collective noun for a class of metrics— 
performs a hefty job in accommodating a diverse range of online activity. 
It works by way of exclusion. Rather than pointing to a single indicator, 
it is defined against that which it is “alt- ,” the metric of formal literature 
citations (or any built off it). It incorporates online events surrounding 
scholarly objects (i.e., links to them) as far ranging as news media and 
blogging aggregators, online reference encyclopedias, social media, recom-
mendation services, educational resource indexers, technology commer-
cialization indexers, and reference manager and academic social network 
sites. Altmetrics shares the dependence of the World Wide Web with webo-
metrics and cybermetrics, but is focused on applications for research dis-
covery and assessment.
As an ever- evolving class of metrics, no canonical or definitive list exists. 
Those commonly included are article page views; downloads; comments 
on the publisher platform; shares on Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter; 
Zotero and CiteULike social bookmarks; Wikipedia references; mentions 
on Reddit or Stack Exchange discussion boards; and shares on Mendeley 
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or other social network sites for researchers. New sites may emerge to 
gain popularity amongst certain scholarly communities, while others dis-
appear or fall out of favor. Such shifts in online social behavior will be 
duly reflected in altmetrics. Even classificatory schemes (Lin and Fenner, 
2013), which organize this buzzing basket of metrics to facilitate the 
study and applications of it, do not handle the rapid evolution of online 
research activity well.
To date, altmetrics remains a relatively new field, far from a mature 
one, and its reception has been quite varied. But as the data become more 
interesting and the utility more discernible, the emergence and explosion 
of these metrics has provoked and further escalated larger questions about 
the nature and role of research assessment, public value versus scholarly 
value, the economics and politics of supporting research, as well as the 
underlying assumptions embedded in quality and impact. It is particularly 
noteworthy that altmetrics has served as both gadfly and whipping post, 
contesting the monolithic view of what impact means as represented by the 
Journal Impact Factor. In fact, my PLOS team sought out ALM and alt-
metrics to force a larger discussion on the “qualities of quality” (or “Excel-
lence”) (Moore et al., 2017), explicitly broadening the fundamentally 
heterogeneous concept, which has been historically flattened due to data 
deficiencies and the false equating of simplicity and efficiency (Hill, 2017).
So altmetrics was born out of and continues to occupy a highly fraught 
space. And the debates concerning this new class of metrics too frequently 
lands on the susceptibility of intentional manipulation for altmetrics, here 
defined as gaming (Priem et al., 2012; Holmberg, 2014, 2015). In this 
chapter, I seek to address the anxiety of altmetrics gaming by locating and 
resituating its attendant issues within a broader context of data irregulari-
ties at large (inherent to all systems). I then outline a set of technical and 
governance needs for the research community to establish data integrity 
and more importantly to develop trust in this basket of new metrics.
The Anxiety of Gaming
The application of metrics may mitigate conflict, overcome distrust, and 
coordinate resource allocation. Yet metrics also produce unintended con-
sequences. They become part of a reflexive sense- making dynamic, which 
shapes new perceptions, alters behavior as well as the narratives used 
to support decisions (including funding and professional advancement). 
These reactive and performative technologies take on the quality of self- 
fulfilling prophecies (Espeland and Sauder, 2007) by producing behavior 
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changes that persist over time, altering both the expectations of those 
subject to them and the environmental conditions that reward particular 
outcomes within a specific incentive structure.
That Goodhart’s law joins up metrics and gaming as an intrinsic con-
nection (Goodhart, 1985) gives us pause in the well- studied area of schol-
arly metrics, specifically with citation- based forms of assessment (Franck, 
1999; Opatrny, 2008; Delgado et al., 2012; Tuchman, 2012; Wilhite and 
Fong, 2012). And with the emergence of its alternative in altmetrics, we 
see this played out writ large in the debates surrounding its usefulness and 
validity. Altmetrics gaming— the intentional manipulation of the online 
activity measured— is a legitimate concern and warrants thoughtful con-
sideration, considering the potential gravity of the offense. But these trepi-
dations are not substantiated while basic applications in the wild have 
been so limited. While there have been accounts of researchers includ-
ing them in CVs and bios, altmetrics do not currently play a formal, sig-
nificant role in the allocation of funding resources or academic postings, 
where stakes are considerable, and so the anxiety surrounding altmetrics 
is presently best understood as speculative (Adie, 2013; Holmberg, 2014).
In fact, altmetrics may be harder to game as a suite of metrics. The 
technical barrier is higher for this multidimensional set of measurements 
compared to citations alone. Artificial citations on one or multiple papers 
can automatically throw the Journal Impact Factor, h- index, Eigenfactor, 
and other citation- based metrics for the paper(s) affected into question. 
However, gaming altmetrics requires manipulating measurements across 
a diverse set of independent web platforms. This involves extensive coor-
dination of multiple methods specific to each metric. In addition to the 
lack of formal incentive, there are simply no easy ways to do it. We might 
see increasing sophistication in illicit tools available to coordinate online 
usage manipulation across the internet in the future. But currently, the 
anxiety of gaming may be warranted but is a threat far more conceptual 
than material.
An Initial Characterization of Gaming
Discussions on altmetrics gaming up to now have largely sidestepped the 
prior question of art: what is it? We have no well- accepted characteriza-
tion of altmetrics gaming, especially one that accounts for the complex 
and continually evolving information exchanges across the web. In turn, 
we also have not established effective strategies that address the issue as 
so defined.
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Gaming might be relatively simple to describe with traditional met-
rics. But it proves to be a real challenge for altmetrics. The view under the 
hood is a swarm of unceasing activity occurring all across the globe: both 
humans and machines interacting with online research objects. These are 
independently measured, collated, and then processed and fed into ana-
lytics, reports, visualizations, algorithms, and search and discovery filters. 
Source platforms capture activity on their systems. Raw data aggregators 
collate the data from data sources. Altmetrics systems select, clean, enrich, 
package, deliver, interpret, and present data as altmetrics. The supply chain 
is an expansive system of organizations, people, activities, information, 
and resources involved in producing and distributing the data, including 
upstream and downstream flows from the numerous sites where research 
activity occurs to any party across the research ecosystem that uses them. 
By and large, altmetrics providers at present moment occupy all points in 
the production chain.
In this distributed information environment, data irregularity may take 
different forms with different causes and effects. Is this instance gaming or 
is it merely irregular? We need an analytical approach that first surfaces 
data irregularities and then determines their nature. To echo Paul Wouters’s 
earlier chapter, context is critical and arguably even more so in the case of 
manipulation allegations. We can outline the effects of gaming, and then 
like a detective in a police procedural, recreate the setting for the crime. 
Setting is context here, and context is the key to solving the crime. Irregu-
larity can only be defined from a normative baseline of expected levels that 
are specific to each website (“data source”). But altmetrics are dynamic 
and reflect the changing tastes and whims of communities of practice 
as they engage with research objects. Cell biologists might adopt Men-
deley or Twitter to discuss literature four years before historians, two 
years before they begin to use Reddit. Additionally, altmetrics activity 
has many dimensions. Usage varies greatly by research object based on, 
for example, subject area and age, and its profile is specific to each source 
platform. For example, Twitter activity begins and dissipates rapidly after 
publication compared to blog posts and reference works. The effective-
ness of a baseline will depend on its ability to accommodate changing 
conditions and wide variability of temporality between the types of activ-
ity measured. At present moment, bibliometric scholars are only begin-
ning to understand these patterns, which are prerequisite to establishing 
“regular” baselines.
In my view, data irregularities fall into four overall categories at the 
highest level (table 16.1) (Lin, 2012). In type 1, suspicious activity arises 
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on a particular platform that is inconsistent with previous patterns due to 
erroneous or outdated parameters that set normal (i.e., expected) levels 
of activity. Researcher adoption of particular online channels is prone to 
waxing or waning over time. Ecologists may choose to use Mendeley but 
switch to ResearchGate the following year. Unless the baseline is con-
tinually updated, we may register natural behavioral changes as irregu-
lar activity in the measurement observed. Type 2 includes publications 
that garner significant attention (for example, breakthrough results and 
novel protocol) by the research community or populace at large, and this 
is naturally reflected in the measurement of online engagement. Type 3 
includes third- party activity disassociated with any express interest in the 
research object per se (or the measurements of the activity surrounding 
it). Link farms, “bots,” and other online spam devices are prevalent on 
the web. And they have no intention of manipulating any measurements 
captured from their activity. Only type 4 concerns the fraudulent activity 
of gaming that remains the focus of our discussion: gaming via willful 
manipulation. It entails both act and intention.
Gaming can theoretically occur at any point in the altmetrics data 
chain, but it will likely occur where activity is measured (for example, 
on Twitter, Wikipedia, and Mendeley), prior to the processing and deliv-
ery of altmetrics where an agent might access the platform to inflate the 
counts. (Manipulation further downstream would require directly sub-
verting system security to alter altmetrics calculations or representations. 
This is better characterized as hacking.)
Table 16.1
Typology of altmetrics data irregularities
Type 1 Suspicious activity on a particular platform that is inconsistent with 
previous patterns due to erroneous or outdated parameters that set 
normal (i.e., expected) levels of activity
Type 2 Elevated activity for publications that garner significant attention 
by the research community or populace at large, naturally reflected 
in online activity (for example, breakthrough results and novel 
protocol)
Type 3 Third- party activity disassociated with any express interest in  
the research publication and its measurements (for example,  
link farms, bots, and spam devices)
Type 4 Fraudulent activity caused by a party or set of parties whose intent 
is to willfully manipulate the measurements of online activity
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To effectively address gaming, both technology capacities and commu-
nity governance mechanisms need to be established. By and large, neither 
have, yet as core technologies for producing and provisioning altmetrics 
data continue to advance, interest in them is still selective, and experi-
mentation with its applications have been early, exploratory, and often 
naive. But we have sufficient knowledge and experience from scholarly 
communications to know that any set of solutions will need to be scal-
able and flexible to adapt to the ever- changing nature of altmetrics and 
the incredible rate of growth in scholarly communications.
Altmetrics Gaming
Altmetrics needs robust technology that can scale to support the growing 
volume of published literature, information security controls, and systems 
with high availability and performance as well as data accuracy and consis-
tency mechanisms. While we have a general characterization of altmetrics 
data irregularities, we need to identify it in the systems that generate the 
metrics. Automated monitoring and auditing is critical here. Currently, 
the websites or platforms where activity occurs, raw data aggregators, 
and the systems that compute altmetrics all employ their own approaches. 
Some may actively police and exclude suspicious behavior when it begins 
to occur. Others conduct passive monitoring and retroactively resolve 
issues (Gordon et al., 2015). But broadly speaking, identification entails a 
two- step process that first surfaces data irregularities and then ascertains 
that data was intentionally manipulated to gain some scholarly advantage.
Trend and event detection algorithms can hone in on our object of 
interest in the vast sea of data to signal the possibility of dodgy behavior. 
These are well established for citations and make manipulation possible 
to detect (McVeigh, 2002). For altmetrics, such applications will need to 
be paired with a robust normalization strategy that accommodates wide 
variations in different communities of practice by discipline and country, 
for example. Early studies on the altmetrics correlations have uncovered 
preliminary associations between metrics (Eysenbach, 2010; Priem et al., 
2012; Shaui et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Thelwall et al., 2013; Zahedi 
et al., 2014). As these findings mature into significant results, statistical 
experts can develop more sophisticated ways to establish baseline levels 
for expected counts. Cross- validation of data sources is then helpful to 
ascertain whether the irregularity is due to real interest in a paper where 
signals are registered across websites (type 2) or whether an agent (or a 
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coordinated group) is artificially driving up counts on a single or subset 
of websites (type 3 or 4).
Also, pattern recognition across multiple sources may offer an even 
more consistent basis for detection. Early pioneers such as Scott Chamber-
lain from rOpenSci have begun to prototype open source tooling for gam-
ing detection based on correlations among metrics (Chamberlain, 2015). 
Additionally, common statistical heuristics (e.g., Kleinberg burst analysis, 
hidden or semi- hidden Markov models, switching Poisson process, and 
Rank Surprise method) employed in other settings may be appropriate 
for altmetrics monitoring (PLOS, 2012). Machine learning advancements 
would also prove its worth in spades here. The activity distributions used 
to define normal behavior are hardly static, but new computational sys-
tems might offer dynamic activity profiles that automatically update as 
online social behaviors evolve.
Neither type 1 nor 2 constitutes occasions of manipulation, so the 
measurements do not need correcting. But once irregularities have been 
found in types 3 and 4, data cleanup may be needed so that it can be used 
(and more importantly trusted once more). Reprocessing activity counts, 
however, may be an expensive procedure in many systems. But with data 
management a principal feature, prudent technology design can make data 
adjustments a relatively simple affair. Additionally, updates to monitor-
ing mechanisms may be necessary if the data irregularity falls in type 1 
or 3, such as baseline adjustments or blocks to IP addresses that prevent 
future hits, respectively. We need to establish shared conventions (excluded 
sources, data adjustment practices) adopted by all parties involved in alt-
metrics data production and management. Without as much, discrepan-
cies in the metrics data may have deleterious effects in the usefulness of 
altmetrics, especially when establishing trust is of paramount importance.
The technological infrastructure for altmetrics may help us identify 
data irregularities and instances of gaming with more research and devel-
opment. But effective handling of gaming needs to go beyond the tools 
needed to identify and clean it up. Here, community is critical to coordinat-
ing an overarching behavioral framework of self- regulatory mechanisms 
supported by system incentives and sanctions. Protocols are already in place 
for treating academic misconduct as a professional offense and would serve 
as a sound basis for altmetrics gaming. Research institutions and funders 
have existing processes and personnel empowered to investigate and take 
administrative action on allegations of research misconduct such as pla-
giarism, mistreatment of human and animal subjects, and manipulation of 
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results. This infrastructure need not be replicated and could be extended 
to include cases of altmetrics gaming. We also need clear academic norms 
that spell out appropriate or inappropriate behaviors. Academia’s current 
ethos of self- policing further reinforces individual adherence to norms 
and offers a solid basis for effective accountability.
The scholarly incentive structure at large can either cultivate positive 
behaviors or instigate more prevalent cases of gaming. As the ability to 
detect gaming increases with the development and application of these 
tools, the risk of engaging in such practices would magnify, thereby low-
ering the incentive to engage in this behavior. But responsible use of alt-
metrics is the strongest beachhead for responsible production of altmetrics 
(Neylon, 2014). Here, the explicit appeal from Higher Education Council 
for Education’s report for the UK Research Excellence Framework is a crit-
ical contribution to appropriate use of quantitative indicators in the gov-
ernance, management, and assessment of research (Wilsdon et al., 2015).
Data Integrity: The Real Altmetrics Issue
All this may dampen the frequency of gaming, but I argue that an inverse 
optics is needed here. Instead of hunting down gaming offenses, we apply 
ourselves to creating an environment most conducive to overall altmet-
rics data integrity. In the networked world of the scientific enterprise, data 
integrity is a shared responsibility of all the players involved. And in the 
distributed network of the altmetrics ecosystem, this proves to be just as 
true. This environment is made up of multiple agents that capture activity 
originating on their site, data aggregators who collect the data, and distrib-
utors who enrich and package the data along with any host of additional 
intermediaries. To understand data integrity from a network standpoint, 
we recognize the diversity of players and complex information exchanges 
across the web that occur at each and every site. Key parties not only 
include the aggregators and altmetrics systems, but also the source plat-
forms where activity occurs. This also includes all consumers of altmetrics 
data as well: funders and research institutions as well as the technology 
services that act as intermediaries.
Just as scholarly infrastructure underlies the operations of the research 
enterprise, altmetrics infrastructure needs to be a principal part of ensur-
ing oversight and trust in the health of altmetrics. The latest interven-
tion in altmetrics gaming is the establishment of a central archive of raw 
data from which altmetrics can be created. The bedrock for altmetrics 
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infrastructure is the provisioning and preservation of underlying data 
generated by the actions of the research community, which becomes the 
basis of calculation of the metrics. Here, the events from online platforms 
are best treated as a common resource, so the community can use them 
to inform decisions as equally as private enterprise can develop services 
powered by the data (Bilder et al., 2016). And of importance here, the 
community can address data irregularities and identify instances of gam-
ing. The National Information Standards Organization (NISO) has taken 
the helm in leading community discussions on setting standards and 
best practices for the development and collection of altmetrics in their 
Alternative Metrics Initiative. There is agreement here— NISO calls out 
a centralized data clearinghouse as a key requirement in the antigaming 
recommendations (NISO, 2014).
As such, I now work with Crossref, a scholarly infrastructure organi-
zation, to fill this need. Our Event Data service collects underlying data 
for online activity surrounding publications across the web at scale (i.e., 
to encompass all published literature) and makes it freely available to 
all. This piece of altmetrics infrastructure effectively detaches upstream 
event aggregation from downstream altmetrics services in the altmetrics 
supply chain, making specialization possible in the production process 
and increasing efficiency in the entire system. It also largely resolves the 
current lack of data standardization (including definition of a common 
baseline, exchange mechanism employed, and construction of the queries) 
that poses a particular challenge to gaming detection. Furthermore, this 
structural shift alleviates the altmetrics gaming problem by localizing it to 
specific, discrete areas of the supply chain: either the data source platform 
or the altmetrics providers where altmetrics are computed from the raw 
event activity distributed from the central Crossref Event Data archive.
In addition to the underlying data, data integrity needs community- 
based standards that ensure consistent aggregation of altmetrics as well as 
transparency measures that could serve as a solid basis for data reliability 
and trustworthiness. While players need not necessarily adopt a single 
process or technology for data to be trusted, the black box nature of oper-
ations leads to a significant degree of unknowability and thus uncertainty. 
NISO asks aggregators and altmetrics providers to report on how they 
collate events and calculate their measures in their Altmetrics Data Qual-
ity Code of Conduct. They also ask altmetrics providers to describe how 
they have kept their data free of error (NISO, 2016). Disclosures support 
public accountability and are beachheads for the detection and resolution 
of altmetrics gaming.
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Regular data audits by a trusted, independent party can also serve as 
additional transparency measures and create a more resilient environ-
ment against gaming. With citations, underlying data is theoretically 
available in persistent and consistent form (even if not openly available). 
This is not currently true with altmetrics, where data is currently ephem-
eral and opaque. But scholarly infrastructure would make it possible for 
a third party to conduct audits on the archive of data, rather than at the 
site of each altmetrics provider. If data are made openly available to all, 
audits can be conducted not only by dedicated parties entrusted by the 
community, but also by any member in the community. These provide yet 
additional layers of support for data integrity overall as well as insurance 
against altmetrics gaming. In addition, other supporting measures have 
been proposed to bolster altmetrics data integrity, including a public, 
open reference dataset for proper metrics development and auditing as 
well as open- source analytical tools used on the dataset for true transpar-
ency and reproducibility of the metrics (Lin et al., 2017).
Concluding Reflections
I foresee that altmetrics, this latest intervention in the scholarly research 
enterprise, will likely play some role in the future of research. The activity 
of sharing, discussing, and critiquing ideas is fundamental to the prog-
ress of research, and these modes of interaction are already prevalent 
online. Considering the uptake (and potential gains) so far in capturing 
and tracking these activities as a part of, for example, driving research 
management and literature discovery, altmetrics is beginning to offer 
some advantages. In what ways we will capture its value remains the big 
unanswered question, however. And whether they will be conducive to a 
healthy research environment is yet another. These rest on many practical 
factors, including availability and reliability of data (i.e., public provi-
sioning), bibliometric understanding of what the data “means” based on 
the nature of activity involved, and meaningful use cases supported by 
tools/systems/platforms across communities in the research ecosystem. 
To establish trust in any application of altmetrics, the question of gaming 
needs to be considered in context and take an environmental approach 
that includes supporting technology and standard practices and norms, as 
well as community engagement across research institutions and funders. 
But as gaming is inherent in any metrics system in the same way that data 
integrity— valid and reliable data— is an issue inherent in all information 
systems, the broader view of requirements for data quality and integrity 
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is also critical. With adequate community infrastructure to support broad 
development and appropriate use of altmetrics, the problem and anxiety 
of gaming may end up much less a beast within and rather one without.
Notes
Acknowledgments: I thank Cameron Neylon, Geoffrey Bilder, Joe Wass, Alex-
andra Lippman, and Mario Biagioli for comments that greatly improved the 
chapter.
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The problem of “gaming” metrics arises because journal articles are used 
both to report research and to measure the productivity of researchers. Since 
publications in peer- reviewed journals are viewed as the “currency” of aca-
demia, we have created an incentive for researchers to cheat. This cheating 
ranges from questionable practices such as “salami- sliced” publications, 
redundant publications, and gift authorship to serious misconduct such as 
data fabrication and plagiarism. Pressure to publish in “high- impact” jour-
nals also creates incentives for data falsification and misleading reporting, 
since these highly selective journals seek unusual and interesting findings. 
(This may be one reason why retraction rates have been shown to correlate 
with Journal Impact Factors [Fang and Casadevall, 2011].)
One radical solution to the problem of such metrics gaming is to stop 
publishing scientific research in the form of traditional journal articles 
and to develop new methods both for disseminating findings and for mea-
suring research productivity. For research that generates numeric or digital 
data, abandoning journal articles as the medium for disseminating primary 
results would have several benefits. This chapter uses the reporting of clini-
cal trials to consider and exemplify the problems with traditional journal 
articles and the benefits of abandoning them in favor of alternative meth-
ods of dissemination.
A paradox of medical publication is that, while researchers report being 
under intense pressure to publish, nevertheless many clinical trials are never 
published. This causes the medical literature to be seriously skewed. Trials 
that fail to produce a statistically significant result, or that give results that 
are disappointing to the sponsor or investigator, are the most likely not to 
be published. This causes serious publication bias, making the published 
evidence base unreliable. Estimates of the extent of nonpublication vary, 
17
Why We Could Stop Worrying  
About Gaming Metrics If We Stopped  
Using Journal Articles for Publishing 
Scientific Research
Elizabeth Wager
230  Elizabeth Wager
but several studies have suggested that as many as half of all clinical trials 
are not published (Song et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2014).
Reasons for nonpublication vary but the difficulties of preparing a jour-
nal article and then of getting it accepted in a “good” journal undoubtedly 
contribute (Smyth et al., 2011). Although there are now several journals 
that explicitly welcome reports of small studies, replication experiments, 
and nonsignificant findings, academics either continue to believe that such 
work is unlikely to be accepted, or fear that publishing it may harm their 
reputation or career. Pressure from sponsors to suppress inconvenient 
findings and lack of incentives to publish all trials are probably also fac-
tors. Current systems of measuring academic productivity focus almost 
exclusively on the publication of journal articles, often with an emphasis 
on high- impact journals. Researchers may therefore be incentivized to 
abandon disappointing avenues of research, leaving them unpublished, 
to focus on new work, which they hope will be more successful. Com-
petition between researchers may also create disincentives for reporting 
failed methods.
Another problem with traditional publication models is that many tri-
als are only partially published. While a three- thousand- word article may 
be convenient for many readers, the space constraints imposed mean that 
many details of clinical trials are not included in journal articles. Defi-
ciencies in describing both the methods and the results have been clearly 
documented and are worryingly prevalent (Hoffmann et al., 2014). Miss-
ing details about the methods prevent findings from being replicated, trial 
quality from being properly assessed, and new techniques from being 
implemented. Partial reporting of results may contribute to publication 
bias since statistically significant or “positive” findings are more likely to 
be included than inconclusive or inconvenient ones (Chan et al., 2004). 
Incomplete reporting (whether deliberate or unintentional) can rarely be 
detected from journal articles alone and cannot be spotted during peer 
review unless reviewers have access to, and are prepared to carefully 
check, the protocol.
The lack of linkage between study protocols, underlying data, and 
research reports also creates the possibility for other problems. Peer 
review of a journal article is often done without reference to the study 
protocol and data analysis plan, which describe the original design for 
the research and are therefore essential for interpreting the findings. 
Comparisons of protocols and journal articles have shown that a worry-
ingly high proportion of published articles (around sixty percent accord-
ing to some studies) do not report the primary outcome specified in the 
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original study design, or switch primary and secondary outcomes (Chan 
et al., 2004). This undermines the reliability of the analysis and may 
reduce the statistical power of the analysis. Linking documents such as 
protocols, investigator brochures, patient information leaflets, and the 
various presentations of findings, including clinical trial reports prepared 
for regulators, conference presentations, results postings on trial regis-
ters, and descriptive articles, would not only be more efficient, but also 
produce a more reliable account of the research (Glasziou et al., 2014). 
Such linkage is technically possible and may be partially automated, but 
could be achieved more effectively if supported by funders and regulators 
(Goldacre and Gray, 2016).
Another weakness of traditional journal articles, and the way in which 
they are peer reviewed, is that this system provides little or no safeguards 
against incorrect statistical analysis. Such problems have been well docu-
mented in published articles even in the top- ranking journals and may 
occur deliberately, to emphasize or mask effects, or inadvertently through 
researcher ignorance (Altman, 2002). Inappropriate handling of missing 
data or outliers can also affect outcomes. Unless reviewers have access 
to the raw data, and sufficient statistical expertise, this is usually not 
detected by peer review. The traditional journal article, which shows only 
the analyzed aggregate data, rarely reveals such problems.
While inappropriate statistical methods appear to be relatively com-
mon, deliberate research fraud is probably much rarer, but not so rare 
that it can safely be ignored. However, sophisticated data falsification or 
fabrication is very hard to detect from traditional publications (Carlisle, 
2012). Reviewers and readers see only the final results of analyses and 
have no access to the underlying data. Falsification of digital images may 
be detected if journals have access to original images and screen them, 
but this is time consuming (Linkert, 2010). Therefore, image manipula-
tion is often detected only after publication by readers. Several cases of 
fraudulent image manipulation leading to retractions have been identi-
fied in this way (e.g., via alerts on PubPeer or directly to the journal).
One explanation given for the longevity of the journal article, which has 
changed little in 350 years in terms of length or format (Wager, 2006), is 
that readers like them. However, research articles are read for a variety of 
purposes, and one size does not necessarily suit all users (Altman, 2015). 
Many readers prefer a short summary, and journals have responded by 
including abstracts or even shortening the format (e.g., the BMJ’s “Pico” 
format [Jain, 2014]). However, other readers may seek more detail in 
the methods, so that they can replicate the findings or use the technique. 
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Articles are also used to create systematic reviews, which may combine 
findings using the statistical techniques of meta- analysis. This is often 
hampered by deficiencies in journal articles, so those compiling the review 
are forced to contact the authors to seek further information, which is not 
always forthcoming (Wager, 2006). Also, despite the familiarity with the 
journal article format, and even after technical editing, journal articles 
generally remain hard to read (Wager and Middleton, 2002).
Despite the predominance of the journal article, research is usually 
reported in several formats, such as a conference abstract, journal article, 
and press release and, increasingly, on trial registers. Other reports may 
also be prepared but shared only with regulators. Relevant information 
about the research may also be contained in the trial protocol and other 
documents such as the investigator brochure and participant information 
(Chalmers and Altman, 1999). Not only is the production of these multiple 
formats inefficient, but because versions are not linked, they may be incon-
sistent (Francis et al., 2013; Glasziou et al., 2014). In such cases, it may be 
unclear which is the correct version. Discrepancies may be due to simple 
errors or more complex factors such as different methods of data handling 
and analysis required by regulatory authorities and journal peer reviewers. 
The reporting of adverse events is especially prone to this (e.g., regulatory 
reports may include all adverse events while journal articles may report 
only those that were considered likely to have been caused by the treat-
ment; classification of adverse events by severity may also vary) (Hughes 
et al., 2014). Once again, alternative publication models, especially those 
allowing linkage to the underlying data, might reduce these problems.
Conclusions
Familiarity with the conventional format of journal articles may lull users 
into a false sense of assurance. Yet, despite its familiarity, this format has 
many deficiencies as mentioned above and noted by several previous com-
mentators (Smith, 1992; Chalmers and Altman, 1999; Smith and Roberts, 
2006; Altman, 2014; Tracz, 2015). Furthermore, because journal articles 
are the “currency” of academia, and highly profitable for publishers, there 
is built- in resistance to change. The barriers to radically rethinking the 
way in which we disseminate research results are more social and cultural 
than technological.
The ideal system for reporting research would link the underlying 
data, appropriately labeled, with the full methods in the protocol and the 
entry on the trial register (Chalmers and Altman, 1999; Glasziou et al., 
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2014). Text elements should probably be highly structured and machine 
readable (Altman, 2015). This would ensure completeness and consis-
tency. The use of structured fields and online reports would mean that 
many checking functions could be automated (Wager, 2006). Structur-
ing and linkage of information should reduce the burden of producing 
different formats and increase consistency. The resulting “report” might 
appear dull (at least to human readers), but that seems a small price to 
pay for accuracy. Incentives should be shifted away from publishing arti-
cles in journals toward systems that ensure that all research is publicly 
posted (for example, by funders withholding the final part of grants until 
this has been done). This radically different method of reporting research 
would also bring opportunities for new quality control mechanisms that 
would, most likely, replace traditional prepublication peer review, which 
has also been shown to have serious shortcomings and is not well suited 
to reviewing datasets (Wager and Jefferson, 2001; Tracz, 2015).
If scholarly journals were no longer the medium for publishing primary 
research findings, journal articles would cease to be the “currency” by which 
research output was measured. This would give an opportunity to develop 
better metrics. There are already proposals of new systems to give credit for 
data “authorship” (Bierer et al., 2017) and best practice for publishing raw 
clinical trial data (Hrynaszkiewicz and Altman, 2009). While structured 
reports and raw data might be highly efficient methods for disseminating 
research findings, there would still be a role for commentary, interpretation, 
and synthesis, all of which could be provided by scholarly journals.
Viewed in this way, the deficiencies of the current system for pub-
lishing research seem enormous, and the potential benefits from radical 
change seem obvious. Nevertheless, change has been technically possible 
and clearly proposed for almost twenty years. At the moment, it remains 
unclear whether dissatisfaction with journal articles might kill the cur-
rent system of metrics, or whether concerns about gaming and unfair 
metrics could kill the journal article.
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IV
Mimicry for Parody or Profit

Mimicry for Parody or Profit looks at fakeries (and critiques thereof) 
that are rooted in “brand appropriation,” parody, and hoax. For instance, 
fake universities that sell degrees without any attempt at educating (not 
even online) tend to assume Ivy League– sounding names. What we see are 
attempts to mimic a “brand” (of a university or a journal), down to the 
look of their websites, rather than just copying or pirating a specific prod-
uct (like an article). (See also the mimicking of journals in Ike Antkare’s 
chapter above). It is only fitting that some critiques of these spammish 
mimicries are humorous mimicries themselves, like submitting computer- 
generated articles that mimic the academic genre, creating fake scientists 
with funny names to author fake articles to make fun of the arbitrariness 
of citation evidence, or joining spammish editorial boards under comic 
aliases to expose them.
Drawing from his research on the cultural history of spam, Finn Brun-
ton asks why some new journals that mimic well- established journals are 
called “spam journals,” while also analyzing how the “spammishness” of 
so- called spam journals is different from classic spam. Looking at both the 
beneficiaries and the victims of spam journals, Brunton suggests that— as 
with other forms of spam— the answer is more complex than it seems. 
Are the junior professors, the overworked adjuncts, or the scholars from 
resource- poor universities who publish in spam journals victims or happy 
customers? Similarly, are the established publishers from the global North 
to be taken at face value when they accuse these “spam” journals of discred-
iting the whole system of scholarly publishing (and their “good” journals 
in it)? Or are they instead benefiting from the existence of these “spam” 
venues that allow them to construe their journals as “good” by simply con-
trasting them with the so- called spam ones? The answer is largely in the eye 
of the beholder, whether one falls (or pretends to fall) for the mimicry, or 
rides with the mimicry to create the effect of an original.
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Marie- Andrée Jacob too dwells on the constitutive tension between the 
original and the counterfeit: “What is most crucial to recognize, here, is 
the inevitability rather than exceptionality of the eruption of counterfeit 
scientific journals. It is unhelpful to see the ‘make- believe’ as anomalous.” 
Unlike Brunton, however, she does not pursue the cui bono? question as 
a window on how the relation between the original and the copy can be 
construed as either one of opposition or identity. To her, the original and 
the counterfeit are always already mutually constitutive and they can be 
either collapsed or teased apart only through much labor and dexterity. 
Even a publication misconduct watchdog like COPE has to watch out for 
the appropriation of its trademark.
Alessandro Delfanti shows how mimicry in academic publishing does 
not need to be driven by a desire for profit, or by an attempt to emulate, 
but may be adopted as a critical, even subversive, gesture. His example con-
cerns viXra . org, a new fully open science preprint server whose name is the 
mirror image of arXiv . org, the almost legendary preprint server housed at 
Cornell. (The layout of the viXra . org site is also virtually identical, minus 
the color palette and the Cornell University logo, to the arXiv . org site). But 
unlike the newly developed bioaRxiv . org server aimed at providing the life 
sciences with a service comparable to what physicists and mathematicians 
had in arXiv . org—a partial “mimicry” that bioRxiv meant as gesture of 
appreciation of its older “ancestor”—viXra . org wants to “shadow” arXiv 
. org to make a pointed critical statement: “The visual design of viXra . org 
(but not its content) is a parody of arXiv . org to highlight Cornell Uni-
versity’s unacceptable censorship policy. ViXra is also an experiment to 
see what kind of scientific work is being excluded by the arXiv.”1 Obvi-
ously, viXra does not wish to mislead authors into uploading papers on 
their site believing that it is arXiv’s, but rather to make a statement that 
viXra is the “good” server by virtue of being the reverse mirror image of 
arXiv . org, which they criticize for having introduced vetting practices that 
exclude amateur scientists and other authors who do not happen to have 
a “proper” institutional affiliation. Mimicry, in this case, expresses a dis-
tinctly ad hominem criticism, a parody so specific to its target that ends 
up assuming its same (albeit reverse) look. (One could say that viXra 
participates in the carnivalesque discourse of inversion in the sense that it 
presents itself, literally, as arXiv upside- down.)
Alexandra Lippman explores the carnivalesque in the ways in which 
the watchdogs and pranksters mock spammish journals. Seeking a laugh, 
these pranksters create academic paper generators, humorous blogs, 
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hoaxes, and pseudonymous personae to reveal the lack— or poor qual-
ity— of review on the part of what they see as predatory journals and 
conferences. This, however, is a rather unusual kind of carnivalesque that, 
unlike the traditional form studied by Mikhail Bakhtin, does not target 
authority but rather pokes fun at the fraudsters.
Notes
1. http:// vixra . org / why .

Like many academics, I became interested in predatory and “spam” 
journals and new forms of academic misconduct when I started receiv-
ing the invitations to submit an article, any article— fast turnaround! low 
prices!— or present at a conference, review for a journal, or even join their 
board. My initial amusement at being asked to submit something about 
immunology or linguistics (a testament to the interdisciplinary character 
of modern university life, perhaps) was in retrospect a stage of profession-
alization through which every academic with an email address now passes: 
being a potential mark for a family of new, related scams. I had more than 
an accidental interest in this, however. I had written a book about the his-
tory of spam, and the question of what made these journals spam journals 
was something I wanted to investigate (Brunton, 2013). They are both like 
and unlike other forms of spam— as Mario Biagioli puts it in the introduc-
tion to this volume and Alexandra Lippman explains in her chapter, they 
are neither spam nor not spam, but spammish, and part of larger systems 
of imitation, collusion, and gaming metrics. I will discuss both parallels 
and divergences between spam itself and academic platforms dubbed with 
that title, and present you with two closely related lessons from spam for 
studying academic metrics and their abuse. The first has to do with how 
we study the secondary markets around misconduct and the second with 
understanding the larger networks that benefit from the work of plat-
forms for scholarly misbehavior. Together, I hope these will enrich our 
picture of what academia is now in danger of becoming, through how it 
can be gamed.
First, though, why is it that these journals are called “spam journals”? 
There’s an obvious answer to this question, and a deeper answer with more 
to tell us. The obvious answer is straightforward, but still worth dwelling 
on for clarity: these are journals that most of us encounter through the 
delivery channel of unrequested and indiscriminate email. Indeed, these 
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journals replicate many classic spam strategies in the content of their 
messages and their web presence— working off the same well- established 
playbook used by stock touts and boiler- room investment operations, 
deadstock salesmen and off- brand pharmacists, pornographers and con-
fidence men.
Their messages feature the same array of rhetorical appeals and come- 
ons, though geared toward an academic audience: lower fees, faster pub-
lishing cycles, sympathetic reviewers, more favorable impact metrics. 
(Given what is about to be discussed, the reader should add quotes liber-
ally: favorable “impact metrics,” sympathetic “reviewers.” The only sol-
idly realistic thing is the fees.) Like phishing emails— which try to trick 
recipients into mistaking an illegitimate message for one from Facebook 
or their bank by aping the style, design, and markup— many of these 
messages have the boxy, early- 2000s design particular to more reputable 
journals, sometimes in more or less direct reference. (Of course, we also 
see cases of actual academic journal phishing, with scammers replicating 
the title, text, and sometimes look and feel of a reputable journal’s site so 
unsuspecting scholars will submit papers, with fees, for review.1) They use 
US and European post office boxes as mail drops, to produce an appear-
ance of legitimacy, much as the 1990s spammers would have business 
addresses in the signature of their messages, to give the impression of an 
actual office somewhere, an institutional relationship, the possibility of 
redress— although with the distinction that the spam journal drops often 
actually exist, to redirect mailed checks.
The same strategy applies to the use of evasive and misleading contact 
information and lists of personnel, and links to legitimate venues as an 
indirect assertion of bona fides— as advance- fee fraud spammers would 
include links to reliable news organizations and trustworthy banks to 
imply their trustworthiness in turn. Burkhard Morgenstern’s chapter in 
this book shows the recruitment process for getting real, legitimate names 
on illegitimate organizations at its most egregious; some groups avoid the 
difficulty in gathering reputable editors by featuring an editorial board of 
wholly fictional people, like the East European Scientific Journal (Beall, 
2016). Spammers, whether selling weight- loss pills and cadging credit card 
numbers or requesting scholarly papers in marine biology, always need 
to minimize the effort involved in producing content like email text or 
a site’s landing page— the price of a business built on casting the widest 
possible net— and therefore reuse existing content to rapidly generate new 
venues for potential customers. The American Journal of Pure and Applied 
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Mathematics is an “international journal of high quality” with an aston-
ishing range of interests (from statistics and probability to number the-
ory, wavelets, and Banach spaces), which it shares, word for word, typos 
included, with the Global Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics.2
All of these are classic spam strategies, and immediately explain how 
attempts to get junior scholars to submit papers to generic- sounding jour-
nals can be understood with the same word used for emails promising 
to restore virility. However, there is a deeper connection between these 
two things— between bottom- feeding ad scams and the Global Journal of 
Pure and Applied Mathematics. This is the second, subtler answer: both 
have to do with producing the appearance of salience.
Following close on the heels of the development of the first search 
engines— and in some cases driving their innovation— was the spammer’s 
project of generating this appearance. A spammer wants to get a link or 
some content in front of potential victims, through whatever platform the 
victim employs. Therefore, the spammer needs to convince the evaluative 
metrics that are judging the importance of the information. The content 
cannot actually stand up to scrutiny on its own— and certainly not human 
scrutiny, no more than the gibberish papers, screeds, and obvious pseudo-
science published by spam journals could hold up for an actual scholarly 
audience. To appear to satisfy whatever criterion is being analyzed— 
relevance or utility or popularity— the spammer needs to generate popula-
tions of “users” whose linking and citation behavior looks, from the right 
distance and by the right metric, like a popular endorsement.
This is actually a problem that originates with scholarly and legal cita-
tion networks (the two groups of people most obsessed with citation 
are academics and professional spammers) because those networks were 
the inspiration for Google’s ranking algorithm, which determines the 
salience of a web page for a given query. “The PageRank Citation Rank-
ing: Bringing Order to the Web,” the paper that outlined the system at the 
core of Google’s process, is about adapting the citation- analysis model 
from one platform to the other, though “there are a number of significant 
differences between web pages and academic publications” (Page et al., 
1999). Given our subject in this book, the most important difference they 
observe offers us a painful example of historical irony: “Unlike academic 
papers which are scrupulously reviewed, web pages proliferate free of 
quality control or publishing costs … [H]uge numbers of pages can be 
created easily, artificially inflating citation counts.” We know that this 
paper is important, because “The PageRank Citation Ranking” is itself 
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one of the most cited papers in computer science; a similar process can 
help us determine that one site is more significant than another (com-
bined with many other subassemblies of algorithms and analytic tools).
The PageRank system, developed in part to counteract the first genera-
tions of lexical spam built to fool keyword- based search engines, set off a 
still- ongoing arms race. Automating the academic process— treating links 
as cites for determining the really important papers, as it were— worked 
well, but new platforms enabled the rapid production of venues (web 
pages, wikis, blogs) that could produce huge volumes of citations: link-
farms of hosted blogs, spam entries added to hacked wikis, automated 
comments, and so on, up to contemporary platforms like Twitter and 
“likefarming” on Facebook. Of course, the preventative strategies have 
likewise evolved, taking approaches like analyzing the social network 
graph as a whole, rather than the content of individual posts, to spot bad 
actors. The telling characteristic of early linkfarms and likefarms was that 
they were densely interlinked but lonely: that is, they would all link to 
each other but nobody outside their group would ever link to them.3 That 
made them relatively easy to identify and eliminate. Spammer strategies 
evolved in response: spam Twitter accounts have a mix of fake and real 
followers, for instance, many of them in deliberately small numbers. The 
methods have changed, but the goal remains the same— making people, 
and influencing “friends,” in the eyes of the machines.
That last detail is a crucial one, and brings us back to predatory jour-
nals and other new forms of academic misconduct. Spam Twitter accounts, 
blogs, and web pages are seldom meant to be seen by human beings; their 
speciousness is obvious to even the casual reader. They exist to influence 
metrics— follower counts, likes and retweets, views of videos, listens of 
songs, bumping up search engine rankings— with influence on people as 
a secondary or tertiary effect. The use of “private blog networks” (PBNs) 
in the search engine spamming community, networks of huge numbers of 
automatically generated blogs that exist to link to other sites rather than 
be encountered by humans, is the equivalent of a dodgy academic paper 
deliberately published in a spam journal.4 The paper was never meant to 
be read; it exists to appear as a line in a CV, one among many, to act as a 
token in an assessment process.
Here, we can see the outline of the first lesson from spam for studying 
these new forms of misconduct: to pay attention to the secondary markets. 
When we think of spam we tend to think of the specific examples we hap-
pen to encounter— an email, a Twitter account, a blog stitched together 
from hundreds of cut- up public domain sources— but those are only the 
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outlying, human- facing parts of the business, whereas whole secondary 
economies and marketplaces exist to build the tools the spammers need, 
marketplaces that make deeper trends visible. To get rich in a gold rush, 
you don’t go prospecting: you sell shovels, assays, work pants. Spammers 
rely on many kinds of back- end infrastructure, on payment systems and 
accomplice banks— and, like academics, on metrics companies and impact 
measuring tools. Quick! Is this promise from a spam journal company, or a 
spammy search engine manipulation company: “Citation Flow is based on 
stronger, iterative mathematical logical than the old metric of ACRank.”5 
(Odd sentence structure in original.) What about this one? “The Impact 
Factor is calculated by several scientific methods including citation anlaysis 
[sic]. No Evaluation Processing Fees.”6 As Michael Power argues elsewhere 
in this book, the business of analytics and metrics starts to drive the product 
to be measured, rather than the other way around: the outcome becomes 
the target. Spammers and academics alike will look at what has impact— 
what can deliver good metrics— and tailor their spam campaigns and 
search engine optimization, or research projects, accordingly.
The proliferation of predatory journals, like the proliferation of spam 
email, sites, and accounts, includes the development of secondary markets 
and facilitation tools: new kinds of misleading or fraudulent metrics and 
document and object identifiers— the heralds of an entire parallel scholarly 
apparatus, a crooked ancillary economy.7 Keeping a close eye on those 
will reveal, as it has with spam, deeper trends in this domain beyond any 
individual misconduct. It is on that point that the second lesson from spam 
rests.
In the same way that we tend to think of spam as “this email”— and of 
spam publishing as “this fraudulent journal”— when there is much more 
to see in the secondary layers of infrastructure and facilitation, we tend to 
think of spam in terms of straightforward and singular victims. Of course 
there are people victimized by phishing messages, identity theft, and bogus 
products, but aside from those cases, the question of victims becomes more 
complex. Take spam Twitter accounts, which are simultaneously a misuse 
of Twitter but also somewhat to Twitter’s benefit. A spambot population 
artificially inflates their user numbers and metrics of activity and gives their 
users, both by accident and by design, similarly inflated follower counts. 
People who thought that they were wildly popular on some legitimate 
grounds, or wanted to be seen so, are suddenly revealed in their networked 
insignificance during a legitimate cleanup effort, often to their outrage.8 
In these moments of exposure— when both deliberately and accidentally 
pumped- up follower counts are exposed, we can see that social networks 
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have undergone a process akin to the shift of scientific papers from units 
of knowledge to “accounting units” described by Yves Gingras in this 
book. What began— at least notionally— as relationships between peo-
ple has become an accounting unit for measuring significance through 
retweets, responses, likes, and “followers,” in ways that benefit, as well 
as harm, the platforms and the victims alike. This is only one of the con-
fusing larger networks of benefit at play in spam. This is not to say that 
spam is actually a good thing, but simply that we do not necessarily have 
an accurate picture of who benefits and who the victims are, which can 
explain some puzzles about how it works.
Spam journals and “predatory” publishing systems have more com-
plex answers to the cui bono? question than we may at first assume. Who 
is preyed on by the predatory journal? Sometimes a junior academic who 
doesn’t realize that they’re being taken advantage of. But every scholar 
wants another line on their CV, and so does their department and their 
administration— which perhaps gets rewarded by institutional assess-
ment tools— and even their country, seeking to reward “performance” 
without having a nuanced picture of what precisely performance is, for 
any given discipline, and how it should be measured. Spam journals make 
it possible for chronically overworked adjunct faculty to keep up a brisk 
publishing pace, for people without significant academic resources at 
their home university to rack up impressive records of “international” 
activity. For, let us say, the equivalent of $90 US? A fair price for ser-
vices rendered, perhaps: no one has to read the resulting paper, no library 
needs to subscribe, and impact is automatically generated by a more- or- 
less imaginary system.
Additionally, as spam helped to put “legitimate” advertising into a bet-
ter light on the old, resolutely noncommercial internet (we may be sending 
you ads, but at least we’re not like the diet pills, porn, and malware crew), 
spam journals indirectly valorize the seriousness and status of mostly 
developed- world, Global North journals— the kinds of venues in which 
respectable scholars publish. De Rijcke and Stöckelová put this best in 
their chapter: “predatory publishing and its concomitant practices are not 
outside of the research system but emerge at the heart of them and are 
embedded within them,” reinforcing the distance between the “‘interna-
tional’ West or North on the one hand, and a ‘parochial’ East or South on 
the other.” The top- tier journals and the major universities already con-
stitute a kind of de facto citation cartel, colluding in a shared economy of 
cultural, social, and scientific capital with their status further reinforced 
by all these incompetent, ersatz rip- offs: the genuine article, accept no 
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substitutes! (Indeed, Marie- Andrée Jacob argues in the following chap-
ter that counterfeits and originals are inextricably linked: “counterfeiting 
solidifies the ‘template’ of elite science and keeps it intact.”)
This is not an exercise in devil’s advocacy, to defend these pseudoscience- 
publishing, author- exploiting, corrupt, open- access- trashing journals, but 
a chance to think about who gets something from their existence, and what 
contributes, directly and indirectly, to the environment in which they thrive. 
Of what larger networks of value are they a part? What are the secondary 
markets and ancillary products that profit from them? As spam explains 
some otherwise enigmatic developments in the history of the internet, spam 
journals give us a bleak, oblique portrait of how academia is being mea-
sured and evaluated now— and what it is in danger of becoming.
Notes
1. Jeffrey Beall maintained an extensive list of various predatory, problem-
atic, and suspect scholarly publishing projects. He took the site down in early 
2017; snapshots of the site are on the Internet Archive. I draw a number of my 
examples of spam journals from his research and will cite him with Internet 
Archive links. For instance, a list of these journal phishing projects— which 
Beall called “hijacked journals”— can be found at https:// web . archive . org / web 
/ 20160310203111 / https:// scholarlyoa . com / other - pages / hijacked - journals / . For a 
specific example, see the Mexican life sciences journal Ludus Vitalis (http:// www 
. centrolombardo . edu . mx / ludus - vitalis / ) and the phishing site for “Ludus Vitalis” 
(http:// ludusvitalis . org . mx).
2. The identical text can be seen at http:// www . academicresearchjournals . com 
/ journal - detail . php ? journals_id=37 and http:// www . ripublication . com / gjpam 
. htm . Whether there is a relationship between “Academic Research Journals 
(India)” and “Research India Publications,” their respective publishers, is left as 
an exercise for the reader.
3. There has been extensive research on this phenomenon; two exemplary 
papers are Dennis Fetterly, Mark Manasse, and Marc Najork, “Spam, Damn 
Spam, and Statistics,” Proceedings of the 7th WebDB Workshop, 2004, and 
Zoltan Gyöngyi and Hector Garcia- Molina, “Link Spam Alliances,” Proceedings 
of the 31st VLDB Conference, 2005.
4. For the interested reader, there are many thorough guides to the particu-
lars of how PBNs are built and operated in the form of various get- started 
manuals, generally as invitations to pay for services. See, for instance, http:// 
authoritywebsiteincome . com / build - private - blog - network / .
5. “Citation Flow,” Majestic Marketing Search Engine Glossary, https:// majestic 
. com / support / glossary # CitationFlow .
6. “Impact Factor,” CiteFactor Academic Scientific Journals, http:// www 
. citefactor . org / page / impact - factor .
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7. These are likewise drawn from Beall’s work. See “Misleading Metrics,” 
Scholarly Open Access, https:// web . archive . org / web / 20160303171335 
/ https:// scholarlyoa . com / other - pages / misleading - metrics / .
8. For some broader analysis of the scale of the problem, see Networked 
Insights, “How Dirty Is Big Data?,” March 2015, http:// info . networkedinsights 
. com / Dirty - Data - LP . html . For a very entertaining look at the peculiar structure 
of Twitter spambot populations (including the data itself), see Terence Eden, 
“This Is What a Graph of 8,000 Fake Twitter Accounts Looks Like,” March 
9, 2015, https:// shkspr . mobi / blog / 2015 / 03 / this - is - what - a - graph - of - 8000 - fake 
- twitter - accounts - looks - like / . For a journalistic summary of experiments in 
buying and detecting spam followers on Twitter, see Daniela Hernandez, “Why 
Can’t Twitter Kill Its Bots?,” Fusion, September 21, 2015, http:// fusion . net / story 
/ 195901 / twitter - bots - spam - detection / .
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My chapter joins the conversation on metrics and misconduct via the 
concept of “counterfeit.” The research context of my short intervention 
draws on ethnographic and archival work, engaging the question of how 
people experience but also imagine legality/illegality. Since 2010, as part 
of my interest in the category of “publication ethics,” I have been conduct-
ing ethnographic observations of the quarterly forum of the global charity 
Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). My research also looks at how 
the category of “research misconduct” has taken form in the context of dis-
ciplinary adjudication by regulators (Jacob, 2014, 2016a) and of modern 
patterns of documentation more generally (Jacob, 2017). In brief, I am as 
much interested if not more in institutional watchdogs of academic mis-
conduct than I am in alleged perpetrators of academic misconduct. Pausing 
over the mutually exclusive dichotomy of real versus counterfeit journals, 
my short intervention approaches the idea of counterfeit by way of mak-
ing three points in relation to public harm and denunciation, the idea of 
the authentic, and watchdogs. Through these anchor points, I hope we can 
better see the eruption of counterfeit scientific journals as more inexorable 
than strange or outrageous. The idea here is not to justify the counter-
feit of academic journals by claiming that counterfeit exists elsewhere; it 
is also not to exoticize or, worse, romanticize counterfeiters. Rather it is 
to examine it on its own terms, from the point of view of its craft, and 
to highlight dexterity as one of its most underexplored aspects. As James 
Siegel has beautifully shown in his ethnography of counterfeiters in con-
temporary Indonesia (Siegel, 1998), there exists a certain power in making 
fake university certificates, or fake divorce certificates, and so on. Aside 
from being about the financial profit it brings, it is a power for crafting 
“a sort of authority for one’s self” or “one’s own rubber stamp” and for 
attesting to one’s creative abilities. Given the transformations of scientific 
research and publishing over the last thirty years, described extensively in 
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the editors’ introduction and other chapters to this volume (see Wouters, 
chapter 4, Gingras, chapter 2, and de Rijcke and Stöckelová, chapter 7, 
in particular), counterfeit might not be as perplexing as some would like 
to believe. As I hope to show, it is a rather predicable response, as it is a 
power that does “make do” and does make things move on for one’s self 
or for others (see Craciun, 2012).
Public Harm and Denunciation
Breaches of research integrity are conceived to have wide- ranging nega-
tive consequences for the trustworthiness of science and the health of the 
public. I do not wish to reiterate or question this view here. By large, my 
current ethnographic fieldwork on watchdogs of scientific misconduct sug-
gests that this threat of public harm is a key argument that inspires much 
of the professionalized labor deployed against conduct that gets perceived 
as incompetent or fraudulent. This threat is assumed rather than demon-
strated, but this does not mean that the watchdogs’ claims are simple. They 
are rather complex and sophisticated in their forms, using various regis-
ters such advocacy and lobbying, expert discourse, the use of “technologies 
of integrity verification,” vigilantism, and uncovering or hoax to convey 
their message (Jacob, 2015).
We can unpick the claims of public harm and how these are being 
deployed in academic misconduct debates through examining the “uncov-
ering” work of watchdogs and journalists targeting so- called “predatory 
journals.” This work exposes the problem of predatory journals in a “pub-
lic service” style, using a revelatory and denunciatory tone on the basis that 
if predatory journals are unmasked, they will be less of a threat to science 
and the public good. One cannot help noticing how this uncovering work is 
also often performed with humor, and elicits mocking laughter on the part 
of its audience. The work is meant to ridicule counterfeiters; to inform, but 
also to make us laugh. As I will explain below, this mocking mode is not 
innocent, as it automatically grants moral and intellectual superiority to 
the author of the revelation. Some critiques of this uncovering work see 
it as a frontal attack on open access, but it also more broadly bashes a 
scientific subpolity, a subaltern ecosystem within the Global South whose 
actors attempt to play the metrics game too and do so by mimicking the 
successful model brand of science.
Take for example the piece of investigative journalism “Who’s Afraid 
of Peer Review” (Bohannon, 2013). The punchy Bohannon article is 
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based on an elaborate hoax concocted by the author, in which a spoof 
article was submitted and accepted to dozens of open- access journals, 
thus exposing deficient peer- review practices. The piece bashes the Global 
South in its explanation of the very making and preparatory work of 
the sting itself— for instance, an African- sounding name was deliberately 
used as pseudonym to add credibility to the fake paper.1 Bohannon’s piece 
also mocks well- established Western scientists from elite institutions who 
attempt to double- dip, that is, to gain benefits— credit, credentials, lines 
in the CV— from both the model science and the subpolity of counterfeit 
journals.
Stings like this expose an alternative ecosystem that has understood 
very well that one of the most valuable currencies here is precisely what 
is copiable, what can be slotted in and read into a CV (to be noticed but 
not necessarily read), and what makes one “make do”: the names and the 
brands of science. Recent research has demonstrated what sorts of cur-
rency fake journals produce (Xia et al., 2015). More so, it has debunked 
assumptions about which “public” or audience is addressed by the fake 
journals sounding like real journals, and to what extent they harm this 
public: Jingfeng Xia and his colleagues show that the target audience of 
these journals is not mainly comprised of readers, users, and stakeholders 
in the ordinary sense of the words— but rather decision makers within 
Global South institutions where individual counterfeiters live and hope 
to “make do,” that is, to make a living by keeping their job.
We can illustrate the point further by looking at an analogy from 
the context of state making. In her study of the make- believe state, Yael 
Navarro- Yashin (2012) notes that a “wannabe” state has to produce docu-
ments to look and act like a state, in other words to perform the state. 
The entity Navarro- Yashin refers to is not recognized as such under inter-
national law: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Yet tax 
office, electricity unit, and immigration office documents all carry its logo. 
These printed logos “do not only represent specific identities and trans-
actions, but also declare legitimacy of the TRNC. They work within the 
make- believe state, but are not considered legal (and therefore ‘real’) out-
side of this self- declared polity” (Navarro- Yashin, 2012). This last sen-
tence points to the currency and leverage of “wannabe” documentation. 
The TRNC logos echo the point about the effects of counterfeit journals 
beyond their own polity: counterfeit journals, like the “wannabe” docu-
mentation illustrated by Navarro- Yashin, have a more local and affective 
than large- scale impactful existence. Yet Western Euro- American fears 
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about these journals remain palpable, and the uncovering work helps 
satisfy the appetite for denunciation, using a form that is easily identifi-
able to scientists such as the hoax.
In addition, in order to unravel what the allegedly public and harmful 
nature of counterfeit is made of, there is urgent need for ethnographic 
engagement in trying to understand the mechanisms of this affective 
and performative documentation work that is termed as predatory, on 
their own terms. Researchers looking for inspiration for such a mode of 
engagement and response may wish to look into recent work that blends 
art history with ethnography. For instance, Winnie Wong has examined 
Chinese Dafen “copyist” painters as they navigate a world where West-
ern art is at once the gold standard and a commodity (2015). In Wong’s 
work, Chinese hand- painted art products are observed ethnographically, 
and creators taken seriously for their craft and what they say about it, 
without moral judgment and without the filters of highbrow concep-
tual artists who unwillingly end up exoticizing them. What we find out 
through this engagement is that the privileged categories of originality, 
uniqueness, and authenticity are far more contingently constructed than 
we may think. In turn, the work that we associate with “fake art,” that is, 
of manually copying, repetitively, and for pay, has in fact a lot in common 
with global contemporary art production in general. I can only surmise 
here, but given the current conditions of competitive, globalized science, 
it is not impossible that the actual activities of counterfeiters have more 
in common with those of “real scientists” that we can imagine.
Voices from the Global South also have to be included in policy 
research and policy- making debates on academic misconduct. Terms and 
themes engaging directly the Global South are almost completely absent 
from the conversation, including this book. Exceptions include Sarah de 
Rijcke and Tereza Stöckelová’s contribution to the present volume, as 
they pointedly refer to the divide between the “international” West or 
North on the one hand and a “parochial” East or South in academic 
and publishing markets (de Rijcke and Stöckelová, this volume, chapter 
7). When we think about issues such as public interest/public harm in 
research integrity, we have to reflect carefully about this divide and its 
distributive justice dimension. Science has a long history of translating 
“Third World people and their interests into research data within Western 
capitalist paradigms” (Escobar, 2011). Yet transnational and postcolonial 
critiques have not yet managed to infuse the organization, structures, and 
principles of research and publishing (Fletcher, 2015).
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The processes of standardizing and measuring the forms science can 
take, and the privilege that comes attached to these, cannot be separated 
from the issue of counterfeit of the brands in science. Recognizing this 
fact highlights connections between normative good science and an eco-
system of scholarly publications that asserts privilege and exclusion. 
These connections are spelled out in other chapters of the present book 
(see de Rijke and Stöckelová).
Returning to Bohannon’s sting, we see that the way it unfolded shows 
that within the scientific milieu, there seems to be a division between 
proper work of deception and improper work of deception. Bohannon 
and other authors of scientific media hoaxes, like Alan Sokal or more 
recently James A. Lindsay, Peter Boghossian, and Helen Pluckrose for 
instance (see also Lippman, this volume, chapter 21),2 are perceived by 
many as being upright, brave deceivers who debunk and offer social criti-
cism of sort, whilst also protecting the public. Interestingly it is assumed 
that Bohannon himself did not act fraudulently. We can ask at what point 
does the unmasking work of the denunciators who set traps to catch the 
improper deceivers become fraud itself? To answer this, it is worth pay-
ing attention to the format of the hoax as a strategy to expose fraud, as 
opposed to being an instance of fraud in itself. Journalist Curtis MacDou-
gall’s classic work Hoaxes defines the hoax as “deliberately fabricated 
falsehood made to masquerade as the truth,”3 and philology attributes 
its origin to hocus, “to cheat.”4 The hoax can only work as a hoax if its 
author decides at the appropriate point in time to self- disclose and let 
others in. This temporality is critical, and the author of the hoax needs to 
maneuver it carefully, for the hoax would not work if it were its victims 
or a third party who would discover the plot. In cases where someone 
other than the author would reveal the hoax, its author could be consid-
ered as having committed deception, or fraud, just the same. Rhetorically 
speaking, there is no categorical demarcation between hoax and outright 
fraud, argues Lynda Walsh (2006). Whilst the hoaxer may be motivated 
by the desire to enact social criticism rather than rip people from their 
money or status, the authors of both hoax and fraud derive professional, 
reputational, or financial benefits, and inflict damage on their victims: 
wasting their time, causing reputational harm by depicting them as gull-
ible, unprofessional, or vain (Walsh, 2006). Rereading the famous Sokal 
hoax with the tale of the emperor’s new clothes, Walsh notes that the 
author of the hoax, Alan Sokal, demonstrated a desire to be seen as the 
canniest character, like the tailors. If the duped editors and peer reviewers 
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of Social Text are cast as the emperor, whose vanity prevented candid 
admission of not understanding the article Sokal submitted, in this saga, 
Sokal self- posed as the clever and brave trickster who can tell us all how 
things really stand.
Looking at the “Authentic”
My second point is very simple and takes its cue from the previous chapter 
by Finn Brunton: in addition to creating welcomed opportunities for coun-
terfeiters, the practice of counterfeiting also benefits those who are copied. 
Counterfeiting solidifies the “template” of elite science and keeps it intact; 
in other words, by reinforcing the value and prestige of the model, it often 
is “the sincerest form of flattery” (Mazzarella, 2015).5 In our context, coun-
terfeiters possibly contribute to sustain the structures of mainstream science 
by keeping them intact and off the radar whilst our scrutiny targets the 
counterfeiters. Further, through distinguishing themselves from the coun-
terfeiter, the counterfeited— the elite journal, conference, or organization— 
accumulates further symbolic capital, as Adrian Johns has pointed out in his 
study of piracy (Johns, 2010). Therefore, the big challenge for the counter-
feited is not quite identity theft as much as recuperating all that otherness, 
that externality associated with the counterfeiter, and using it tactically.
For watchdogs, including regulators and ethicists, the target remains 
the pirate, the predator, or the parasite. Whilst concerned with hunting 
misconduct, watchdogs pay less attention to the systemic features of the 
mainstream science on which the counterfeit models itself. Counterfeit-
ers (and hoaxes, for that matter) often invite sustained scrutiny into the 
details and histories of relations and of hidden maneuvers. In the art 
world as much as in the scientific world, the work of copying is almost 
always condemned because it is not creative, not transformative or inno-
vative, not critical, but a mere reiteration (Wong, 2013; Hayden, 2010). 
It is either feared as harmful or dismissed as useless. It is often mocked 
precisely because of the modesty inherent in this form of engagement. It 
is a “bad copy.”6 These get foregrounded when one examines counter-
feiting, but relations are not dissected symmetrically when it comes to 
mainstream science.7 Some of these relations are made explicit in Sergio 
Sismondo’s contribution to the present volume (chapter 9; see Aldersey- 
Williams, 2005; Sismondo, 2009).
Let me illustrate further with an example from the Committee on 
Publication Ethics (COPE) Forum where (anonymized) allegations 
of breach of publication ethics get aired and debated amongst journal 
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editors. Participants often state that they face a dilemma and thus have 
to choose between two potential goals: either solving disputes between 
authors/editors or maintaining the integrity of the “research record.” In 
the former case, questions are asked about research funding and institu-
tional arrangements. Uncovering the relations and processes that occur 
before and behind the publication of the paper in question is thought 
to be critical. “‘Publication ethics’ does not come out of nowhere,” a 
COPE governing member says, acknowledging explicitly that in order 
to “do” publication ethics by way of helping resolve a dispute between 
authors, one has to take stock of a composite of different persons and 
roles as well as institutions, some legitimated and some less. For instance, 
different forms of authors, including guest or honorary, ghost, external 
consultant, medical writer, and student, operate within structures where 
the line between pure academic work and market- driven research may 
no longer exist (Rabinow, 1996), but where hierarchical lines of author-
ity between established professors, domestic and international, English- 
speaking and non– English- speaking PhD students, and early- career and 
experienced scholars still hold sway. This unpacking takes place when 
the COPE members discuss authorship dispute. However, when discus-
sions deal with cases of alleged falsification or fabrication of data, partici-
pants tend to construct the research record as a self- contained object, and 
emphasize the need for maintaining its inherent integrity. In these cases, 
the “research record” is made into an object, detached from, but possibly 
threatened by, supposedly external personal relations or histories. If the 
research record is threatened by misconduct, it can, in turn, be restored 
as a standalone object. My research shows that this process of restoration 
reifies the research record, isolates it from human relationships (between 
authors, or between authors and editors) and, in turn, makes these rela-
tions recede in the background (Jacob, 2019).
So publication ethics watchdog organizations like COPE struggle to 
get the full picture when it comes to counterfeit and to mainstream sci-
ence, but like most other players in the milieu, they are also stuck, albeit 
unwillingly, in the loop that links together authentic and counterfeit.
Ethics Can Be Counterfeited Too
The publication ethics and research integrity movement demands authen-
ticity within a system that has conflicting demands over value. In many 
ways and as this book makes explicit, the ecology of science, by demand-
ing both quality and high quantity from players (academic authors), 
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drives the demand for fake. So watchdogs are extremely busy. Reflecting 
upon the tension between fake and authentic, and the regulatory activities 
this tension entails, leads me to another analogy from outside of scientific 
publishing: the consumer movement’s response to the market in faked 
goods in China.
Anthropologist Susanne Brandtstädter has researched a citizen- led 
movement that acts as a sort of watchdog against counterfeit products in 
China. Brandtstädter’s intriguing work shows that “value” as quality and 
authenticity is itself also a currency that can be accumulated, invested, 
and distributed (2009). The contradiction of demands— demands for 
fake and demands for true value by the consumers in China— means that 
local stall owners now aim to cater to both by producing a fake Gucci bag 
that looks real, but importantly, that also comes with a fake certificate of 
authenticity (2009). Similarly, certifications and signatures are a big part 
of the added value of Dafen hand- painted art products (Wong, 2013). 
But why is this observation interesting for our thinking about publica-
tion ethics watchdogs? It means watchdogs’ brands are also at the risk of 
being counterfeited. Certifications of “ethics,” “authenticity,” and “integ-
rity” have become templates that can become vulnerable as such. This is 
not unique to publishing since “ethic” is a fruitful template to replicate, 
in many areas (ethical certification is used for organic food and fair trade, 
for example).
COPE, for instance, aims to provide an example of good practice and 
professionalism within publishing. The example it provides is activated 
through material objects like its flowcharts, newsletters, and, of course, 
its logo. Its logo is a mark, a kind of certification with its own aura, which 
itself can be counterfeited. To preserve the authentic nature of its name 
and logo, COPE recently transformed its logo into multiple personalized 
logos that each contains a unique number, now available for download 
by their genuine, fee- paying registered members— out of painstaking con-
cern for preserving a brand of “authenticity” that is vulnerable.
Brand names allegedly “concern the need to provide information to 
consumers/readers/citizens efficiently about the unobservable qualities of 
the product that is being sold” in order to assist decision making (Cope-
man and Das, 2015). But of course they do more than that: brand names 
try to create markets for products (Mazzarella, 2015). Any product. With 
this unavoidably comes the mimetic ability to copy the name and use 
it for an inferior product, or to take a similar- sounding name and thus 
to steal a part of the name and the market share (Copeman and Das, 
2015). What is most crucial to recognize here is the inevitability rather 
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than exceptionality of the eruption of counterfeit scientific journals. It is 
unhelpful to see the “make believe” as anomalous.
Notes
Acknowledgments: I wish to thank the editors Mario Biagioli and Alexandra 
Lippman for inviting me to contribute and for their helpful feedback.
1. John Bohannon explains: “My hope was that using developing world authors 
and institutions would arouse less suspicion if a curious editor were to find 
nothing about them on the internet.”
2. The Sokal affair refers to a scientific publishing hoax perpetrated in 1996 
by professor of mathematics Alan Sokal. Sokal submitted a nonsensical article 
entitle “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards an Hermeneutics of Quantum 
Gravity” to the academic journal of cultural studies Social Text. With this sub-
mission, he wanted to conduct an experiment to test the journal editors’ rigor 
and to see whether the article could get published. The article did not undergo 
peer review but was accepted by the editors and published in Social Text’s 
special issue on the science wars. On the day of publication, Sokal wrote a piece 
in Linga Franca disclosing the hoax. The hoax triggered many debates within 
and beyond academia on publishing ethics, postmodernism, and rigor in the 
humanities. In 2018 Lindsay, Boghossian and Pluckrose conducted a hoax on 
what they call grievance studies scholarship and peer- review process. The hoax 
has been called Sokal Squared in reference to Sokal’s hoax.
3. Curtis MacDougall, Hoaxes, Dover, 1958.
4. Robert Nares, 1822, “A Glossary; or, Collection of Words Which Have Been 
Thought to Require Illustration in the Works of English Authors,” London: 
Robert Triphook.
5. The proliferation of counterfeits may divert some customers away from the 
authorized product while at the same time heightening the prestige of “the real 
thing” (Mazzarella, 2015).
6. Cori Hayden, 2010, “The Proper Copy,” Journal of Cultural Economy 
3(1):85– 102.
7. See Bruno Latour, 1991, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, Paris: La 
Découverte.
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Doppelgängers exist in science too. While counterfeit or reappropriated 
brands have long been regular features of the commercial world, schol-
arship is increasingly dealing with a similar phenomenon. Appropriat-
ing a successful brand is indeed a way to tap into the value the original 
brand creates and the communities it fosters. This does not need to be 
illegal or deceptive though. viXra . org is a preprint repository that mimics 
the design, logo, structure, and functioning of arXiv . org, the open- access 
website that collects articles from physics, mathematics, and other quan-
titative sciences before or regardless of their submission and publication 
in a peer- reviewed journal. Launched in 2009 as an answer to the role of 
arXiv as the dominant platform for scholarly publishing in some areas, 
viXra is an ironic copycat version of the “official” website, of which it 
spells the name backwards (Brumfiel, 2009). At the same time though, one 
cannot help but notice that viXra contains thousands of articles. It has in 
fact grown to become an alternative platform for scholarly communica-
tion. While it would be easy to discard it as a container for “crackpot” 
and irrelevant science such as cold fusion or unorthodox astrophysical 
theories, it hardly represents a form of misconduct. Sure, viXra engages 
in spam- like practices (Brunton, this volume, chapter 18). For example, 
users who misspell arxiv . org’s URL and type “rxiv . org” instead will land 
on a website that mirrors viXra’s and presents its content.1 But what is 
more important is that viXra could help shed light on how current forms 
of digital scholarly publishing run counter to rhetorics of openness, and 
how practices of brand appropriation and mimicry can allow criticism to 
be embodied by concrete, if ironic, alternatives.
Like the made- up scientist Ike Antkare (this volume, chapter 14), 
viXra seems indeed to aim at highlighting some of the critical issues at 
stake in a media ecology in which digital platforms for publishing and 
valorizing scholarly content are assuming an increasingly central role. 
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These platforms may be open for any reader to access their content free 
of charge, but can also entrench other forms of power. Indeed, viXra’s 
website bears the motto “open e- print archive” as a remembrance of 
its critique of the “official” repository’s publication standards. In many 
cases, when we think about ways of gaming metrics of scholarly output 
we refer to peer- reviewed journal articles and citations, which tend to 
be seen as the main factor underpinning academic rankings and evalu-
ations. Yet there are other forms of publishing that have come to repre-
sent crucial places through which academic credit is built. Among these, 
online repositories and social media such as Academia . edu or Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN) are emerging as key spaces of both 
knowledge circulation and credit allocation. These platforms come with 
two relevant characteristics. First, they tend to become inter- or intra-
disciplinary powerhouses and thus obstruct the emergence of competing 
actors such as new platforms but also, for example, predatory or irrel-
evant journals. Second, they come with their own sets of detailed metrics, 
such as download counts, internal citations, popularity, and other rating 
systems, allowing for individual forms of metrics microcontrol. This has 
been dubbed “gamification of research” (Wagman, 2016).
In physics and mathematics, arXiv . org presents both characteristics 
and thus represents a unique bottleneck. Founded by particle physicists 
in 1991 and now run by Cornell University, arXiv is the hegemonic space 
of circulation for scholarly articles in a number of scientific disciplines. 
After its launch in particle physics in 1991, arXiv has quickly expanded 
to cover a number of subfields. In particle physics, for example, it quickly 
plateaued to include more than ninety percent of all articles published 
in the field (Gunnarsdottir, 2005). In 2014, it passed the mark of one 
million deposited papers across the disciplines it serves. This reposi-
tory grew out of traditional epistolary exchange practices that predate 
digital communication technologies and have been institutionalized in 
a “preprint culture” since the end of World War II, especially in phys-
ics. In some of the disciplines covered by arXiv, such as particle physics, 
publications in peer- reviewed journals are recognized for prestige and 
recognition outside the community, but arXiv provides quick and broad 
recognition within it. One could say that in the eyes of the community, 
a physicist does not exist if their work does not appear on arXiv. Physi-
cists and mathematicians simply refer to it as “the archive.” The website 
publishes preprint versions of scholarly articles and at the same time pro-
vides metadata for platforms that provide metrics of impact: for example, 
Google Scholar or inSPIRE, a particle physics service that uses arXiv data 
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to provide author pages and metrics such as citation counts. Citations 
allow inSPIRE to rank articles on a ladder that starts with “renowned,” 
moving to categories such as “famous” or “well known,” and ending with 
“unknown” papers.
Scholarly Brands
The backward- spelled viXra is the evil twin that appropriates arXiv’s 
name and image. Theories about brands have been developed for market-
able products that are constructed, approached, accessed, and used very 
differently from a scholarly journal or publishing platform. Yet focusing 
on viXra as a copycat version of the brand arXiv might help understand 
their relationship. Brands are incredibly powerful. They make up a rel-
evant chunk of many companies’ value. Also, far from being mere pieces 
of design, brands are underpinned by socially meaningful activities such 
as customer activity on social media or informal product re- elaboration, 
just to mention a couple of examples. Since their value is at the very least 
partially the product of customer activities, brands need to be flexible 
enough to modulate, incorporate, and valorize such activities (Arvids-
son, 2006). Thus brands are able to incorporate innovation while at the 
same time being subject to hijacking. Brands are thus at the same time 
extremely powerful and extremely weak.
For example, brands can be re- elaborated and thus made more authen-
tic by customers— think of the sticker that makes the illuminated apple 
on a Mac laptop look like as if it is being held by Snow White’s witch. 
These activities have a direct effect on a brand’s value. In other cases, this 
very flexibility can expose brands to appropriation by actors the com-
pany cannot control. Counterfeit brands can come to existence when an 
original product with a remarkable brand value worth copying already 
exists on the market. Its characteristics are copied into another product, 
which is at least partially indistinguishable from the original, and is sold 
at a lower price. Oftentimes consumers are well aware of the difference 
between the two products. Counterfeit products would be a clear exam-
ple of partial appropriation of a brand’s value by external actors. You 
can buy copycat Nike shoes carrying a perfect “swoosh” logo and none 
of that money will go to Nike. Counterfeit journal websites routinely 
collect author fees from scholars deceived by doppelgänger versions of 
recognized journals. In many cases, these hijacked journals use slightly 
different names and graphics than the originals, masquerading as “legiti-
mate” journals such as Archives des Sciences or Wulfenia (Butler, 2013).2 
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Scholarly journals continuously engage in battles over the identification 
and denunciation of these copycat scam operations. But this is not the 
main aspect of brand repurposing in viXra’s case.
A different case of brand appropriation is represented by brands that 
purposely tweak, or subvert, the original brand. Through practices of 
subvertising (a portmanteau of subvert and advertising), political activists 
transform a logo and use it against the original, for political purposes. 
Oftentimes this means exposing issues of concern such as labor conditions 
or environmental problems caused by the company (Klein, 1999). Think 
of the golden arches of McDonald’s logo reading “McDiabetes.” Subverted 
brands are not only tools to be used in the public sphere to criticize some-
thing, they can also be used to organize new publics and thus create alter-
native spaces or entities that are based upon arrangements that contradict 
a brand’s logics. This kind of reappropriation functions according to a sort 
of “the medium is the message” logic, whereas the very existence of the 
subverted brand may be more important than the content it carries. This 
could be the case for viXra, which is both a critique and an alternative to 
the “official” archive and is not meant to deceive its users. As stated on 
viXra . org: “The similarity of web design is a form of parody to highlight 
the endorsement and moderation policies of arXiv . org which we believe 
are a hindrance to scientific progress. We reverse the name and colours as 
a symbol of our opposing policies and to ensure that there is no confu-
sion between the sites.”3
The hindrance mentioned by viXra is created by the ways in which 
arXiv . org is made available to some scholars while fencing off others. 
What is at stake here is the meaning and role of “openness” in contempo-
rary scholarly communication.
arXiv vs. viXra
Since arXiv . org is so central to the physics community, people have 
started asking how it shapes publishing and evaluation practices within 
the field. Indeed, arXiv is the place where credit is attributed and com-
munity boundaries are continuously created (or perhaps we should say 
enforced), especially within some subfields, such as particle physics, which 
put less emphasis on journal publications (Delfanti, 2016). Its backbones 
are its technological infrastructure and its moderators, chosen within the 
disciplinary communities it serves. Moderators control the quality of the 
submitted articles and thus guarantee the scientific relevance of arXiv’s 
content. The archive is considered one of the flagship infrastructures of 
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the open- access movement. Indeed, arXiv . org is free of charge and open 
access. Anyone with a computer connected to the internet can access 
and download its content without any restrictions such as paywalls or 
registration. Nevertheless, what is not fully open is arXiv’s submission 
and publishing system. ArXiv is open for readers, but not for authors. 
Unlike repositories such as Academia . edu or SSRN, which allow scholars 
to publish preprints or peer- reviewed articles and do not filter content, 
arXiv is not a self- publishing platform. It checks submissions for quality, 
enforcing rules that would be deemed inadequate for scholarly journals.
There are indeed three filters, all geared toward making sure that the 
content amounts to “physics” or “mathematics” and is original. First, in 
order to publish on arXiv, one needs to set up an account, which can 
only be done through a recognized institutional email account, such as 
utoronto . ca, or by receiving an endorsement from an active arXiv user. 
Second, a machine learning software performs automated textual analysis, 
scanning articles for plagiarism or technical issues, and sorting out papers 
that might be uninteresting. Third, articles “flagged” by this system are 
checked by human moderators. As a result of this process, articles can be 
outright rejected, although this seems to be rare; they can be redirected to 
categories such as PH- GEN (general physics), a “ghetto” subcategory that 
tends to include papers that are authored by physicists that are recognized 
as members of their disciplinary community, but do not live up to the 
standards of publication; or they can be accepted for the required spe-
cific category, such as HEP- TH (theoretical high- energy physics) (Reyes- 
Galindo, 2016). Arguably, arXiv does a great job of including recognized 
members of the specific research communities it hosts, and institutionally 
sanctioned physicists and mathematicians tend to agree that it is a fantas-
tic platform for fast, reliable, and relevant communication. At the same 
time, criticism may be rare, but it strikes to the core of arXiv’s functioning 
and role. Over time, individual members of the research community have 
criticized arXiv for its lack of transparency or for blacklisting scholars 
(a practice arXiv denies; Merali, 2016). The website arXiv Freedom lists 
cases of independent scientists who accuse arXiv of “abuse” for rejecting 
articles that are deemed uninteresting or fringe.
Out of the frustration with arXiv’s dominant role and in response to 
its perceived abuses, in 2009, physicist Philip Gibbs created viXra. This is 
a doppelgänger of the “official” archive, a clone website that is identical 
to arXiv, including many of the same categories, such as astrophysics or 
condensed matter, the same logo (spelled backwards and in a different 
color), and the same organization and presentation of published papers. 
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While stressing that viXra is a parody, the founders aimed at building 
an alternative archive that could be open to “the whole scientific com-
munity” (emphasis added). The founders of viXra believe that, in con-
temporary scholarly communication, openness should not stop short of 
allowing all researchers to place their ideas in public view for scrutiny. 
Indeed, descriptions on the viXra . org website state it is “an experiment to 
see what kind of scientific work is being excluded by the arXiv. But most 
of all it is a serious and permanent e- print archive for scientific work. 
Unlike arXiv . org it is truly open to scientists from all walks of life.”4
While viXra’s success is based on its explicit mimicry of arXiv, its 
ability to create a community should not be overlooked. We know from 
marketing studies that preference for a counterfeit brand is greater when 
the brand attitude serves a social function. This means that alternative 
brands are accepted and embraced when they help people construct 
and maintain social bonds, and thus create new collectives. Counterfeit 
brands help people maintain relationships. For example, consumers are 
motivated to consume a copycat product to gain approval in social situa-
tions rather than communicate their central beliefs, attitudes, and values 
to others (Wilcox, 2009). The collective organized around viXra may 
indeed sound like a strange one. But while viXra’s main feature may be 
the way it uses parody to strike a critique at the core of the function-
ing of digital preprint archives, the fact that it is not just a boutade or 
media performance is crucial. As of June 2017, viXra had gathered more 
than eighteen thousand articles, the content of which is composed by 
lots of unorthodox or “crackpot” science. But this may be beyond the 
point: although most authors seem to be nonacademically trained, viXra 
also contains articles that have been published by institutionally recog-
nized, peer- reviewed scholarly journals, as well as articles that are cross- 
posted on arXiv (Kelk and Devine, 2012). Indeed, aiming at gathering 
science “from all walks of life” leads viXra to attract a very diverse mix 
of content, arguably with a majority of ideas that would not be consid-
ered appropriate within institutionally sanctioned physics. In a sense, the 
repository recognizes that this is not what makes viXra relevant. Indeed, 
it explicitly states it is not interested in competing with scholarly jour-
nals or becoming a space for credit attribution and reputation building: 
“Acceptance into viXra does not constitute a publication of research in 
the academic sense since no quality review takes place. … ViXra does not 
aim to improve its reputation by filtering by quality. Our aim is to cul-
tivate a reputation for openness by supporting free speech principles in 
science.”5
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But does viXra not constitute a publication? Arguably that is exactly 
what the “official” archive does: while it can not claim to produce insti-
tutionally recognized publications, it uses community- based forms of 
recognition to attribute credit, at least within a specific community, to 
scholarly objects that have not been subject to formal expert peer review. 
Openness is a concern because the lack thereof in arXiv’s screening process 
is meant exactly to protect this system of community- based recognition. 
On the flip side of the coin, scholars working in institutional settings seem 
to be discouraged from publishing on viXra. This could indeed affect their 
credibility. But why? After all, it has become increasingly normal for schol-
ars to publish their work on institutional repositories or academic social 
media such as ResearchGate or Academia . edu . Credibility issues are still 
present within some disciplines, but publication on other platforms does 
not seem to be as heavily moralized as it is with viXra. This may be because 
publishing on viXra is not a matter of irony but rather a way of joining 
another community that does recognize those papers as  publications. Also, 
viXra struggles with making its content accepted by services that could 
use its metadata to provide metrics of impact. Neither Google Scholar nor 
inSPIRE provide information on viXra papers. Instead, viXra provides 
download statistics for individual articles, thus forging its own metrics 
system, albeit arguably an outcast one.
Conclusions
If the “official” arXiv is a central space for the attribution of individual 
credit and the emergence of metrics of impact such as citation counts, the 
alternative repository viXra tries to criticize and at the same time emulate 
this role. Poking fun at arXiv is common in physics. The snarXiv is a 
“random high- energy theory paper generator” that mimics arXiv while 
producing articles generated by randomly aggregating particle physics 
lingo. Its arXiv vs. snarXiv page is a web- based test that asks you to 
pick the “real” article when confronted with a title from arXiv and one 
randomly generated, for example, “An Entropic Resolution of the Con-
finement Problem Magnetic” vs. “Monopole Is Photon.”6 Yet while these 
forms of brand appropriation amount to jokes based on a shared subcul-
ture, viXra manages to highlight how the use of preprint archives should 
be analyzed in the light of their role as dominant keepers of the bound-
aries of a scholarly field. ArXiv’s systematic exclusion of nonrecognized 
scholarship is based on principled decisions that have to do with system 
efficiency and noise reduction, as well as with the maintaining of closed 
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community boundaries. Also, it has created its own measurements of 
impact, thus shaping publishing and evaluation practices.
Obviously, the history of digital cultures has shown us that projects 
that seemed weird and marginal at their birth, like Linux or Wikipedia, 
ended up reshaping their fields. They did so precisely by opening up to 
broad constituencies that were not part of incumbent institutions— think 
IBM or Encyclopedia Britannica. This analogy would be amiss though. 
Sure enough, the alternative repository viXra shows that the rhetoric that 
portrays digitally enabled communication as providing universal open 
access to the scholarly communication system may be misplaced. It also 
provides an alternative for noninstitutionally sanctioned scholars who 
need a preprint publishing system in order to become visible and gain 
access to a community. So on the one hand, viXra could be seen as an 
attempt— funny and goofy perhaps— at using a copycat platform to con-
tribute to shaping the evolution of the original one (Jacob, this volume, 
chapter 19) or of scholarly publishing more in general. One could argue 
instead that viXra is just a weird space where bogus and crackpot physics 
and mathematics find their way through a fake system of publication that 
could not even aspire to misconduct. Yet its most important (or sole?) 
accomplishment may be the critique it embodies by parodying arXiv. As 
a subverted brand, viXra highlights the increasingly crucial role played 
by non– peer- reviewed, preprint- based spaces, with their own gatekeeping 
rules and metrics of impact. As these platforms are quickly establish-
ing themselves as dominant actors within some disciplines (for example, 
SSRN for law, Academia . edu for many areas of the social sciences), criti-
cal practices such as brand appropriation may help expose the limits of 
these publishing venues as well as the new forms of power that they are 
entrenching. Perhaps viXra will help us imagine how to build the real 
alternatives we need so badly.
Notes
1. http:// www . rxiv . org / (last accessed June 13, 2017).
2. For an updated list of hijacked journals, see http:// beallslist . weebly . com 
/ hijacked - journals . html (last accessed June 13, 2017).
3. http:// www . vixra . org / disclaimer / (last accessed June 13, 2017).
4. http:// www . vixra . org / why (last accessed June 13, 2017).
5. http:// www . vixra . org / info (last accessed June 13, 2017).
6. http:// www . snarxiv . org (last accessed June 13, 2017).
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The Office of Research Integrity is hardly renowned for its sense of humor. 
By contrast, a new generation of independent watchdogs and bloggers 
interested in academic misconduct employ jokes, pranks, witty pseud-
onyms, and humorous hoaxes as a part of their critique and as tools of 
investigation. The new watchdogs represent a significant shift from top- 
down, bureaucratic, institutionalized detection of academic misconduct 
toward collaborative discussion, detection, and dissemination. Not only 
is this work often done for free, but it also is often done with and through 
humor.1
Until recently, hoaxes within academia targeted authorities— highly 
regarded scholars, journals, or disciplines. In 1996, New York University 
physicist Alan Sokal wrote and submitted an article to Social Text. His 
goal was to test whether a top cultural studies journal in the United States 
would publish an article rife with nonsensical claims “if (a) it sounded 
good and (b) it flattered the editors’ ideological preconceptions” (Sokal, 
1996). But unlike Sokal’s relatively straightforward hoax, which Social 
Text accepted and published, the bloggers and pranksters discussed in this 
chapter reveal shams through elaborate jokes and stings, crowd partici-
pation, and the creation of fictional personae. Furthermore, while hoaxes 
as a genre target reputable institutions and figures of authority, contem-
porary misconduct watchdogs’ hoaxes and jokes take aim at fraudsters 
with a sense of humor.2
I argue that the detection, critique, and mocking of academic gaming 
and scholarship have taken a carnivalesque turn. I will discuss changes 
within the focus of critique by comparing two software- based, scholarly 
article generators released a decade apart: the Postmodernism Generator, 
created in 1996, and SCIgen, created in 2005. While the creator of the 
Postmodernism Generator playfully mocks renowned humanities schol-
ars’ jargon through producing Dadaist computer- generated papers, the 
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creators of SCIgen aim lower and mock spammish3 conferences by cre-
ating computer- generated computer science papers. Through mimicking 
academic articles, article generators raise questions about the style and 
content of academic writing, reading, and peer review. As we argue in our 
introduction to the volume, the increasing emphasis on scholarly metrics 
has led to the rise of a new type of unambitious academic misconduct, 
which focuses on gaming metrics or publishing in spammish journals to 
meet basic requirements for academic employment, retention, and pro-
motion. Academic watchdogs and scholar- pranksters track this shift by 
humorously targeting fraudsters and so- called predatory journals instead 
of figures of authority.
Carnivalesque Watchdogs
Contemporary misconduct watchdogs— without institutional affiliation, 
unconnected to funding agencies— mark a transformation from top- 
down to bottom- up knowledge production around emerging forms of 
academic misconduct and metrics- driven gaming. I contend that their 
work tends toward the carnivalesque since it is marked by crowd partici-
pation, anonymity, and various uses of humor.4
Crowd- generated knowledge and rumors drive discussion and detec-
tion of misconduct. The website Retraction Watch asks the public for 
“any tips … about the nature of a retraction, expression of concern, or 
correction” (Oransky, this volume, chapter 10). The short- lived blog “Sci-
ence Fraud” also used crowdsourcing and knowledge sharing about mis-
conduct. Paul Brookes, a biochemist at the University of Rochester, ran 
the blog under the pseudonym “Frances de Triusce” (an anagram of “sci-
ence fraudster”) (Brookes, this volume, chapter 13). Numerous readers 
emailed him examples of suspected data irregularities and image manipu-
lation. During the six months of its existence, Science Fraud discussed 
275 articles (of which 16 were retracted and 47 issued corrections) and 
credited tipsters by their chosen pseudonym, thanking “freddy fraudster,” 
“an astute reader,” and “Blotette (again!).” In part, Science Fraud— which 
relied on anonymous discussion— was motivated by Brookes’s frustra-
tion with the ORI’s slow pace and particularly with their revelation of 
his identity to the mentor of a postdoctoral scholar, in whose work he 
had discovered image manipulation. The ORI’s unmasking of Brookes’s 
identity to the mentor of the scholar accused of fraud pushed Brookes to 
pursue a mode of critique that would preserve anonymity of participants 
(including himself).
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Watchdogs’ anonymity and pseudonimity can create a carnivalesque 
atmosphere. Anonymity creates a freer space for watchdogs’ discussion 
of and jokes about suspected misconduct. This turn toward disguise 
recalls Mikhail Bakhtin’s discussion of the symbolic meanings of masks 
used during carnival: “The mask is related to transition, metamorpho-
ses, the violation of natural boundaries, to mockery and familiar nick-
names. It contains the playful element of life; it is based on a peculiar 
interrelation of reality and image” (1984). Pseudonyms, anonymity, and 
masked IP addresses recall the masks of carnival. Disguises facilitate 
a range of humorous responses from playfulness, to critique, and to 
mockery.
Sometimes— as is characteristic of carnival— the watchdogs poke fun 
at powerful authorities. Anonymity makes it possible for junior schol-
ars to critique established academics without fear of repercussions. For 
instance, anonymous discussions on Retraction Watch and PubPeer of 
leading French plant biologist Olivier Voinnet’s work revealed his manip-
ulation of images and resulted in his being suspended for two years from 
the French National Centre for Scientific Research (Guaspare and Didier, 
this volume, chapter 12).
The online journal club PubPeer allows the public to comment on 
published papers either anonymously or with their names on their web-
site.5 Founded by Brandon Stell and brothers George and Richard Smith 
in 2012, PubPeer’s stated goal “is to foster a scientific environment where 
robust, high- quality research is valued, while providing a forum to dis-
cuss the problems of unreproducible, misleading, misconceived, or fraud-
ulent work.”6 The post- publication peer review allows for the in- depth 
discussion of articles.7 While PubPeer allows for the public to comment 
anonymously, the tone of the discussion— unlike other watchdogs I will 
discuss— remains fairly serious.
The high seriousness associated with university committees and gov-
ernmental institutions dedicated to ethics and research integrity contrasts 
with the carnivalesque attitude pervasive in crowdsourced misconduct 
detection. For instance, Science Fraud titled posts with puns of scientists’ 
names. One blog post titled “Ezzat a paper in your pocket or are you 
just pleased to see me?” highlighted oncologist Sheeran Ezzat’s “creative 
imagery.”8 Retraction Watch is equally fond of puns in the titles of their 
postings: “Warts and All: Derm Pub Retracts Plantar Paper after Author 
Cries Foul,” or “Double trouble: Psych Journal Prints PTSD Paper Twice.” 
Retraction Watch also posts a “leaderboard,” ranking authors with the 
most papers retracted— a snide inversion of the impact factor.9
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Choosing pseudonyms also offers an opportunity for humor and 
mockery. Computer scientist Cyril Labbé invented “Ike Antkare” (I Can’t 
Care) as the fictional author of multiple SCIgen papers, and successfully 
skewed Google Scholar’s ranking to make Ike Antkare rank above Albert 
Einstein (Antkare, this volume, chapter 14). Similarly, when Burkhard 
Morgenstern created fictional scholars to join spammish journals’ edito-
rial boards, he chose ridiculous photos, biographies, and names like Hoss 
Cartwright from the television series Bonanza (Morgenstern, this volume, 
chapter 15). Dr. Cartwright with his postdoctoral fellowship at “Cowboy 
University” and current position as “senior cattle manager” graced the 
editorial boards of various journals from the International Journal of 
Agriculture Innovations and Research to the Journal of Primatology.
Hailing from a variety of backgrounds and professional trajectories, 
the new generation of watchdogs democratizes participation in the detec-
tion and discussion of misconduct and blurs the line between “policemen” 
and “pranksters.” This anti- hierarchical tendency also recalls carnival, 
which, as Bakhtin asserts, “does not acknowledge any distinction between 
actors and spectators. … Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; 
they live in it, and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all 
the people” (Bakhtin, 1984). Carnivalesque critique— facilitated through 
anonymity and disguises— permits satire, pranks, and derision from the 
crowd.
Mocking Authority: The Postmodernism Generator
In 1996, a few months before Sokal’s hoax, Andrew C. Bulhak released 
the Postmodernism Generator and the underlying Dada Engine software. 
Richard Dawkins calls the generator “a literally infinite source of ran-
domly generated, syntactically correct nonsense, distinguishable from the 
real thing only in being more fun to read” (1998). Bulhak claims inspira-
tion from Douglas Hofstadter’s best- selling (and Pulitzer Prize– winning) 
Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1979), in particular the 
author’s ideas about recursion. Hofstadter demonstrates a method for 
producing grammatically correct— but nonsensical— English texts and 
illustrates it “with an example, a selection of fragments of text, ten of 
which were generated using a computer program and three which were 
taken from a journal titled Art- Language[,] and a challenge to the reader 
to identify which ones were generated artificially” (Bulhak, 1996).
The Postmodernism Generator mocks famous scholars of postmod-
ernism, cultural theory, and literary criticism. Bulhak chose these genres 
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because he thought it “easy to convincingly generate meaningless and yet 
realistic travesties of works in it” (Bulhak, 1996). Bulhak imagined that 
“automated travesties of papers in, say, mathematics or physics, would 
be less successful because of the scientific rigor of these fields” (1996). By 
contrast, he also discusses how the Dada Engine can be modified to simu-
late the “ranting of a paranoid schizophrenic street preacher, or perhaps a 
USENET ranter” or to generate “eccentric pseudoscientific/religious pam-
phlets” (1996). By titling his technical report “On the Simulation of Post-
modernism and Mental Debility using Recursive Transition Networks,” 
Bulhak draws parallels between the two. He notes that the patterns of 
“abnormal modes of human communication— such as a restricted special-
ized field of discourse …— are easier to replicate than normal communica-
tion” (1996).
The version of the generator that I accessed online has delivered 
14,440,299 essays since it went live in 2000. When I opened the website, 
Elsewhere . org / pomo, I generated an essay titled, “The Collapse of Cul-
ture: Baudrillardist simulacra and constructivism,” co- authored by two 
nonexistent professors at the University of Illinois and U Mass- Amherst. 
This essay included lines such as the following: “‘Sexual identity is part 
of the economy of truth,’ says Sontag. If predialectic textual theory holds, 
we have to choose between capitalist theory and neocultural narrative. 
Thus, Lyotard uses the term ‘Baudrillardist simulacra’ to denote a self- 
sufficient totality.”
Theorist name- dropping, scholars’ names transformed into adjectives— 
for example, Foucaultian, Debordist— citations, footnotes, sections, and 
bibliographies all simulate specialized writing, while the generation of the 
essay through a software program mocks the genres. Through its travesties 
of papers, which reference major figures of cultural studies and literary the-
ory, the Postmodernism Generator provokes laughter at authorities and 
fits traditional carnivalesque critique, which aims high rather than low.
Spamming and SCIgen
In 2005, three graduate students at MIT’s Computer Science and Artifi-
cial Intelligence Laboratory decided that they had had enough of spam-
mish calls for papers flooding their inboxes. In the tradition of many MIT 
students, they set up a clever prank. They created SCIgen, software that 
generates computer science papers, which they could then submit to spam-
mish conferences. The students, Dan Aguayo, Max Krohn, and Jeremy 
Stribling, worked on the project for a couple of weeks. The capaciously 
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named World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics, and Informat-
ics (WMSCI, 2005) accepted one of their SCIgen contributions, “Rooter: 
A Methodology for the Typical Unification of Access Points and Redun-
dancy” as a “nonreviewed” paper for their conference.
After the hoax was revealed, WMSCI withdrew their paper. Like per-
sistent spammers, however, the graduate students did not give up. They 
raised money to attend and set up a parallel session at the conference hotel 
in Orlando entitled “Methodologies, Theory, and Information” to prank 
the conference. Although WMSCI attempted to forbid them from using 
its name on their fliers and posters advertising their session, the deter-
mined grad students persisted. Sporting fake mustaches, wigs, clip- on ties, 
and white lab coats, Aguayo, Krohn, and Stribling presented from SCIgen 
slides, which they had not read beforehand.10 Trying to keep a straight 
face, they discussed slides with conclusions like:
• Scherzo will address many of the obstacles faced by software engineering
• Prevents the World Wide Web
• We verified that redundancy and e- business can interfere to achieve 
this aim
• Our application represents a profound advancement to theory
A couple bewildered people sat through some of the PowerPoint karaoke. 
By wearing costumes, using silly pseudonyms, and reading ridiculous 
SCIgen presentations, the three MIT students pranked the conference.
SCIgen’s success and popularity derives in part from its being very 
funny. Its creators wrote humor into the code. Aguayo, Krohn, and Stribling 
explicitly avoided more sophisticated, technically challenging approaches 
such as Markov chains because, although they could produce proper syn-
tax, the material could turn out to be dry and boring. In an “Ask Me Any-
thing” on Reddit, Stribling writes, “We literally sat around for two weeks 
and just brainstormed buzzwords, clauses, paragraph structures and other 
paper elements just based on what we thought would be funny. That’s the 
grammar. Then SCIgen itself just goes through the grammar and makes 
random choices to fill stuff in. That’s why you see things like ‘a testbed 
of Gameboys’ in the evaluation sections sometimes— we just thought it 
would be hilarious.”11
The creators intended for SCIgen “to maximize amusement.”12 Laugh-
ing at a SCIgen paper expresses opposition to the appropriation of open 
access ideals for profitability, the gaming of academic metrics at all levels, 
and reading’s disappearance from evaluations of scholarly merit. Despite 
an apparent lack of seriousness, humor critiques and highlights problems 
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within academia. SCIgen’s creators felt “fed up with all of the bogus 
journals and conferences that spam researchers and charge crazy fees for 
articles they don’t even read.”13
Against the original intent of its creators, SCIgen also proved popular 
amongst the journals, conferences, and scholars they intended to mock. 
Counterfeit journals populate their websites with SCIgen text and schol-
ars submit SCIgen papers to conferences and journals with the hopes of 
getting published. Labbé discovered SCIgen has been used to generate 
hundreds of published conference papers (Van Noorden, 2014; Bohan-
non, 2015) and to game Google Scholar’s rankings with self- citing SCI-
gen papers (Antkare, this volume, chapter 14). After academic publisher 
Springer’s embarrassment that their journals had accepted more than 100 
SCIgen papers, the publisher hired Labbé to create SciDetect, a computer 
program to spot SCIgen content.
The founders of SCIgen, however, thought that SciDetect facilitated the 
continuation of not reading. For Stribling, SciDetect “seems like just a way 
for them to avoid having real peer review. … There are better ways to solve 
the problems exposed by SCIgen than just having a detector.”14 Relying on 
SciDetect incorporates the technology of critique but not the point of cri-
tique: the rise of spammish scholarship and the end of reading in evaluation.
Figure 21.1
Aguayo presenting as Franz T. Shenkrishnan, PhD.
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Reading also played a role in one of the SCIgen developer’s early projects. 
As a college student at Harvard, Krohn co- created TheSpark . com, which 
became SparkNotes. With its cheat sheets summarizing books, SparkNotes 
promises, “When your books and teachers don’t make sense, we do.” In 
their Ask Me Anything session on Reddit, Krohn mentions TheSpark when 
asked about his favorite programming language: “The original version [of 
SCIgen] was programmed in … Perl! I ripped the code off from TheSpark 
. com’s high school English paper generator, which was also written in 
Perl. It’s since been modernized. All of the magic is in the grammar rules 
though.” Like TheSpark promised to eliminate the need for reading the 
original texts, SCIgen promises to eliminate the need for writing original 
texts. Both projects relish cracking and reverse engineering text.
While both the Postmodernism Generator and SCIgen generate nonsen-
sical articles as a method for critique, the Postmodernism Generator cre-
ated articles that poked fun at figures of academic authority. By contrast, 
the primary target of SCIgen’s critique is not the academic elite but rather 
fraudsters. SCIgen mocks spammish conferences and journals, shoddy 
reviews, easily manipulated rankings, and metrics- driven academic mis-
conduct. The different targets mark a shift in perceived threats to science 
from postmodern theorists in the 1990s to spammish science in the 2000s.
Conclusion
Changes in humor reflect changes in the ecology of scholarship. Some-
times these jokes embrace vulgarity. The same year that WMSCI accepted 
the SCIgen paper for their conference, David Mazières and Eddie Kohler 
wrote a paper titled “Get me off Your Fucking Mailing List,” [sic] which 
they submitted to WMSCI. The paper consists almost entirely of the 
sentence, “Get me off your fucking mailing list,” repeated many times, 
including in two illustrative figures that simply restate, “Get me off your 
fucking mailing list.” The paper was not accepted.
Nearly ten years later, “Get me off Your Fucking Mailing List” [sic] 
fared better. After receiving an email invitation to submit to the Interna-
tional Journal of Advanced Computer Technology, engineer Peter Vamplew 
sent the “article as a reply to the spam email without any other message.”15 
To his surprise, Vamplew— who was not even listed as an author on the 
paper— received notice of the paper’s acceptance for publication “with 
minor changes” along with a boilerplate reviewer report and a request for 
$150 to be paid to the account of Tej Pal Singh.
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In 2013, John Bohannon conducted what he called a “sting operation” 
by submitting a fatally flawed paper about the “anticancer” properties of 
a chemical extracted from lichen to Science. Bohannon submitted versions 
of the paper under pseudonyms such as Ocorrafoo Cobange, a biologist at 
the fictional Wassee Institute of Medicine in Asmara. Of the 304 submis-
sions, 157 of the journals accepted the article, revealing— for Bohannon— 
the “contours of an emerging Wild West in academic publishing” (2013). 
In this Wild West, journals take advantage of open- access article processing 
charges to earn money from scholars overeager, even desperate, to publish. 
While Bohannon identified “predatory” open- access journals as primarily 
a problem of the global South (India, in particular), the issue is in fact 
transnational and widespread. Even journals published by Elsevier, Wolt-
ers Kluwer, and Sage accepted the hoax article apparently without care-
fully reading it.16
In his essay “The Death of the Author,” Roland Barthes proposed a 
separation between text and writer. Unlike the author who precedes and 
nourishes his book, the modern writer or scriptor, Barthes suggested, is 
“born simultaneously with his text” (1977). The Dada Engine and SCIgen 
may appear to fit the bill as scriptors in which author and text come into 
being precisely at the same moment. Yet the paper generators’ creators, 
who wrote the code, the grammar, and chose the language— creating pos-
sibilities for “a testbed of Gameboys,” continue to precede the text. A 
native English- speaking person coming across phrases like “a testbed of 
Gameboys” in a standard academic article would laugh and realize that 
the article was a joke. Yet hundreds, if not thousands, of SCIgen articles 
have been published. Rather than the death of the author, what SCIgen 
announces and pokes fun at is, in fact, the death of the reader. These new 
players of misconduct detection then shift their critiques away from the 
authorities of the academy and target the criminal, the counterfeit, and 
the cut- and- paste scientist.
Yet, as we laugh at their jokes, at biologists with names like Ocorrafoo 
Cobange, at Tej Pal Singh requesting $150 to publish “Get me off Your 
Fucking Mailing List,” at readers who do not understand the humor of “a 
testbed of Gameboys,” do we realize why we are laughing? Are we laugh-
ing at nonnative English speakers or scholars from the global South? 
Does our laughter at spammish scholarship reaffirm the legitimacy and 
superiority of powerful publishers who can ask for a $10,000 article pro-
cessing charge? Laughter judges but offers little analysis, and so we must 
ask what judgments lie behind our laughter.
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1. It will be interesting to see what cases of misconduct this public model 
catches compared with the traditional behind- closed- doors model.
2. Hoaxes that target figures of authority continue. For instance, philosophers 
Philippe Huneman and Anouk Barberousse submitted a hoax article to Badiou 
Studies under the fictitious pseudonym Benedetta Tripodi from the Universitatea 
Alexandru Ioan Cuza. They explain, “The parody is designed to undermine the 
foundations on which the ontology of the ‘Master’ rests, its use to determine 
how social relations work, how radical politics can be based, and, apart from 
anything else, is highly amusing.” Accessed June 1, 2017. http:// retractionwatch 
. com / 2016 / 04 / 07 / philosophy - journal - spoofed - retracts - hoax - article / .
3. As in our Introduction, the term “spammish” points to the new misconduct’s 
affinities with “spam.” Labels such as “fake” and “predatory” fail to capture the 
complexity of these new forms of scholarly manipulation.
4. Gabriella Coleman has also written about how humor, jokes, and even funny 
code figure prominently in hacker discourses (2013). 
5. The founder was anonymous for the first three years. Anonymity, which 
makes some uncomfortable or dismissive, can allow for more honest discussion 
among scientists. Accessed July 5, 2016. http:// science . sciencemag . org / content 
/ 341 / 6146 / 606 . full .
6. “PubPeer FAQ.” Accessed July 2, 2016. https:// pubpeer . com / faq .
7. Watchdogs’ anonymity can anger scholars accused of misconduct, who 
sometimes sue to unmask, and then sue their critics. Unlike traditional carnival, 
in which the authorities permit mocking as a way to reestablish hierarchy and 
status quo, scholars who are mocked may fight back. This lack of permissive-
ness around mocking might result from the fact that the stakes are different. 
There can be consequences after the carnival. The status quo is not always 
reestablished. Scientists can lose their jobs. http:// retractionwatch . com / 2015 
/ 04 / 13 / lawsuit - involving - pubpeer - unmasks - commenter - as - pseudonymous 
- whistleblower - clare - francis / .
8. Science Fraud is archived on the Internet Archive’s “Way Back Machine.”
9. They note that, “all but two of the top thirty are men, which agrees with the 
general findings of a 2013 paper suggesting that men are more likely to commit 
fraud.” Accessed July 5, 2016. http:// retractionwatch . com / the - retraction - watch 
- leaderboard .
10. They documented their prank with this video. Accessed October 1, 2016. 
https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v=uT - WOSI2tXg .
11. “At MIT we created SCIgen, which generates gibberish science papers that 
continue to fool academic conferences. Ask us anything!” Accessed April 8, 
2019. https:// www . reddit . com / r / IAmA / comments / 32l0ym / at_mit_we_created 
_scigen_which_ generates/.
12. “SCIgen - An Automatic CS Paper Generator,” https:// pdos . csail . mit . edu 
/ archive / scigen / .
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13. These quotations are taken from SCIgen’s “Ask Me Anything” subreddit.  
https:// www . reddit . com / r / IAmA / comments / 32l0ym / at_mit_we_created_scigen 
_which_ generates/.
14. Ibid.
15. “Bogus Journal Accepts Profanity Laced Paper,” https:// scholarlyoa . com 
/ 2014 / 11 / 20 / bogus - journal - accepts - profanity - laced - anti - spam - paper / .
16. For a map of Bohannon’s experiment in open access, see http:// scim . ag / OA 
- Sting .
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